Guide to Citizens’ Rights and Responsibilities

martial law: rule by military forces in an
occupied territory or rule by military officials
declared during a national emergency
nationalism: the belief that one’s nation or
culture is superior to all others
fundamentalism: a philosophy marked by an
extreme and literal interpretation of religious
texts and an inability to compromise on doc-
trine or policy
bicameral: comprised of two chambers,
usually a legislative body
sovereignty: autonomy; or, rule over a
political entity 
■ ■ ■  

After parliament was reconvened, the number of seats in the lower cham-
ber of the Jordanian legislature was increased from 60 to 110 in 1989. There
have been several national elections since 1989—in 1993, 1997, and 2003 (after
King Abdullah II suspended the 2001 elections). Elected deputies serve for four
years. The king appoints members to the upper chamber; they also serve for
four years and may be reappointed. He uses these appointments to ensure that
the largest tribes, including the Bedouin, and the most prestigious families
(all those with high levels of loyalty to the king) are represented. Tribes play an
essential role in the political life of the kingdom. Since a sizable segment of the
Jordanian population is of Palestinian origin, the king is dependent on the tribes
to solidify his power and ability to control the country. Tribe members hold key
military positions. They, in fact, played a pivotal role in the PLO’s forced exile
to Lebanon in 1970.
The bureaucracy is mainly dominated by Transjordanians (not of Palestinian
origin); this has increased their power within the political system. Moreover,
their domination extends to the military. The bureaucracy, as is typical of most
bureaucracies in developing countries, has long been accused of inefficiency
and overly long procedures at a time when higher performance is critical to
address the nation’s many pressing problems and ensure its growth.
As for the judiciary, it is considered an independent branch of the state.
However, it does not enjoy total independence; thus, it has not played an impor-
tant role in the country. It mainly addresses issues related to the day-to-day life
of Jordan’s citizens. It was not until 1991 that King Hussein repealed martial law
and allowed the country to operate under its civil laws.
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The Jordanian constitution specifically guarantees the rights of Jordanian citi-
zens, including the freedoms of speech, association, academic pursuit, membership
in a political party, religion and the right to participate in the election of parliamen-
tary and municipal representatives. In the 2003 election 58.8 percent of the popula-
tion voted. Six seats in the lower chamber have been allocated for women deputies.
After the king legalized the formation of political parties in 1991, numerous parties
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J o r d a n
T H E   R O L E   O F   J O R D A N I A N   T R I B E S   I N   G O V E R N M E N T
The relationship between the King of Jordan and the
Jordanian Bedouin tribes is historically close, as the Hashemite
monarchy has obtained most of its political support from the
tribes. The Jordanian Bedouin tribes of the early twentieth cen-
tury were mostly nomadic, although some of these nomads
adopted a settled way of life as early as the 1920s. By the late
1970s, fewer than 3 percent of Jordanians were still nomads;
nevertheless tribal membership is an important aspect of
Jordan’s social structure even in the early 2000s.
In spite of the persistence of tribal loyalties, however,
some observers think that the ties between King Abdullah
and the tribes may be weakening. One reason is the spread
of higher education in Jordan; educated Jordanians tend to
consider their immediate families more important than
their tribe. Another reason is the growing size of the urban
Palestinian population in Jordan, which resents the way the
country’s political districting allows rural areas to be over-
represented in Parliament at the expense of the cities.
(Roughly half of Jordan’s population is of Palestinian ori-
gin.) The competition between the Bedouins and the
Palestinians has led to a split between secularists who favor
the monarchy and Muslim fundamentalists opposed to it.
In addition, King Abdullah’s moves toward reform, includ-
ing his acceptance of a larger number of Palestinians in the
government as of early 2005, may cost him the support of
tribal leaders in the future.
■ ■ ■

