Al-Ghaza¯lı¯’s Philosophical
partial knowledge of al-Kirma¯nı¯’s cosmology
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ogy with what may indeed be a partial knowledge of al-Kirma¯nı¯’s cosmology. Al-Ghaza¯lı¯ was, for instance, aware of the Isma¯ ¶ilite concept of a totally tran- scendent God who is neither existent nor nonexistent. 123
With regard to the earlier stage of Isma¯ ¶ilite cosmology, al-Ghaza¯lı¯ seems to have misunderstood that the “intellect” there refers to the totally transcend- ent deity. Al-Ghaza¯lı¯ mistakenly believed that in Isma¯ ¶ı¯lite cosmology, the “pred- ecessor” ( al-sa¯biq ) is the very fi rst cause who employs the “follower” ( al-ta¯lı¯ ) as his intermediary ( wa¯sit.a ) and that both are considered gods ( ila¯ha¯n ). In reality, Isma¯ ¶ı¯lites such as al-Sijista¯nı¯ saw both the “predecessor” and the “follower” to be intermediaries created and employed by a totally transcendent God. 124 Continuing with this misunderstanding, al-Ghaza¯lı¯ criticizes and condemns the Isma¯ ¶ı¯lites for teaching a dualism of “intellect” and “soul” similar to the light-and-darkness dualism of Zoroastrianism ( al-maju
125
In this part of his critique, he follows earlier Ash ¶arites such as ¶Abd al-Qa¯hir al-Baghda¯dı¯. 126 The confusion of the “in- tellect” with the Isma¯ ¶ı¯lite God, however, does not accord with a brief passage on how the Isma¯ ¶ı¯lite teachings are similar to those of the fala¯sifa . There, al-Ghaza¯lı¯ reports that the Isma¯ ¶ı¯lites—like the fala¯sifa —believe the “intellect” is a creation of the First Principle. A further explication links this passage to al-Kirma¯nı¯’s Fara- bian model of cosmology. In his criticism of the Isma¯ ¶ı¯lite cosmology, al-Ghaza¯lı¯ refers the reader to his Incoherence , in which he explains its doctrinal problem: in Isma¯ ¶ı¯lite cosmology, the First Being causes the intellect by necessity ( ¶ala¯ sabı¯l al-
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luzu ¯m ) and not through free choice that aims to achieve a certain purpose ( la¯ ¶ala¯ sabı¯l al-qas.d wa-l-ikhtiya¯r ). 127
In his report on the Isma¯ ¶ı¯lite cosmology, al-Ghaza¯lı¯ tries to fuse two different models, an earlier one by al-Nasafı ¯ and al-Sijista¯nı¯ and a later one by al-Kirma¯nı¯, which ultimately meddles elements of both models that do not belong together and thus creates confusion. Despite his claims to have benefi ted from insider informants, al-Ghaza¯lı¯ did not have enough reliable infor- mation on the Isma¯ ¶ı¯lite cosmology to fully penetrate and understand it. Al-Ghaza¯lı¯ was probably unaware of one of the most signifi cant elements in al-Kirma¯nı¯’s cosmology, namely, his claim that the God of the Qur’an and the philosophers is not a god at all, but just the fi rst creation of the real and much more transcendent God, who Himself is unable to be in such a close relationship with His creation. Had al-Ghaza¯lı¯ known this, he would have very likely criticized it. We have reason to assume that the higher echelons of the Isma¯ ¶ı¯lite movement tried to keep a tight lid on al-Kirma¯nı¯’s texts and success- fully prevented their dispersion among non-Isma¯ ¶ı¯lite scholars. Few texts were known by the Isma¯ ¶ı¯lites’ dogmatic enemies, and al-Ghaza¯lı¯ relied heavily on information passed down from earlier Ash ¶arite authors who may have seen some of these texts. 128
We know that al-Ghaza¯lı¯ studied the activities of the Isma¯ ¶ı¯lite missionaries closely, as his works contain reports of the strategies used by these agents. The lively and engaged character of these reports some- what suggest that these accounts rely on fi rsthand experience. 129 It is not impos- sible that al-Ghaza¯lı¯ gained some mediated knowledge either of al-Kirma¯nı¯’s cosmology or of other Isma¯ ¶ı¯lite cosmologies that applied a similar strategy and that are less well preserved in our sources. Although both al-Kirma¯nı¯ and al-Ghaza¯lı¯ describe the philosophical God as a creature of the real transcendent God, there are a number of differences between the cosmologies of these two thinkers. Al-Kirma¯nı¯ presents varying models of the number of intellects and the spheres that they move. In most places in which he explains the cosmological order, the fi rst intellect is also the unmoved mover of the most outermost sphere, the primum mobile ( falak al-
tellect is not associated with a sphere and is one step removed from the intellect that moves the primum mobile . 130
Al-Ghaza¯lı¯ distinguishes between the cosmol- ogy of Aristotle and that of Avicenna, putting the God of the latter—whom he terms “the one who is obeyed” ( al-mut.a¯ ¶) —on a level that transcends physical movement. This fi rst intellect of the Ghazalian cosmology is situated beyond the ten spheres of the Ptolemaic cosmos. In al-Ghaza¯lı¯, the second intellect is the one that moves the outermost sphere, the primum mobile .
