Handbook of psychology volume 7 educational psychology
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- PA R T T W O COGNITIVE CONTRIBUTIONS TO LEARNING, DEVELOPMENT, AND INSTRUCTION
- Contemporary Theories of Intelligence
- Implicit Theories 26 Explicit Theories 26
- WHY THEORIES OF INTELLIGENCE MATTER TO SOCIETY
- The Societal System Created by Tests
- Why Theories of Intelligence Matter to Society 25
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Hoy, A. W. (2000). Educational psychology in teacher education. Educational Psychologist, 35, 257–270. Hunt, J. M. (1961). Intelligence and experience. New York: Roland Press. Hurley, E. A. (1997, April). The interaction of communal orienta- tion in African-American children with group processes in co- operative learning: Pedagogical and theoretical implications. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Educa- tional Research Association, Chicago, IL. Inhelder, B., Sinclair, H., & Bovet, M. (1974). Learning and the development of cognition (S. Wedgwood, trans.). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Jaeger, R. M., & Bond, L. (1996). Quantitative research methods and design. In D. C. Berliner & R. Calfee (Eds.), Handbook of educa- tional psychology (pp. 877–898). New York: Macmillan. Kaiser, H. F. (1958). The varimax criterion for analytic rotation in factor analysis. Psychometrika, 23, 187–200. Kintsch, W. (1989). Learning from text. In L. B. Resnick (Ed.), Knowing, learning, and instruction: Essays in honor of Robert Glaser (pp. 25–46). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Lambert, N., McCombs, B. L. (1998). How students learn: Reform- ing schools through learner-centered education. Washington, DC: APA Books Lerner, R. M. (1998). Theories of human development: Contempo- rary perspectives. In W. Damon & R. M. Lerner (Eds.), Hand- book of child psychology: Theoretical models of human development (5th ed., pp. 1–24). New York: Wiley. Levin, J. R. (1973). Inducing comprehension in poor readers: A test of a recent model. Journal of Educational Psychology, 65, 19–24. Levin, J. R. (1994). Crafting educational intervention research that’s both credible and creditable. Educational Psychology Review, 6, 231–243.
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McCombs, B. L., & Whisler, J. S. (1997). The learner-centered classroom and school: Strategies for increasing student motiva- tion and achievement. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. Meichenbaum, D. (1977). Cognitive behavior modification: An integrative approach. New York: Plenum. Miller, G. A., Galanter, G. A., & Pribram, K. H. (1960). Plans and the structure of behavior. New York: Adams Bannister Cox. Morelock, M. J., & Feldman, D. H. (1993). Prodigies and savants: What they have to tell us about giftedness and human cognition. In K. A. Heller, F. J. Monks, & A. H. Passow (Eds.), Interna- tional handbook of research and development of giftedness and talent (pp. 161–181). Elmsford, NY: Pergamon. National Commission on Teaching and America’s Future. (1996). What matters most: Teaching for America’s future. New York: Author.
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20 Current Perspectives in Educational Psychology Rosenthal, T. L., & Zimmerman, B. J. (1978). Social learning and cognition. New York: Academic Press. Rutter, M. (1987). Psychosocial resilience and protective mecha- nisms. American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, 57, 316–331. Schank, R. C., & Abelson, R. P. (1977). Scripts, plans, goals and understanding: An inquiry into human knowledge structures. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Schoenfeld, A. H. (1985). Making sense of “out loud” problem- solving protocols. Journal of Mathematical Behavior, 4, 171– 191. Scribner, S., & Cole, M. (1981). The psychology of literacy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Slavin, R. E. (1995). Cooperative learning: Theory, research, and practice (2nd ed.). Boston: Allyn and Bacon. Terman, L. M., & Childs, H. G. (1912). Tentative revision and extension of the Binet-Simon measuring scale of intelligence.
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PA R T T W O COGNITIVE CONTRIBUTIONS TO LEARNING, DEVELOPMENT, AND INSTRUCTION CHAPTER 2 Contemporary Theories of Intelligence ROBERT J. STERNBERG 23 WHY THEORIES OF INTELLIGENCE MATTER TO SOCIETY 23
Intelligence-Related Measurements 24 The Societal System Created by Tests 24 CLASSICAL THEORIES OF INTELLIGENCE AND THEIR CONTEMPORARY COUNTERPARTS 26
26 Explicit Theories 26 CONTEMPORARY THEORIES OF INTELLIGENCE 28
CONCLUSIONS 38
REFERENCES 40 Hundreds of tests of intelligence are currently available to those who wish to test intelligence. Some are household names; others are known only to small groups of aficionados. Can such tests be justified in terms of psychological theory? If so, what are the theories, and what is the evidence in favor of them? Do all the theories lead to the same kinds of tests, or might alternative theories lead to different kinds of tests? And if alternative theories lead to different kinds of tests, might people’s fates be changed if other types of tests are used? These are the kinds of questions that are addressed in this chapter.
