Al-Ghaza¯lı¯’s Philosophical


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erture through which the water fl ows out; and that is known by way of calcula-

tion.” 

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  The causes thus determine their effects. In the water clock, every effect 



“is determined when its cause is determined, without increase or decrease.” 

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The causal effects of the water clock do not end with the generation of the sound 

at a calculated and predetermined time. Because this specifi c clock is used to 

indicate the times of worship, the sound is a cause for people to perform the 

prayer. And because praying will ease people’s way to redemption in the after-

life, the sound of this clock is one of the causes for bliss in the hereafter: 

 Perhaps the falling of the ball into the metal box is a cause for an-

other movement, and this movement is a cause for a third and so on 

through many steps to the point where remarkable movements are 

generated by it ( yatawalladu minhu ), determined by some degree of 

measures. And their fi rst cause is the outfl ow of water according to a 

known measure. 

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 Here we should pause and take a closer look at al-Ghaza¯lı¯’s wording. He 

says that the effects “are generated by” ( tawallada min ) their causes. The lan-

guage of the “generation” ( tawallud ) of effects appears at least three times in 

the simile of the water clock. In his earlier works, al-Ghaza¯lı¯ criticized the 

Mu ¶tazilites for their usage of the word “generation”: those who talk about the 

“generation” of effects deny both secondary causality and God’s direct creation 



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of events, assuming that whatever “generates” an event is its absolute effi cient 

cause. These concerns no longer seem to bother al-Ghaza¯lı¯ in his  Highest 

Goal.  Here, he uses the term “generation” similar to how he used “cause” in 

the  Revival . Michael E. Marmura concluded that al-Ghaza¯lı¯ did not hesitate 

to use the causal language that is ordinarily used in Arabic, employing com-

mon Arabic terms such as “cause” and “generation” for his own meaning, 

Marmura says, yet with a metaphorical usage. 

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  It seems that al-Ghaza¯lı¯’s 



ideas about what is acceptable language shifted. Although in the  Revival,   he 

criticizes the usage of the active verb “to generate” ( wallada ) in order to refer 

to causal connections, 

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  he employs the passive “to be generated by some-



thing” ( tawallada min ) here in his  Highest Goal.  This is still the language used 

by Mu ¶tazilites to describe that humans create their own actions and these 

actions’ immediate results. 

 In his fi nal step, al-Ghaza¯lı¯ explains what the different elements in the 

simile of the water clock stand for, and he expounds on its cosmological and 

theological lessons. The water clock stands for God’s universe, which is cre-

ated in three steps. Here al-Ghaza¯lı¯ comes back to the three divine actions: 

judgment ( h.ukm ), decree ( qad.a¯ 7) , and predestination ( qadar ). The judgment is 

the arranging ( tadbı¯r ) of the water clock—we would say its design—by decid-

ing how the device must be constructed in order to achieve a certain effect, 

the generation of a sound at a certain time. The second step is the “bringing 

into existence” ( ı¯ja¯d ) of the device and its elements by forming the cylindrical 

basin containing the water, the hollow vessel on the surface of the water, the 

string tied to it, the container with the ball in it, and the metal box into which 

the ball falls. This second step, al-Ghaza¯lı¯ says, is the decree ( al-qada¯ 7) .  Third, 

the clock maker “must install a cause that necessitates a predetermined move-

ment according to a calculated measure.” This he does by making an aper-

ture with a “determined size” ( muqaddarat al-sa a ) in the bottom of the water 

basin. Only the constant fl ow of water from the basin sets the mechanism in 

motion to lower the water level, straighten the string, tilt the container, set 

the ball in motion, make it fall, and make a sound at a predetermined time. 

All these steps come as a result of the fi rst movement, “by a known amount 

and (pre-)determined measure,” which is the speed of the water’s fl ow. This 

third step, al-Ghaza¯lı¯ says implicitly, is comparable to divine predestination 

al-qadar ). 

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 Whoever understands the working of a water clock has also understood the 

workings of divine predestination. The heavens and the spheres, the stars and 

the earth, the sea and the wind are all like such a water clock. They are fuelled 

by a cause similar to the aperture in the water basin: 

 The cause that causes the movement of the spheres, the stars, the 

sun, and the moon according to a known calculation is like that 

aperture, which necessitates the fl ow of water according to a known 

measure. That the movement of the sun, the moon, and the stars 

lead to temporal results on earth is similar to the fact that the move-


 

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ment of the water leads to those movements that result in the ball’s 

falling, indicating that the hour [ for prayer] has come. 