More important, al-Kirma¯nı¯ and al-Ghaza¯lı¯ differ on the attributes of God. Al-Kirma¯nı¯ applies an almost completely negative theology to God. He is not the creator or the originator; He is not the agent or the cause of the uni- verse. 131
For al-Kirma¯nı¯, God is not even a being. Al-Ghaza¯lı¯ rejected negative theologies—even among the Sunni groups—and he vigorously opposed such extreme ones. Al-Ghaza¯lı¯ was convinced that God can be conceived and per- ceived by humans, albeit only after overcoming much diffi culty by education or preparation such as “polishing of the heart.” In a parable in the twenty-fi rst
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¯ ’ s ph ilosoph ic a l t h e olo g y book of the Revival about a competition between Chinese and Greek painters, a parable later made famous by Niz.a¯mı¯ (d. c . 604/1207) and Jala¯l al-Dı¯n Ru¯mı¯ (d. 672/1273), 132 al-Ghaza¯lı¯ expresses the opinion that falsafa and Sufi sm are equal ways to comprehend the divine. A king asks a group of Chinese and Byzantine- Greek ( ru ¯mı¯ ) artists each to paint one half of a chamber ( s.uffa ) in order for him to judge which group does it better. They work independently from one another and cannot see the other group’s efforts. When the curtain that separates the chamber is lifted, it turns out that the Greek painters had produced a vivid picture of God’s creation using brilliant and shining colors, while the Chinese painters had polished their side so thoroughly that it perfectly mirrored the painting of the Greeks. The king is highly impressed by both groups (fi gure 9.2). 133
The Greek painters represent the way of “the philosophers and the schol- ars” ( al-h.ukama¯ 7 wa-l- ¶ula¯ma¯ 7) who comprehend God by acquiring the sciences and obtaining their “picture” ( naqsh ) within their souls, while the “friends of God” ( al-awliya¯ 7) —meaning the Sufi s—perceive God through the manifesta- tion of His splendor upon their polished hearts. In the Scale of Action ( Mı¯za¯n al- ¶amal ), al-Ghaza¯lı¯ explains this parable and clarifi es that the souls of those who have cleansed it from the rusty stains of passions and vices will refl ect the true knowledge ( al- ¶ulu
( al-lawh. al-mah.fu¯z. ) and in the “souls of the angels” ( nufu¯s al-mala¯ 7ika ), meaning the active intellect and the other separate celestial intellects. 134
Al-Ghaza¯lı¯ rejected the negative theology of the Isma¯ ¶ı¯lites. In his Book of the Distinction ( Fays.al al-tafriqa ), he reports the Isma¯ ¶ı¯lite position that God is nonexistent ( la¯ mawju ¯d ) and is unable to be defi ned as a single entity ( wa¯h.id ) or as omniscient. These teachings, al-Ghaza¯lı¯ says, are “clear unbelief.” 135 For al- Kirma¯nı¯, however, God cannot conceive Himself and thus is also not conceiv- able by humans. 136 Al-Ghaza¯lı¯’s God is the source of all existence that bestows being on all other beings. He is the creator of the world, who designs all de- tails of this universe according to His free will. He can be conceived in various ways, among them (1) pondering over the sheer fact of existence, like Avicenna did, (2) understanding the marvels of His creation, like the natural scientists do, (3) studying His revelation, like the theologians do, (4) perceiving His splen- dor in the mirror image of the celestial intellects, like the Sufi s do, or, of course, (5) through a combination of all this, like al-Ghaza¯lı¯ did. Final Doubts about Cosmology: Restraining the Ordinary People (Ilja¯m al- ¶awa¯mm) Given that the Niche of Lights was probably written years after the Revival and also after the Highest Goal, one might infer that its cosmology refl ects a certain development away from al-Ghaza¯lı¯’s uncommitted position regarding the na- ture of causal connections. Maybe al-Ghaza¯lı¯ had become convinced that truth lies on the side of Avicenna and that the world is governed by secondary causal- ity? Although the subject of causal connections is not discussed in the Niche of
figure 9.2 A king adoring the two identical paintings of the Chinese and the Byzan- tine-Greek painters. Miniature illustrating Niz.a¯mı¯’s Quintet (Khamsah) by the school of Herat, dated 853/1449–50 (MS New York, The Metropolitan Museum of Art, Gift of Alexander Smith Cochran, 13.228.3, fol. 322a).