with wide-ranging 
ideologies
, from 
liberalism
to fundamentalism, sprang up in
Jordan: the Jordanian Ba’th Arab Socialist Party, Jordanian Communist Party, Islamic
Action Front, Jordanian People’s Democratic Party (HASHD), Al Mustaqbal (Future)
Party, Jordanian Democratic Popular Unity Party, and many others.
Despite these positive developments, evidence does suggest that Jordan
has sometimes violated the rights of its citizens. The government strictly con-
trols the press. The 1998 Press and Publications Law and 1999 revisions to it
restricted the operations of the country’s newspapers, essentially imposing
complete censorship. Accusations of police abuse and the gross mistreatment
of detainees persist, as do allegations of arbitrary arrest, secret investigative pro-
cedures, interference in the judicial process, infringements on citizens’ rights of
privacy, and the detention of members of opposition political parties. All raise
serious questions about the government’s respect of human rights.
See also: 
Palestine; West Bank.
B I B L I O G R A P H Y
The Economist. Pocket World in Figures
.
London: Profile Books, 2003.
“Jordan.” CIA World Factbook 2004. Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2004.
Ͻhttp://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ng.htmlϾ.
Karsh, Efraim, and P. R. Kumaraswamy, eds. “Israel.” In The Hashemites and the
Palestinians: The Fateful Triangle. Portand, OR: Frank Cass, 2003.
King Hussein Website. 
Ͻhttp://www.kinghussein.gov.joϾ.
Lucas, Russell E. “Deliberalization in Jordan.” Journal of Democracy 14, no. 1 ( January
2003):137–144.
Massad, Joseph A. Colonial Effects: The Making of National Identity in Jordan. New York:
Columbia University Press, 2001.
Milton-Edwards, Beverly, and Peter Hinchcliffe. Jordan: A Hashemite Legacy. New York:
Routledge, 2001.
Schenker, David Kenneth. Dancing with Saddam: The Strategic Tango of Jordanian-Iraqi
Relations. Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2003.
World Bank Website. 
Ͻhttp://www.wb.comϾ.
World Health Organization Website. 
Ͻhttp://www.who.netϾ.
Mounah Abdel Samad
Judicial Independence
Judicial independence is generally regarded as crucial to the rule of law and
to stable economic and political change. Both the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights list
judicial independence as central to safeguarding human rights. The United
Nations (UN), the Council of Europe (CoE), and organizations such as the
American Bar Association promote judicial independence.
There is wide agreement that an independent judiciary has three basic
elements, even though no consensus exists on a definition. First, the judicial
system must be publicly perceived as impartial in rendering decisions. Judges
should not have a personal interest, whether due to bribery and corruption, or
as a result of political pressures, in the outcome of disputes between private
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ideology: a system of beliefs composed of
ideas or values, from which political, social,
or economic programs are often derived
liberalism: a political philosophy advocating
individual rights, positive government action,
and social justice, or, an economic philoso-
phy advocating individual freedoms and free
markets
■ ■ ■  

parties and the government. Second, judicial decisions must be accepted and
respected by the contesting parties and the larger public. Third, judges need to
be free from undue interference from the parties in a case, other branches of
government, and higher courts within a national judiciary.
Judicial independence, according to some studies, varies depending on the
degree of party competition in a political system. Courts are often accorded little
independence in single-party-dominated political systems, because the governing
party expects to continue winning elections and to remain in power. Competitive
two- and multi-party systems tend to favor greater judicial independence in order
to preserve a party’s legislative gains when out of office. In Japan, J. Mark
Ramseyer (1994) argues, the dominance of the Liberal Democratic Party for most
of the last half-century gave it control over judicial appointments and resulted in
a deferential and dependent judiciary. But other scholars counter that the
Japanese judiciary has a high degree of institutional independence, while individ-
ual judges enjoy little independence, because its career judiciary is overseen by an
elite judicial bureaucracy. Still, in such constitutionally designated single-party
states as the Lao People’s Democratic Republic and Vietnam, courts and judges
are closely monitored by the ruling political party, which may reverse or repri-
mand judges for their decisions.
Other scholars find a strong association between 
federalism
and the
strength of 
judicial review
in countries such as Australia, Canada, India, and
the United States. These countries are among the geographically largest and
have decentralized judiciaries that share a common law heritage. By contrast,
one of the smallest and strongest federal states, Switzerland, prohibits judi-
cial review; in the United Kingdom, which has no constitution and until
recently no supreme court, individual judges are nonetheless considered
independent.
It is often assumed that constitutional provisions for judicial independ-
ence must be made, such as those in the U.S. Constitution stipulating that
federal judges’ salaries may not be diminished, and that they may not be
removed from office except through 
impeachment
by the House of
Representatives and conviction by the Senate for high crimes and misde-
meanors. Most Central and Eastern European countries, along with South
Africa, have similar constitutional provisions. According to some scholars
constitutions that provide for more than one of several guarantees—guaran-
teed terms in office, fiscal autonomy, 
enumerated
judicial qualifications, the
finality of judicial decisions, and the separation of powers—tend to strengthen
judicial independence and protection for human rights. But, other scholar
found that actual (in contrast with formal provisions for) judicial independ-
ence also increases the probability of human rights protection.
Constitutional provisions for judicial independence, however, do not nec-
essarily ensure an independent judiciary, as evident in the experiences of Third
World and a number of Central and Eastern European countries. Constitutional
provisions are no guarantee because they are subject to interpretation and
manipulation. Moreover, Israel, Sweden, and New Zealand do not have consti-
tutionally entrenched provisions for judicial independence, yet their courts
exercise considerable autonomy.
Measuring judicial independence remains difficult for a number of reasons. In
the first place, judicial independence is a relative, not an absolute, concept. It is not
an unqualified goal. Since judges and courts provide public services, their inde-
pendence always must be balanced with competing demands for accountability
and responsiveness.
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federalism: a system of political organiza-
tion, in which separate states or groups are
ruled by a dominant central authority on
some matters, but are otherwise permitted to
govern themselves independently
judicial review: the ability of the judicial
branch to review and invalidate a law that
contradicts the constitution
■ ■ ■  
impeach: to accuse of a crime or misconduct,
especially a high official; to remove from a
position, especially as a result of criminal
activity
enumerate: to expressly name, as in a list
F A S T   F A C T S
The American Bar Association (ABA) is the
largest voluntary professional association in
the world, with over four thousand members
in 2005.
■ ■ ■  

