Al-Ghaza¯lı¯’s Philosophical
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. ikma al- ¶arshiyya ), the Qur’anic verse that “You will not fi nd any change in God’s habit” (Q 35:43) is explained as referring “to the permanence of the command.” 98
In the standard philosophical lexicon, the “world of command” represents the Platonic concept of an intelligible world of forms beyond the material one. The intelligible world is primarily the world of the celestial intellects, including that of the active intellect that gives humans their universal categories of thought. This is also how al-Ghaza¯lı¯ uses the term in the Revival . In the thirty-seventh book of that work, he says: “Every existing thing that is bare of quantity and measure is part of the world of the command.” 99 Arent J. Wensinck remarked that “com- mand” is a synonym for the realm of sovereignty ( malaku ¯t ), which in the Revival refers to the world of the heavenly intellects, the opposite of the materially created world. 100
In al-Ghaza¯lı¯’s cosmology, the most general meaning of “command” is “the intelligibles.” The world of command is the set of universals—or for Avi- cenna, the quiddities ( ma¯hiyya¯t )—that function as the blueprint for all individual and material creation and that are accessible to the human intellect. “Command” refers to the full set of the classes of beings that make up creation. 101
In the cosmology of the fala¯sifa, God is the ultimate endpoint of all causal chains. In the Niche of Lights, al-Ghaza¯lı¯ does not counter that view, readily accepting that the obeyed one ( al-mut.a¯ ¶) is the endpoint of all causal chains. If “the command” is a term for the full set of the classes of beings that make up creation, its category also includes the laws of causality. The immaterial uni- versals determine the relationship between individual beings and thus they in- clude the laws of causal connections. These are the “laws of nature”—a phrase nowhere to be found in al-Ghaza¯lı¯ oeuvre—by whose necessity the one who is obeyed governs and creates the world. Yet in this model, the immediate con- nection between the obeyed one and God seems to be determined by God’s free choice rather than by causal necessity. God passes the command ( al-amr ) to the one who is obeyed ( al-mut.a¯ ¶) , meaning that God sets the classes of beings, the quiddities, the universals, and the laws that govern the connections between things in a deliberate act, integrating those settings into the essence of the one who is obeyed, and gives him the power to create the world from his essence. 102
by commanding the intellect of the outermost sphere. The one who is obeyed ( al-mut.a¯ ¶) , al-Ghaza¯lı¯ says, is also “the one who gives the command” ( al-a¯mir ). He commands the intellect in the outermost sphere, who in turn commands the one in the next-to-outermost sphere and so on, until the tenth intellect, the active intellect, the one who controls the sublunar sphere, is reached. This universe of the Veil Section can be understood as an apparatus simi- lar to that which al-Ghaza¯lı¯ describes with the simile of the water clock. God designs the one who is obeyed, creates him and places him in position, and continues to provide the right amount of “energy” for the apparatus to achieve its intended goals. The apparatus is the whole universe. Creating the one who is obeyed ( al-mut.a¯ ¶) , however, is a suffi cient act for God. All other creation fol- lows with necessity from that created being. Establishing the highest creation does indeed imply the creation of all other beings, since they are causal results
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¯ ’ s ph ilosoph ic a l t h e olo g y of this fi rst creation. The fi rst two steps of creation described in the simile of the water clock as judgment ( h.ukm ) and decree ( qad.a¯ 7) are in the Veil Section expressed as the command ( al-amr ) and the creation of the one who is obeyed ( al-mut.a¯ ¶) . The third step of the water clock, during which God provides the en- ergy or power for the apparatus to create the intended results, is not mentioned in this passage. It is made clear, however, that God is the source of all being and provides being for all things that exist. Infusing a carefully calculated amount of being ( wuju
apparatus. This infusion of being seems to be what al-Ghaza¯lı¯ had in mind when he stressed that God’s “predestination” ( al-qadar ) will come about “by a known amount and (pre-)determined measure.” 103
cosmology acceptable to al-Ghaza¯lı¯ must comply. 104