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¯ ’ s ph ilosoph ic a l t h e olo g y Avicenna, including their explanation as to how creation stems from the nature of the being above the unmoved mover of the outermost sphere. There is no clear reference to the occasionalism of the Ash ¶arites in the Veil Section. In fact, none of the groups mentioned in the Veil Section can be easily identifi ed with the Ash ¶arites. If my identifi cation is correct, all three subgroups of those who are veiled by light are philosophers. Other distinctly Muslim groups, such as the Mu ¶tazilites, rank below these groups of philosophers. This is an unusual version of a Muslim heresiography, in which Avicenna and al-Fa¯ra¯bı¯ stand only one rank below those who have achieved true insight. Richard M. Frank had already observed that there is no discernable theoreti- cal development in al-Ghaza¯lı¯’s cosmology between what Frank considers his earliest work on metaphysics and theology and his latest. 137
Although I do not completely agree with Frank what that cosmology is, I concur that there is little or next to no development on this issue between the seventeenth discussion of the Incoherence and his later works. 138 The impression given by the Niche of Lights that al-Ghaza¯lı¯ eventually accepted the cosmology of the fala¯sifa is shattered by evidence from his very last work, Restraining the Ordinary People from the Science of Kala¯m ( Ilja¯m al- ¶awa¯mm ¶an ¶ilm al-kala¯m ). Here, al-Ghaza¯lı¯ admits that there are certain things concerning God’s creation that we simply cannot know, in- cluding whether or not God created though an intermediary. 139
In this passage, al-Ghaza¯lı¯ aims to convince his readers that even the most experienced Muslim scholar should remain uncommitted on certain issues of metaphysical doctrine, such as whether God creates through the mediation of some creature(s). There is some evidence that his work Restraining the Ordinary People was com- pleted at the beginning of Juma¯da II 505 / in December 1111, only a few days before al-Ghaza¯lı¯ died. This is mentioned in a colophon at the end of a manuscript that pretends to be the oldest available manuscript of the text, copied in Sha ¶ba¯n 507 / January 1114, roughly two years after al-Ghaza¯lı¯’s death. 140
I was unable to verify the age of this manuscript through an analysis of it, and therefore, the note should be met with at least some amount of suspicion. Both the early date of the manu- script as well as the notice about the dating of the text may have been inserted later in order to increase its marked value. The text of Restraining the Ordinary People , however, did also circulate under a second title, Epistle on the Teachings of the Com- panions ( Risa¯la f ı¯ Madha¯hib ahl al-salaf ). We may assume that the two titles refl ect two different manuscript traditions. A manuscript of this second tradition copied in 836/1433 also mentions that this was al-Ghaza¯lı¯’s last text. 141
Restraining the Ordinary People is concerned with anthropomorphic de- scriptions of God that appear in certain verses of the Qur’an and in the pro- phetical h.adı¯th . The companions of the prophet appear in the alternative title of the work because al-Ghaza¯lı¯ wishes to explain how they as the fi rst genera- tion of Muslims understood the anthropomorphic passages in revelation. That does not mean, however, that al-Ghaza¯lı¯ made a turn toward traditionalism during his later life, as his biographer ¶Abd al-Gha¯fi r al-Fa¯risı¯ has suggested. 142
how the rationalism of the religious elite can be taught to the ordinary people without causing any damage either to their prospects of redemption in the af- c os m olo g y in wor k s w r i t t e n a f t er THE REVIVAL 2 6 7
terlife or to their obeying the religious law that maintains societal order. When someone among the ordinary people is confronted with one of revelation’s an- thropomorphic verses or reports, he must fulfi ll seven duties ( waz.a¯ 7if ): (1) he must declare the text holy ( taqdı¯s ), (2) he must acknowledge its truth ( tas.dı¯q ), (3) he must acknowledge his incapacity to fully understand it ( i ¶tira¯f al- ¶ajz ), (4) he must keep silent and not ask questions ( suku ¯t ), (5) he must refrain from rephrasing it in different words ( imsa¯k ), (6) he must abstain from mentioning his personal opinion about it ( al-kaff ), and (7) he must submit to the authority of the people of knowledge ( taslı¯m li-ahl al-ma ¶rifa ). 143
¯m al-khalq ) includes many Muslim scholars. He has in mind all those people who have not studied rationalist theology ( kala¯m ) and who would be unable to present arguments as to why the anthropomorphic descriptions of God in revelation cannot literally be true. 144 The commoners’ fi fth duty to refrain from rephrasing anthropomorphic passages from revelation implies that they must maintain its original wording and must not paraphrase it. Only learned schol- ars are allowed to rephrase an anthropomorphic verse or a h.adı¯th and only under certain conditions. One such condition is when a learned scholar would like to give an explanatory commentary ( tafsı¯r ) on revelation, including para- phrasing the passage into the Arabic vernacular or into Persian or Turkish. All this is forbidden to the ordinary believer. 145