The chapter is divided into four parts following this intro- duction. First, I argue that theories of intelligence matter not only in theory, but also in practical everyday life. The ways in which these theories matter has a profound effect on soci- eties, including that of the United States. Second, classical theories of intelligence are presented and critically evaluated. They are presented not only for historical purposes. Rather, they are presented because these theories continue to be highly influential in the contemporary world, much more so than many contemporary theories. Their influence is contem- porary, even though their origins are in the past. Third, con- temporary theories of intelligence are presented and critically evaluated. There are many such theories, but consistent with the topic of the volume in which this chapter is embedded, the emphasis is on those theories that have some kind of edu- cational impact. Fourth and finally, the chapter presents some challenges to all current conceptions of intelligence and draws some conclusions. The second and third parts of the chapter are each divided into two sections. One section considers implicit theories of intelligence, or people’s informal conceptions of what intelli- gence is. A second section considers explicit theories of intel- ligence, or experts’ formal conceptions of what intelligence is. Each part considers the extent to which implicit and ex- plicit theories correspond, and why the correspondence is, at best, partial. WHY THEORIES OF INTELLIGENCE MATTER TO SOCIETY Underlying every measurement of intelligence is a theory. The theory may be transparently obvious, or it may be hid- den. It may be a formal explicit theory or an informal implicit one. But there is always a theory of some kind lurking Preparation of this article was supported by Grant REC-9979843 from the National Science Foundation and by a grant under the Javits Act Program (Grant No. R206R950001) as administered by the Office of Educational Research and Improvement, U.S. Depart- ment of Education. Grantees undertaking such projects are encour- aged to express freely their professional judgment. This article, therefore, does not necessarily represent the position or policies of the National Science Foundation, the Office of Educational Re- search and Improvement, or the U.S. Department of Education, and no official endorsement should be inferred.
24 Contemporary Theories of Intelligence beneath the test. And in the United States and some other countries, tests seem to be everywhere.
Students who apply to competitive independent schools in many locations and notably in New York City must present an impressive array of credentials. Among these credentials, for many of these schools, is a set of scores on either the Wechsler Preschool and Primary Scale of Intelligence–Revised (WPPSI-R; Wechsler, 1980) or the Stanford-Binet Intelli- gence Scale–Fourth Edition (Thorndike, Hagen, & Sattler, 1985). If the children are a bit older, they may take instead the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children–Third Edition (WISC-3; Wechsler, 1991). The lower level version of the Wechsler test is used only for children ages 3 to 7 1/2 years. The higher level version of the Wechsler test is used for some- what older children ages 6 to 16 years, 11 months of age. The Stanford-Binet test is used across a wider range of ages, from 2 years through adult. Children applying to independent schools in other loca- tions are likely to take either these or similar tests. The names may be different, and the construct they are identified as measuring may differ as well: intelligence, intellectual abilities, mental abilities, scholastic aptitude, and so forth. But the tests will be highly correlated with each other, and ul- timately, one will serve the schools’ purposes about as well as another. These tests will henceforth be referred to as mea- suring intelligence-related abilities in order to group them together but to distinguish them from tests explicitly pur- ported to measure intelligence. The need to take tests such as these will not end with pri- mary school. For admission to independent schools, in gen- eral, regardless of level, the children may take one of the Wechsler tests, the Stanford-Binet test, or some other intelli- gence test. More likely, they will take either the Educational Records Bureau (ERB) or the Secondary School Admissions Test (SSAT). Of course, independent schools are supported by fees, not tax dollars. But children attending public schools will be ex- posed to a similar regimen. At one time, these children would have been likely to take group intelligence (IQ) tests, which likely would have been used to track them or, at the very least, predict their futures. Today, the students are less likely to take intelligence tests, unless they are being considered for special services, such as services for educable mentally retarded (EMR) children, learning-disabled (LD) children, or gifted children. If the children wish to go to a competitive college or university, they will likely take the SAT (an acronym origi- nally standing for Scholastic Aptitude Test, then for Scholastic Assessment Test, and now for nothing in particular) or the American College Test (ACT), the two most widely used tests used for college admissions. If individuals’ scores are within the normal range of a particular college or university to which they apply for admission, the scores may not much affect their admission prospects. But if their scores are outside this range, they may be a crucial factor in determining acceptance, in the case of high scores, or rejection, in the case of low scores. These tests may be required whether the school is publicly or privately funded. The story still is not over. If the individuals (now adults) wish to puruse further study, they will have to take tests of various kinds. These include the Graduate Record Examination (GRE) for graduate school, the Law School Admission Test (LSAT) for law, the Graduate Management Admission Test (GMAT) for business school, the Medical College Admission Test (MCAT) for medical school, and so forth. And the story of intelligence testing may not end with graduate-level study: Many kinds of occupa- tional placements, especially in business, may require appli- cants to take intelligence tests as well. This rather lengthy introduction to the everyday world of tests of intelligence-related abilities shows the extent to which such tests permeate U.S. society, and some other contempo- rary societies as well. It is hard not to take such tests very seri- ously because they can be influential in or even determinative of a person’s educational and even occupational fate. The Societal System Created by Tests Tests of intelligence-related skills are related to success in many cultures. People with higher test scores seem to be more successful in a variety of ways, and those with lower test scores seem to be less successful (Herrnstein & Murray, 1994; Hunt, 1995). Why are scores on intelligence-related tests closely related to societal success? Consider two points of view.