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 The determining cause of all movements in the water clock is the size of the 



aperture in the basin, a cause likened to the determining cause of the celestial 

movements. These movements have results that are temporal ( h.awa¯dith ).  The 

effects in this world are causally connected to the cause of the celestial bodies’ 

movements just as the ball’s falling is causally connected to the fl owing of the 

water from the basin. 

 From reading this passage, it is not immediately clear why al-Ghaza¯lı¯ 

emphasizes the size of the aperture in the water basin. It seems that in this 

clock, the differing lengths of the “hours” were adjusted by varying the size of 

the aperture and not the amount of water in the tank, as one would assume. 

The size of that hole is thus the effi cient cause of the movements in the water 

clock. I will try to give a more modern paraphrase of what al-Ghaza¯lı¯ wishes to 

convey in this simile. The three steps of judgment, decree, and predestination 

qadar )—which apply both to the builder of the clock and to God as the builder 

of the universe—may be best understood in modern terms as designing, build-

ing, and supplying with a constant source of energy. The builder of a clock 

must fi rst make a plan; second, execute this plan and build the clock; and third, 

set the clock in motion by supplying it with an enduring source of energy. That 

energy needs to be carefully regulated because only the right amount of energy 

will produce the desired result. In al-Ghaza¯lı¯’s water clock, the size of the aper-

ture in the water tank regulates the supply of energy. The desired result would 

not be achieved if the hole were larger or smaller. 

 Although engineers at the time of al-Ghaza¯lı¯ did not conceptualize energy 

and its regulation the way we do today, the modern idea of energy input, defi ned 

as the requirement of a physical system to perform a certain amount of work, 

seems to be precisely what al-Ghaza¯lı¯ has in mind by the term  qadar   that  he 

uses for the third stage. When applied to God’s actions, the term  qadar   means 

predestination. The word contains a number of meanings in Arabic, among 

them, the “ability” or the “power” to perform a certain act. Morphologically, it 

is also closely connected to words such as “measure” or “quantity” ( qadr )  and 

to “power” or “capacity” ( qudra ). One may even understand that al-Ghaza¯lı¯ in-

tends to interchangeably call the third step of action either “predestination” ( al-

qadar ), “God’s decree” ( al-qadr ), or “the measure” ( al-qadr ). 

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  These three words 



cannot be distinguished in the unvocalized Arabic script usually used in manu-

scripts, and all three can fi t in the contexts in which the consonants  q-d-r   appear 

as one word in this passage. The fourth word,  qudra , which is related to  qadar,  

has a great signifi cance in al-Ghaza¯lı¯’s cosmology. In the thirty-second book 

of the  Revival , he says that  al-qudra , divine power, is used as an approximate 

expression for the divine attribute from which this world and all new creations 

originate or emanate. This divine attribute is so noble and lofty that we cannot 

refer to it with a clear expression in language (  ¶ayn wa¯d.ih al-lugha ) and must use 

a word that can only indicate the full extend of this attribute’s majesty. 

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Cosmology in  The Highest Goal in Explaining 



the Beautiful Names of God  

 With the simile of the water clock, al-Ghaza¯lı¯ portrays the idea that God designs 

the universe as an apparatus, builds it, and supplies it with what we would 

call a constant supply of energy. The amount of energy needs to be measured 

carefully for the apparatus to produce its intended results. In his later discus-

sion of the divine name  al-H



. akam,   al-Ghaza¯lı¯ writes that the religious benefi t 

h.az.z. dı¯nı¯  ) to be gained from contemplating this name “is to know that from 

God’s side the matter is settled and not to be appealed.” The pen that writes 

all existence is already dry, al-Ghaza¯lı¯ adds. Everything that exists now as well 

as all that will exist in the future is entirely necessary, being a result of God’s 

initial arrangements in creating this world. 

22

  

 The water clock primarily functions as a simile for the workings of the 



celestial spheres. Richard M. Frank has observed that in  Highest Goal,   al-

Ghaza¯lı¯ borrows signifi cantly more from philosophical teachings than in his 

earlier works. The universe to which al-Ghaza¯lı¯ compares the water clock is 

roughly al-Fa¯ra¯bı¯’s and Avicenna’s, with its numerous—in al-Fa¯ra¯bı¯ there are 

nine—celestial spheres that mediate God’s creative activity to the lowest sphere 

below the moon. In his  Revival,   al-Ghaza¯lı¯ proposes the same teachings in less 

philosophical language. In the thirty-second book on thankfulness, al-Ghaza¯lı¯ 

explains once again that human actions are truly God’s actions, created within 

humans. The actions that please God advance the objective ( gha¯ya ) that God 

pursues with His creation, while those actions that are not pleasing to God 

are obstacles to realizing that goal. 