Additionally, the untrained scholar and the ignorant Muslim must refrain from engaging in metaphorical inter- pretation ( ta 7wı¯l ), meaning the “explanation of the meaning of the h.adı¯th after eliminating its literal sense.” 146 These things are forbidden whether done by “ordinary people” or in a conversation between a learned scholar ( ¶ a¯lim ) and an untrained person. However, if a well-trained scholar ( ¶a¯rif ) engages in such metaphorical interpretation ( ta 7wı¯l ) “in the secret of his heart between him and between his Lord,” there is nothing objectionable. 147 This is, in fact, the only occasion when metaphorical interpretation ( ta 7wı¯l ) is allowed. Only someone with a high degree of knowledge might legitimately ponder the meaning of the anthropomorphic descriptions in the Qur 7a¯n and the sunna , and he may not convey this to any other than a member of his own class. This limited permission to interpret gives al-Ghaza¯lı¯ occasion to clarify some parameters for metaphorical or allegorical interpretation ( ta 7wı¯l ) of the revealed text. A well-trained scholar may have three different attitudes ( awjah ) toward what is meant by any given passage of the divine revelation. The fi rst at- titude is that he thinks that he has decisive knowledge about ( maqt.u¯ ¶bihi ) what the text intends to convey; the second is that he has doubts about its meaning ( mashku
that overwhelms him ( maz.nu¯n z.ann an gha¯lib an ). Here, al-Ghaza¯lı¯ distinguishes between the different levels of how strongly one might assent ( tas.dı¯q ) to a certain proposition. These three different levels of tas.dı¯q are discussed by Avicenna in his Book on Demonstration 148 and have infl uenced other parts of al-Ghaza¯lı¯’s oeu- vre, such as his Book on the Distinction between Islam and Clandestine Apostasy . 149
The depth of one’s belief in the truth of a certain proposition can lead to var- ying treatment of the revelatory passage. Again, this is a subject al-Ghaza¯lı¯ has
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¯ ’ s ph ilosoph ic a l t h e olo g y written about in chapters 5–7 of his Book on the Distinction . 150 Here in Restrain- ing the Ordinary People , he just presents a very short version of these teachings. If one has decisive knowledge about the meaning of a passage or phrase, this meaning becomes part of one’s conviction, and one adopts this as part of one’s creed ( al-i ¶tiqa¯d ). If, however, one has doubts ( shuku ¯k ) about a proposed inter- pretation, one should push aside the doubtful interpretation and not apply it: By no means should one judge about what God and His prophet intend [to convey] in their words by means of a conjecture ( ih.tima¯l ), when a similar [conjecture] opposes it and when one cannot tip the scale [between these two conjectures]. 151
The real problem, however, arises with the third attitude, namely, when a scholar is overwhelmed by an assumption ( z.ann ) about the meaning of a passage without having convincing evidence either in favor of or against this proposed allegorical interpretation. In this case, al-Ghaza¯lı¯ says, one must fi rst decide whether the meaning that one is considering is a possible explanation of revelation or whether it is impossible. If the proposed interpretation is impos- sible, it must be dismissed. The case, however, becomes complicated when its possibility can be proven by a convincing argument, but the well-trained scholar is still reluctant to decide that this is what God intends to convey in revelation. This dilemma, al-Ghaza¯lı¯ says, may well be the case regarding the Qur 7anic verses and the prophetical h.adı¯th s in which it says that God “sat Himself up- right on the throne” (Q 7.54, 10.3, etc.) as well as that God is “above” humans (Q 6.18, 16.50, etc.). 152
What al-Ghaza¯lı¯ intends is not to state that these verses may be true in their literal meaning, since valid demonstrations have excluded that from the very beginning. 153
Here, he simply assumes that their literal word- ing is impossible, and therefore God could not have intended to tell us that He sits on a material throne or that He is spatially above us. 154
The problem rests within the proposed allegorical interpretation itself. It may be unclear to the in- terpreter what is meant by these verses, particularly if two suggested allegorical interpretations mutually exclude each other. Even a well-trained scholar may hesitate ( taraddada ) to declaim what these verses actually mean. In the case of God “sitting upright on the throne,” the well-trained scholar wonders about God’s relationship with the described throne. According to the philosophical interpretation, the throne ( al- ¶arsh ) is a reference to the outermost and highest celestial sphere. 155
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