This list was based on al- Ghaza¯lı¯’s criticism of the fala¯sifa in his Incoherence . As we have seen, the cos- mology of Avicenna and al-Fa¯ra¯bı¯ does not fulfi ll all fi ve conditions. It fulfi lls only one of the fi ve, that is, condition number four, which requires that any ac- ceptable cosmology must account for our coherent experience of the universe and allow predictions of future events, meaning that it must account for the successful pursuit of the natural sciences. The cosmology of the fala¯sifa would fail all other four conditions: it would not be able to explain the temporal crea- tion of the world, it would not account for God’s knowing all creations individu- ally and as universals, it would be unable to explain all prophetical miracles reported in revelation, and it would not take into account that God freely deter- mines the creation of existences other than Him. The cosmology of the fourth subgroup at the end of the Veil Section, a cosmology that incorporates much of the fala¯sifa ’ s cosmology, would fulfi ll all fi ve conditions. It would do so, despite the fact that it is based, in fact, on the cosmology of the fala¯sifa . I will briefl y go to the fi ve conditions and explain how this cosmology ful- fi lls them: given that the creation of the one who is obeyed is a deliberate act of the Creator, it is a contingent event that can happen at any time He chooses. The fi rst condition—that of creation in time—is thus fulfi lled. In the Veil Sec- tion, al-Ghaza¯lı¯ says nothing about the nature and the attributes of the Creator. One may assume, however, that God has knowledge of His creation in a more immediate way than does the God of the fala¯sifa . This detailed knowledge of His creation fulfi lls the second condition in our list. However, al-Ghaza¯lı¯ nowhere elaborates on this subject, and there are indications that God Himself need not have a detailed knowledge of human actions, for instance. Because al-Ghaza¯lı¯ views salvation in the afterlife as the causal effect of actions in this world, God would only need to include these sorts of causal relations in His creation that he might justly reward or punish humans for their deeds in this world. The subject of prophetical miracles, the third condition on our list has al- ready been discussed elsewhere in this book. Al-Ghaza¯lı¯ believed that propheti- cal miracles can be explained as rare effects of causes that are unknown to us. His cosmology acknowledges the existence of all miracles reported in revela- tion even though it rejects the idea that God is breaking His habit when He cre- ates the miracle. To be sure, he nowhere denies that Moses turned a stick into c os m olo g y in wor k s w r i t t e n a f t er THE REVIVAL 2 5 9
a serpent, for instance, even if this event was the effect of causes that are as of yet unknown to us. Allowing for the pursuit of the natural sciences is the fourth condition on our list. It is fulfi lled once it is clear that all creations below the obeyed one are subject to rules—laws of nature we would say—that result from the essence of the obeyed one ( al-mut.a¯ ¶) and that will never be suspended. The fi fth and last condition on our list is the most interesting one, and it will make the full merits of the cosmology in the Veil Section evident. Al- Ghaza¯lı¯ demands that an acceptable cosmological theory must acknowledge that God freely decides about the creation of all existences other than His. In Avicenna’s and al-Fa¯ra¯bı¯’s metaphysics, God creates according to His nature, meaning that He cannot choose the classes of beings, for instance, or the number of individuals in any class that is created. The decision of which be- ings are possible and which are not is not a matter of God’s choice but a result of His nature. In one of his early works Avicenna says that whatever is possible for God to do emanates from Him in a state in which its actual existence has not been determined. That only happens in the second stage, so to speak, when God as the absolute effi cient cause becomes the preponderator between the ex- istence and nonexistence of the possibilities ( mumkina¯t ). 105 Richard M. Frank, who assumes that al-Ghaza¯lı¯ largely adopted Avicenna’s cosmology, criticizes him for not discussing the ontological origin of the quiddities and essences. Frank suspects that in al-Ghaza¯lı¯’s cosmology, the origin of what is possible (the mumkina¯t ) lies outside of God’s power. The possibilities are given to God: “It would seem that for al-Ghaza¯li, their being possible as possibles is absolute.” Either al-Ghaza¯lı¯ was unaware of this metaphysical problem, Frank concludes, “or he was unaware of the seriousness of its theological implications.” 106
Other modern interpreters raised the problem of from where the quiddi- ties come in al-Ghazali’s theological system. 107
In Western thought, this has long been seen as a problem of Avicenna’s philosophy. If Avicenna’s God gives existence to things that are possible by themselves, is He also the one who determines the distinction of what is possible by itself and what is impossible? Gerard Smith and Beatrice H. Zedler have argued that for Avicenna, the realm of the possible is a given that is not determined by any of God’s actions. What is possible by itself is just that, meaning its possibility is given by virtue of itself. 108
This prompted David B. Burrell to suggest that for Avicenna, God is a mere demiurge who turns possible beings into actual ones. 109
The cosmology of the Veil Section suggests that al-Ghaza¯lı¯ understood quite well this problem of Avicenna’s cosmology, that the possibles are given at the outset and are not under God’s control. Although al-Ghaza¯lı¯ does not discuss it explicitly, it seems clear that the quiddities and possibilities are among those things that God creates with the creation of the one who is obeyed ( al-mut.a¯ ¶) . The quiddities are part of, even identical to, “the command” ( al-amr ) that God creates when He brings His fi rst creation into being. The one who is obeyed ( al-mut.a¯ ¶) passes the quiddities along the chain of being when he gives “the command” to the lower beings. In this cosmology, God is clearly the creator of everything that exists, including all the possibilities ( mumkina¯t ). In the simile of the water clock, al-Ghaza¯lı¯ calls the act of designing the apparatus of the world 2 6 0 a l - gh a z a ¯ l 1