23

  Humans are mistaken when they think 



that they control their own actions; the actions are rather “of Him who directs 

your motive ( da¯ iya ).” 

24

  Nevertheless, most people mistakenly believe that their 



actions originate in their own selves. Al-Ghaza¯lı¯ here compares these people 

to boys watching a shadow play, with marionettes made of rags and suspended 

on fi ne strings invisible to the boys. The boys do not see the marionette player, 

and only a few intelligent ones (  ¶uqala¯ 7  ) among them know that the rags are 

moved by an outside mover. With the exception of the learned ( al- ulama¯ 7  ),  all 

people are like these boys. They look at people and think they are moving by 

themselves. The learned know that humans are moved by an outside mover, 

but they do not know how. Only those who have insight among the learned 

al- a¯rifu

¯n ) and who are fi rmly rooted in knowledge ( al-ra¯sikhu¯n )  understand 

how the humans are moved. They see the fi ne strings, thinner than those made 

by spiders, which reach from the humans into the sky. 

25

   Al-Ghaza¯lı¯ continues: 



 Then they see the beginnings of those strings at the places from 

where they are suspended and with which they are connected; and 

they see that these places have handles that are in the hands of the 

angels, who are the movers of the heavens. They also see how the 

glances of the heavenly angels are turned towards those who carry 

the throne while [the angels] expect to receive from them [ scil .  those 



 

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who carry the throne] something from the command ( al-amr )  that 

is sent down to them from the Lordly Excellence; in order that [the 

angels] do not disobey God what He orders and do [precisely] what 

they are ordered. 

26

  

 The angels that move the heavens are the intellects and souls that reside in each 



of the celestial spheres. There is a twofold division between them; the lower an-

gels act upon the earth, while the higher celestial beings function as the “carri-

ers of the throne” ( h.amalat al- arsh ). 

27

  The lower angels receive their commands 



from these carriers of God’s throne. The command ( al-amr ) originates with 

God and is passed from the higher celestial intellects to the lower ones. In this 

parable, the lower angels—a group that includes the active intellect—hold the 

strings that move humans and make them perform their actions. 

 The parable of humans as marionettes with strings held by heavenly crea-

tures goes back to Plato. 

28

  In the  Revival,   al-Ghaza¯li uses this parable to express 



the same idea as the simile of the water clock: events in the sublunar world are 

the effects of secondary causes in the heavenly realm. Already in the  Touchstone 



of Reasoning   ( Mih.akk al-naz.ar ), there is a reference to the relationship between 

events in the sublunar world and their cause in the active intellect. Here, al-

Ghaza¯lı¯ considers whether astrology should be classifi ed as a science because it 

makes valid predictions of the future. Astrology falls in the same class as physi-

ognomy in that it relies on true connections but cannot identify the causes of 

the future events it predicts, since it is based on the repeated coinciding of two 

events ( tala¯zumhuma¯ ). This coinciding allows us to conclude that both events 

have the same cause (  ¶



illa ), although that cause may be unknown to us. In 

 Touchstone of Reasoning,   al-Ghaza¯lı¯ encourages his readers to pursue fi elds of 

inquiry such as physiognomy and auguring because they lead to exploring the 

amazing marvels of God’s creation. Such marvels can also be found in the con-

nection between the celestial causes and events on earth. When an augur, for 

instance, counts the red lines in a sheep’s shoulder blade and predicts much 

rain and also much bloodshed that same year, he benefi ts from the fact that all 

three events, the red lines, the rain, and the bloodshed among humans, are ef-

fects of the same cause in the celestial realm: 

 [I]t is not too farfetched that amid the wonders of God’s creation 

there is amongst the celestial causes ( al-asba¯b al-sama¯wiyya ) a single 

cause ( sabab wa¯h.id ) that happens to appear in that year. According 

to a judgment that follows the course of the habit that life has ( bi-

h.ukmi ijra¯ 7i l- a¯dati li-l-h.aya¯t ), this [celestial cause] would be a cause 

(  ¶illa ) for the limbs of the animals and their formation, for the many 

causes ( asba¯b ) of cloud-formation, and for the causes ( asba¯b ) of hearts 

becoming brutish, which are, in turn, the causes ( asba¯b ) for fi ghting, 

which is the cause for bloodshed. 

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 The heavenly cause itself is unknown to us, yet we witness its effects on many 

fronts, which allows us to predict future effects that in past occurrences have 

usually appeared in connection with those effects of this cause that we can 


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already witness. It would be foolish, al-Ghaza¯lı¯ says, to dismiss these causal 

connections as insubstantial: “Only the ignorant reject this knowledge, people 

who have no glimmer of the marvels of God’s creation and the scope of His 

power.” 