Judicial independence is, therefore, a relative (“more or less”), not a
dichotomous (“yes or no”) variable. Measuring judicial independence and
comparing judicial independence around the world would require combining
different elements into a composite index. But those elements are not easy
to classify and do not necessarily move in the same direction. Assigning rela-
tive weight to each thus remains difficult. Research has found that raising
judicial salaries for judges in South America, for instance, did not necessarily
increase judicial independence. Moreover, the degree of judicial independ-
ence in most countries varies considerably between higher- and lower-court
judges. It also may vary depending on the type of 
litigation
, from routine
traffic cases and other civil suits, to criminal cases, and to fundamental issues
of constitutional law.
In addition, measurements are difficult due to the fact that judicial inde-
pendence is multidimensional and multifaceted. There are, in turn, multiple
sources and targets for strengthening or weakening judicial independence. As a
result, no agreed upon model or precise set of institutional arrangements for
ensuring judicial independence exists. 
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I N D E P E N D E N C E A N D   S O U R C E S   O F   D E P E N D E N C Y
It is generally agreed that judicial independence has two broad dimensions.
It embraces the institutional independence of the judicial system as a whole, on
the one hand, and the independence of individual judges in their decision
making, on the other. There is no necessary correlation, though, between a high
or low degree of institutional independence and a high or low degree of indi-
vidual judicial independence. 
Judges in countries as diverse as Australia and Russia have confronted
considerable, if not almost overwhelming, political pressures on their judicial
systems, yet continued to maintain their independence. In contrast, in Japan
and some other countries, the judiciary enjoys a high degree of institutional
autonomy, but the independence of individual judges is constrained by controls
within the judiciary itself. 
In general, individual judges’ dependency appears more likely in civil law
countries with career judicial systems, as in France, where a legal bureaucracy
oversees the training, promotion, and remuneration of judges. Individual judi-
cial independence appears to be greater in common law countries, where
generalist judges are appointed from a range of legal backgrounds and a decen-
tralized judicial structure exists.
The extent of a judiciary’s institutional independence and individual judges’
independence depends on the sources of control and influence brought to bear
on each. There are both external and internal sources of control and influence
over courts and judges.
External sources of dependency are other branches of government and the
forces of non-governmental organizations (NGOs). They may exert a variety of
pressures on courts, judges, and judicial administration. Obviously, courts are
vulnerable to governmental bodies that create and may modify, even destroy,
them. Judges everywhere are subject to political forces aimed at influencing
the outcome of 
adjudication
.
However, no necessary relationship exists between judicial independence
and the external sources and mechanisms of influence and dependency.
Governmental and non-governmental forces, such as the media, interest
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litigate: to bring a disagreement or violation
of the law before a judge for a legal decision
■ ■ ■  
adjudicate: to settle a case by judicial
procedure