¯ ’ s ph ilosoph ic a l t h e olo g y “the judgment” ( al-h.ukm ). Designing the world means determining the quid- dities and the possibilities. In this system, determining the precise amount of how much “being” ( wuju ¯d ) is given to the world fi ne-tunes its effects and deter- mines such things as the number of individuals in each class of being. An Isma¯ ¶ı¯lite Infl uence on the Cosmology in the Veil Section? In a 1991 article, Hermann Landolt suggested that in the Veil Section of Niche of Lights, al-Ghaza¯lı¯ adopted Isma¯ ¶ı¯lite cosmological speculation, “to suit his own Sufi world-view.” 110 It must be stressed that Landolt’s identifi cation of the three subgroups of those veiled by pure light is different from my own. Landolt proposes that the third subgroup represents the Fa¯t.imid Isma¯ ¶ı¯lites ( al-ba¯t.iniyya ). 111
This is the subgroup I identify with the followers of Avicenna and al-Fa¯ra¯bı¯. Landolt’s suggestion, though ultimately misleading, I think, points to some interesting parallels between Isma¯ ¶ı¯lite cosmologies of the fi fth/ eleventh century and al-Ghaza¯lı¯’s own strategy of appropriating Avicenna’s cos- mology for his own purposes. God’s “command,” which is so central in al-Ghaza¯lı¯’s Veil Section, also plays an important role in Fa¯t.imid Isma¯ ¶ı¯lite accounts of cosmology, particu- larly in the cosmology of Abu ¯ Ya ¶qu¯b al-Sijista¯nı¯ (d. c. 365/975). The Isma¯ ¶ı¯lite cosmology of the fourth/tenth century was heavily infl uenced by Neoplatonism and interpreted God’s divine unity ( tawh.ı¯d ) in a radical way. For these Isma¯ ¶ı¯lite authors, tawh.ı¯d meant that God is absolutely transcendent and cannot in any way be part of this world. He is beyond being and beyond knowability. God’s absolute transcendence makes it impossible that He causes anything in His creation, since that would require some immanence on His part. His oneness also prevents God from performing more than one single action. From the early fourth/tenth century on, Isma¯ ¶ı¯lite cosmologies follow a common pattern, one in which God creates a universal intellect by means of His “command” ( amr ). This intellect is the “predecessor” ( al-sa¯biq ) from which the universal soul, which is also referred to as the “follower” ( al-ta¯lı¯ ), emanates. Matter, form, and the elementary components of the world all emanate from the universal soul. 112 Al-Sijista¯nı¯ describes creation as a single act of “origina- tion” ( ibda¯ ¶) , wherein the whole world is put into being. Everything that hap- pens in creation proceeds from this one action: nothing is left out, and nothing can be added or removed at a later time. God issues a single “command,” which manifests itself as an intellect. This “command” is the cause of creation. The created intellect exists in a timeless realm. From it emanates soul ( nafs ) and all of those things that are generated and that will eventually corrupt. Al-Sijista¯nı¯ describes the “command” as something that is uncreated. The “command” is an intermediary ( wa¯sit.a ) between God and existence. 113
follows the planetary system. In his cosmology, the “command” transmits or transforms God’s creative activity to the fi rst being, and from there, it is further mediated to all other existences. The fi rst intellect mediates creation through
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the soul to nature and to the material realm. 114
H . amı¯d al-Dı¯n al-Kirma¯nı¯ (d. c. 411/1021), who was active in the generation after al-Sijista¯nı¯ and who may have been one of his students, teaches a similar cosmology that adopts the Farabian model of intellects as secondary causes. Unlike the Aristotelians, al-Kirma¯nı¯ rejects the idea that the highest of these intellects emanates from God, since divine transcendence prevents such a continuing relationship. He also rejected al-Sijista¯nı¯’s concept of the “command” as a mediator between God and created being. 115
In a single act of origination and creation ex nihilo ( ibda¯ ¶wa-ikhtira¯ ¶) , God constituted the fi rst intellect, which from then on acted autonomously. Given that God is unknowable, this fi rst intellect is the highest being to which humans can relate, and it is the being that the Qur’an refers to as “God” ( Alla¯h ). The God of revelation is not a real deity but rather is the true God’s fi rst creation. Addition- ally, this is the being the philosophers and theologians refer to as “God.” The nine other celestial intellects of the Farabian cosmological system and the sublunar world of generation and corruption emanate from this fi rst and universal intellect. Al-Kirma¯nı¯ retains the philosophical concept that the world is the necessary product of the First Principle ( al-mabda 7 al-awwal ), which stipu- lates that the universe emanates according to its essence. However, he adds the idea that this First Principle is, in fact, the fi rst creation ( al-mubda ¶al-awwal ) of an incomprehensible God. God created this fi rst intellect “in one go” ( duf ¶at
humans.