According to Herrnstein and Murray (1994), Wigdor and Garner (1982), and others, conventional tests of intelligence account for about 10% of the variation, on average, in various kinds of real-world outcomes. This figure increases if one makes various corrections to it (e.g., for attenuation in mea- sures or for restriction of range in particular samples). Although this percentage is not particularly large, it is not triv- ial either. Indeed, it is difficult to find any other kind of pre- dictor that fares as well. Clearly, the tests have some value (Gottfredson, 1986, 1997; Hunt, 1995; Schmidt & Hunter, 1981, 1998). They predict success in many jobs and predict success even better in schooling for jobs. Rankings of jobs by prestige usually show higher prestige jobs associated with higher levels of intelligence-related skills. Theorists of Why Theories of Intelligence Matter to Society 25 intelligence differ as to why the tests have some success in prediction of job level and competency.
Some theorists believe that the role of intelligence is society is along the lines of some kind of natural law. In their book, Herrnstein and Murray (1994) refer to an “invisible hand of nature” guiding events such that people with high IQs tend to rise toward the top socioeconomic strata of a society and peo- ple with low IQs tend to fall toward the bottom strata. Jensen (1969, 1998) has made related arguments, as have many oth- ers (see, e.g., the largely unfavorable reviews by Gould, 1981; Lemann, 1999; Sacks, 1999; Zenderland, 1998). Herrnstein and Murray presented data to support their argument, al- though many aspects of their data and their interpretations of these data are arguable (Fraser, 1995; Gould, 1995; Jacoby & Glauberman, 1995; Sternberg, 1995). This point of view has a certain level of plausibility to it. First, more complex jobs almost certainly do require higher levels of intelligence-related skills. Presumably, lawyers need to do more complex mental tasks than do street cleaners. Second, reaching the complex jobs via the educational sys- tem almost certainly requires a higher level of mental perfor- mance than does reaching less complex jobs. Finally, there is at least some heritable component of intelligence (Plomin, DeFries, McClearn, & Rutter, 1997), so nature must play some role in who gets what mental skills. Despite this plausi- bility, there is an alternative point of view.
An alternative point of view is that the sorting influence of in- telligence in society is more a societal invention than a dis- covery of an invisible hand of nature (Sternberg, 1997). The United States and some other countries have created societies in which test scores matter profoundly. High test scores may be needed for placement in higher tracks in elementary and secondary school. They may be needed for admission to se- lective undergraduate programs. They may be needed again for admission to selective graduate and professional pro- grams. Test scores help individuals gain the access routes to many of the highest paying and most prestigious jobs. Low GRE scores, for example, may exclude an individual not only from one selective graduate school, but from many others as well. To the extent that there is error of measurement, there will be comparable effects in many schools. According to this point of view, there are many able peo- ple who may be disenfranchised because the kinds of abilities that they have are not important for test performance, even though they may be important for job performance. For ex- ample, the kinds of creative and practical skills that matter to success on the job typically are not measured on the tests used for admissions to educational programs. At the same time, society may be overvaluing those who have a fairly nar- row range of skills, and a range of skills that may not serve these individuals particularly well on the job, even if they do lead to success in school and on the tests. On this view, it is scarcely surprising that ability tests pre- dict school grades, because the tests originally were designed explicitly for this purpose (Binet & Simon, 1905/1916). In effect, U.S. society and other societies have created closed systems: Certain abilities are valued in instruction (e.g., memory and analytical abilities). Ability tests are then cre- ated that measure these abilities and thus predict school per- formance. Then assessments of achievement are designed that also assess for these abilities. Little wonder that ability tests are more predictive in school than in the work place: Within the closed system of the school, a narrow range of abilities leads to success on ability tests, in instruction, and on achievement tests. But these same abilities are less impor- tant later on in life. According to the societal-invention view, closed systems can be and have been constructed to value almost any set of at- tributes at all. In some societies, caste is used. Members of cer- tain castes are allowed to rise to the top; members of other castes have no chance. Of course, the members of the success- ful castes believe they are getting their due, much as did mem- bers of the nobility in the Middle Ages when they rose to the top and subjugated their serfs. Even in the United States, if one were born a slave in the early 1800s, one’s IQ would make lit- tle difference: One would die a slave. Slave owners and others rationalized the system, as social Darwinists always have, by believing that the fittest were in the roles in which they rightfully belonged. The general conclusion is that societies can and do choose a variety of criteria to sort people. Some societies have used or continue to use caste systems, whether explicit, as in India, or implicit, as in the United States. Others use or have used race, religion, or wealth of parents as bases for sorting peo- ple. Many societies use a combination of criteria. Once a sys- tem is in place, those who gain access to the power structure, whether via their passage through elite education or else- where, are likely to look for others like themselves to enter into positions of power. The reason, quite simply, is that there probably is no more powerful basis of interpersonal attrac- tion than similarity, so that people in a power structure look for others similar to themselves. The result is a potentially endlessly looping closed system. |