groups, and legal and civic organizations, may present threats to, but also
provide support structures for, judicial independence. In many countries, non-
governmental forces, especially the media, have increasingly targeted judges
and courts. Judges have resigned or been forced into early retirement due to
high-pressure media campaigns, in developing courts and even well-developed
democracies like Australia, Germany, Israel, and England. However, in Italy,
Nepal, Spain, and some other nations, courts have been strengthened by the
support of the media, bar associations, and judicial councils, which have
staunchly opposed judicial and governmental corruption.
Within a national judiciary, internal mechanisms of influence and control
may be brought to bear on individual judges. Lower-court and even high-court
judges’ promotion, salaries, and resources for caseload management may be
manipulated by the country’s highest court or judicial bureaucracy. Internal
sources of dependency are especially prominent in civil law countries with career
judiciaries, as in Japan and Western Europe, as well as in countries where the
judiciary is part of the civil service. Internal sources of judicial dependency are
generally less influential, although not always, in more decentralized, common
law judicial systems, particularly where judges are recruited from outside the
judiciary and there are relatively strong external political controls over courts.
In short, the dependency and manipulation of judges and courts may arise
either from external pressures (whether political, economic, or institutional) or
from forces operating internally within a national judiciary. Some form or combi-
nation of external and internal influence is present in all judiciaries. Furthermore,
some kinds of external control are considered unacceptable in some countries
but not in others, and likewise with internal mechanisms of influence and
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J u d i c i a l   I n d e p e n d e n c e
FLORIDA CIRCUIT JUDGE GEORGE GREER HEARS THE TERRI SCHIAVO CASE ON FEBRUARY 9,
2005.
Pinellas County Circuit Judge George Greer was one of twenty judges from state
and federal courts who withstood heavy political pressure in the right-to-die case of
Terri Schiavo, a severely brain-damaged woman. The fifteen-year struggle between
Schiavo’s husband and her parents over whether Schiavo should be kept alive or
allowed to die expanded to a struggle between executive and legislative powers
and the judiciary at both the state and federal levels. 
(SOURCE: TIM BOYLES/GETTY IMAGES)

control. Judges in common law countries, for instance, generally consider judicial
independence to be compromised by the manipulation of judicial promotions,
resources, and salaries in civil law career judiciaries. In any event, it is unrealistic
to expect courts and judges to be “totally uninfluenced.” Judicial independence
is nevertheless most at risk when either external or internal forces undermine a
judge’s or judiciary’s capacity to adjudicate as an impartial third party in a fashion
acceptable to the contesting parties and to the general public.
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Courts and judges may be targeted by external and internal sources in mul-
tiple ways. The principle targets are:
1. The structure and 
jurisdiction
of courts 
2. The selection, appointment, and promotion procedures 
3.
Tenure
and removal mechanisms 
4. Remuneration and resources for court administration.
Each of these dimensions conditions the relative independence of judges, col-
lectively and individually, from other institutions and from other judges.
The structure and jurisdiction of courts reflect each country’s unique polit-
ical and legal histories. Common law countries tend to have more decentralized
judicial structures than those in the continental civil law tradition. Many coun-
tries in Africa and Asia, due to colonization, combine elements of one or both
traditions with socialist and indigenous legal cultural traditions. Vietnam,
Cambodia, and Laos, for instance, combine elements of the French civil law
system with socialist and culturally indigenous elements, while Indonesia bears
the imprint of Dutch colonization. Indonesia, Israel, and most countries in the
Middle East also have separate religious courts, along with specialized courts for
the military and other kinds of disputes.
Judicial independence varies with the jurisdiction of courts and access to
judges, litigation rates and caseloads, the ratios of judges and lawyers to the
general population, and the transparency of a judicial system. Obviously, judicial
independence is compromised when courts are abolished, reorganized, or have
their jurisdiction altered by other political branches in retaliation for their rulings.
Recruitment and promotion procedures are important for both securing
judicial independence and balancing it with demands for judicial accountability,
as well as for promoting public confidence in the courts. Judicial independence
and accountability, however, may be secured through a variety of institutional
arrangements for recruiting judges. In general, countries with career judiciaries
tend to promote the institutional independence of courts. At the same time,
career judicial systems usually lodge a great deal of control in the chief justice,
judicial service commission, or legal bureaucracy, which in turn may constrain
and punish individual judges. 
Within unitary judicial systems, the degree of judicial independence may
also vary with the level of court and, regardless of the prescribed constitutional
or legal guidelines, the actual practice in selecting, appointing, and promoting
judges. In some constitutional monarchies, such as Nepal and Cambodia, for
instance, the king appoints judges but, in fact, only on the recommendation of
the chief justice, bar leaders, or political parties. There are also basically two dif-
ferent kinds of career judiciaries, and each affects the independence of judges
differently. On the one hand, most countries in Western Europe, along with
countries such as Japan and Thailand, have separate and independent career
judiciaries. On the other hand, in other countries, such as Bangladesh,