116 For al-Kirma¯nı¯, the act of putting into being ( ibda¯ ¶) is synonymous with creating the fi rst creature ( al-mubda ¶al-awwal ). 117
The fi rst creature is also the First Principle of the universe, yet it is not God. 118 All other things follow from the creation of this fi rst being. From the moment of initial creation, the highest being assumes the position of the creator and gives existence to all other beings through the mediation of the other nine celestial intellects and through other secondary causes. The Isma¯ ¶ı¯lite cosmologies of al-Sijista¯nı¯ and al-Kirma¯nı¯ tried to respond to the implication—following from the notion that causes are necessarily re- lated to their effects—that if God were causally related to the world, the latter were a necessary result of Him. 119 Al-Kirma¯nı¯, for instance, denied that God is either the agent or the effi cient cause ( f a¯ ¶il ) of the world. He consciously disagrees with the fala¯sifa when they teach that God is the “fi rst cause” of the world. 120
Al-Kirma¯nı¯ rejects to declare a causal necessity in the relationship between God and the universe. Isma¯ ¶ı¯lite thinkers allowed causal relations to proceed only from the fi rst intellect downwards. The relationship between the highest intellect and God is not causal. Al-Sijista¯nı¯ explains it in terms of God issuing a single “command” that leads to the world’s creation. In crafting his cosmology, al-Ghaza¯lı¯ found himself in a situation quite similar to al-Sijista¯nı¯’s and al-Kirma¯nı¯’s. Avicenna’s cosmology accepted the implication that a causal relation between God and His creation precludes deliberative planning on the part of God. In his response to Avicenna, al-Ghaza¯lı¯ avoids casting the rela- tionship between the Creator and His fi rst being as one of cause and effect. Rather, he constructs a relationship that allows liberum arbitrium on the side of God. Unlike these Isma¯ ¶ı¯lite thinkers, however, al-Ghaza¯lı¯ never—as far as I 2 6 2 a l - gh a z a ¯ l 1
¯ ’ s ph ilosoph ic a l t h e olo g y can see—elaborates on the relationship between God and “the obeyed one.” In al-Ghaza¯lı¯’s thought, “the one who is obeyed”—and not God—issues the “com- mand.” This “command” is somewhat different from that of al-Sijista¯nı¯, as it is clearly a creation of this world and thus has existence. Al-Kirma¯nı¯’s strategy of positioning the God of the Qur’an and of the Aristotelian fala¯sifa as the fi rst creation of the real God may have served as a model for what al-Ghaza¯lı¯ does in the Veil Section of the Niche of Lights. When al-Ghaza¯lı¯ writes about the difference between the God of Aristotle and that of Avicenna, he says that Avicenna simply assumed Aristotle’s God, the un- moved mover of the highest sphere, to be a created intellect. Avicenna’s God transcends this particular intellect and creates it, just as al-Ghaza¯lı¯ does with Avicenna’s God. He assumes that Avicenna’s understanding of cosmology was limited and that he could only see as far as to “the obeyed one,” rather than the creator of this being. This is quite similar to what al-Kirma¯nı¯ did with the God of the Qur’an. Whether al-Ghaza¯lı¯ knew al-Kirma¯nı¯’s cosmology is an open question. In his extant refutations of Isma¯ ¶ı¯lite theology—the most important is the Scandals of the Esoterics ( Fad.a¯ 7ih. al-ba¯t.iniyya )—he does not refer to a cos- mology in which the God of the Qur ’an, the Sunni theologians, or the fala¯sifa is regarded as the fi rst creation. 121 His report of the Isma¯ ¶ı¯lı¯te cosmology is based largely on a stage of their doctrine precededing al-Kirma¯nı¯. These teachings were shaped by al-Nasaf ı¯ (d. 332/943) and al-Sijista¯nı¯, with the perfect “intel- lect” ( ¶aql ) or the “predecessor” ( al-sa¯biq ), and the imperfect “soul” ( nafs ) or the “follower” ( al-ta¯lı¯ ) standing as the key cosmological agents at a level beneath the totally transcendent God. 122
Al-Ghaza¯lı¯’s report of the Isma¯ ¶ı¯lite cosmology is somewhat confusing since it melds this earlier stage of Isma¯ ¶ı¯lite cosmol- Download 4.03 Mb. Do'stlaringiz bilan baham: 
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