30

  Yet, as al-Ghaza¯lı¯ writes in the thirty-second book of the  Revival ,  those 



people who know God and know His actions are also aware that the sun, the 

moon, and the stars are subject to His command. 

31

  This is a reason why al-



Ghaza¯lı¯ bears no objections against astrology as long as it is conducted in this 

universal way and does not pretend to predict individual events as happening 

only to certain humans. 

32

  



 In the fi rst book of his  Revival , however, he describes astrology as a useless 

science that rarely makes correct predictions about future events. Astrologists 

have only an incomplete knowledge of the celestial causes; and if they hit it 

right, it is more due to coincidence than to their insight into the hidden causes. 

Studying astrology is thus seen as a waste of time. 

33

  Astrologers are, however, 



justifi ed in assuming that there are celestial causes for events in the sublunar 

sphere, even if they can only be incompletely predicted. In a previously quoted 

passage from the thirty-second book of the  Revival ,  al-Ghaza¯li says it would be 

unbelief to assume that the stars were by themselves the effi cient causes (  f a¯ ila ) 

of their effects. Similarly, one must not deny that God governs the stars’ move-

ments. In the same passage, al-Ghaza¯lı¯ adds a positive statement: 

 The conviction that the stars are causes that have effects that come 

about on earth, in plants, and in animals by the creation of God—

Exalted—is not damaging to religion but it is the truth. 

34

  



 In the  Revival  and in all his subsequent works, al-Ghaza¯lı¯ never doubts the con-

nection between the heavenly bodies and events on earth, describing this con-

nection as causal. 

35

  Using the fi gurative language of the  Revival,  he describes 



the celestial intellects as angels and likens their infl uence on the sublunar 

sphere to that of a marionette player on his puppets. Here, he follows his own 

directive of speaking in signs and symbols. Since the  Revival  is mostly con-

cerned with the actions of humans ( mu a¯mala¯t ),  al-Ghaza¯lı¯ says in its introduc-

tion, he will severely limit his exposition of the “knowledge of unveiling” (  ¶ilm 

al-muka¯shafa ), of which cosmology is a part. One must not unveil such myster-

ies in writing, he says, despite the fact that the most sincere people crave this 

sort of highest knowledge. The learned scholar must follow the example of the 

prophets and convey this type of knowledge only “through allegory and indica-

tion by way of symbolizing and summarizing.” 

36

  



 Although he has not completely relinquished these reservations in his com-

mentary on the ninety-nine names of God, they seem to have had less infl uence 

on how he expresses himself in that work. In his  Book of the Forty,   al-Ghaza¯lı¯ 

describes the commentary on the ninety-nine divine names as a work that is 

more explicit about theoretical knowledge than even the most explicit books 

in the  Revival.  

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   The   Highest Goal  “knocks at the door of theoretical insight 



ma rifa ).” Real insights, however, are limited to books that cannot circulate 

widely and are confi ned to readers prepared to understand these teachings. Al-

Ghaza¯lı¯ particularly recommends the  Highest Goal  to those readers attempting 


 

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to understand God’s actions. 

38

  Given that most divine names refer to some as-



pect of the relationship between the Creator and His creation, the subject mat-

ter of the  Highest Goal  often veers toward discussing cosmology. Richard M. 

Frank analyzed al-Ghaza¯lı¯’s cosmology in the  Highest Goal  in a way that allows 

us to fall back on his results. According to Frank, the cosmology of the  Highest 



Goal  is largely identical to that of the  Revival . In the  Highest Goal,   al-Ghaza¯lı¯ is 

less reluctant to replicate philosophical teachings in plain language, and some-

times he even uses philosophical terminology. In the simile of the water clock, 

for instance, he describes God as “laying down the universal causes” ( al-asba¯b 



al-kulliya ) so that they will produce certain effects. This is an unmistakable ref-

erence to the celestial intellects using standard philosophical terminology. 

39

  

God is “the being necessary by virtue of itself” ( al-mawju



¯d al-wa¯jib al-wuju¯d 

bi-dha¯tihi ), from which everything whose existence is by itself possible takes 

its being. 

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  Things come into existence by necessity ( bi-l-wuju



¯b ).  Everything 

that is created is both possible by itself and necessary by something else ( al-



munkin bi-dha¯tihi al-wa¯jib bi-ghayrihi ); everything is necessitated by the Eter-

nal Decree. 


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