Polysemy and metaphor in perception verbs: a cross-linguistic study

extensions’ and the latter, ‘verb-driven extensions’. The fact that the weight of the 
semantics of the different elements in the overall meaning of a sentence is not the same in 
all extended meanings, but hierarchically organised according to the degree of influence 
of the lexical items involved, is what I call ‘graduable polysemy’. 
In this section, I have shown that extended meanings are obtained by the 
interaction of the semantic content of both the perception verb and its complements. The 
role of the semantics of both the perception verb and its complements is not the same in 
all extended meanings; in some cases, the verb is more important and in some other 
cases, the complements are. If the semantic content of the complements of these 
perception verbs is so crucial in some of the extended meanings found in this semantic 
field, the next question that arises is whether or not these complements are required to 
have a very specific semantic content in order to obtain that specific extended meaning. 
Whether or not the choice of these complements is constrained by the characteristics of 
this semantic field of perception. It is to this issue that I turn now. 

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B. Iraide Ibarretxe Antuñano
Chapter 2: The Semantic Field of Sense Perception 
195
7.2.2. VERB-PROPERTY REQUIREMENT 
In the previous section, the concept of graduable polysemy has been introduced. 
According to the degree of influence in the overall meaning of the sentence that the 
semantic content of the perception verb and the other elements of the sentence had, 
semantic extensions were classified as (i) unpredictable polysemy, (ii) verb-driven 
extensions, and (iii) argument-driven extensions. 
In this thesis, it has been argued that different conceptual domains are not linked 
as a result of chance. In Chapter 6, it is shown that the different semantic extensions that 
take place in perception verbs are constrained by and based on the physiology of these 
senses, as well as on our perception of these senses themselves. In other words, there is a 
bodily-based motivation for extending the meaning of one conceptual domain into 
another different one.
If this constraint is correct, then it follows that all those elements that contribute to 
the extension of meaning must also be constrained in a similar way. I have argued in 
Section 7.2.1 that polysemous meanings are not just contained in a particular tactile or 
olfactory verb in every extension of meaning. In predictable cases of polysemy, the other 
co-occurring elements contribute with their own semantic content to the configuration of 
the polysemous sense. Therefore, these elements that play a more or less crucial role in 
the creation of the polysemous meanings are required to follow the same bodily-based 
motivation. A motivation, that as shown in Chapter 5, is characterised in terms of 
properties. 
This requirement will constrain the choice of elements in two different ways. On 
the one hand, it will explain why certain elements cannot co-occur with certain verbs in 
particular, why sentences like (26) and (27) below are ruled out. On the other hand, it will 
show how some properties that characterise these perceptual processes are highlighted by 
the semantic content of these elements themselves. I call this requirement on the choice 
of co-occurring elements in extended meanings the ‘verb-property requirement’. 
Firstly, let us focus on the first issue: why these sentences below are not accepted. 
(26) *John 
touched the joke
(27) *John 
smelt the highest point in his career 

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B. Iraide Ibarretxe Antuñano
Chapter 2: The Semantic Field of Sense Perception 
196
Without any more contextual information
147
, both (26) and (27) are not felicitous. 
In (26), the reason why this is so lies in the fact that the joke does not seem to be taken as 
a ‘touchable’ type of concept. In other words, a joke cannot be touched in any physical 
way as objects like the table, the clothes can; but it can neither be touched in any abstract 
possible way as other concepts like the topic, the highest point can. The same statement 
can be made about (27). Whereas concepts such as the joke, danger and so on seem to be 
licensed in this situation, the highest point is rejected, it does not seem to be a ‘smellable’ 
type of concept, either physically (a point does not give off any smell) or metaphorically. 
To say that these complements are not ‘touchable’ or ‘smellable’ types of 
concepts means that these complements do not seem to share the same properties that 
these two perceptual processes have. The properties that characterise these complements, 
their semantic content, seem to clash with some of the properties that characterised these 
verbs. 
For instance, the complement the highest point in (27) clashes with some of the 
properties of the verb smell. A characteristic of this sense is the property no
>. This property refers to the fact that it is very difficult to identify what the stimuli for 
smell are. With the sense of smell, it is possible to detect the stimuli, but when it comes 
to identifying what the smell is, the sense of smell is not as accurate as the other senses 
(see also Section 6.1.1.). The complement in this sentence implies a very specific entity: 
it is a point situated at the very top of something; and therefore, it clashes with one of the 
properties required by the sense of smell. In other words, this complement is not 
‘smellable’, and therefore, it violates the ‘verb-property requirement’.
A similar explanation can be given for (26). The joke, as it stands in this example 
(see footnote 147), clashes with the perceptual requirements of the tactile verb. In this 
sense, yes
> is one of its properties, i.e. the PR must have a physical contact with 
the OP in order to be perceived
148
. However, it does not seem to be possible to establish 
147
As pointed out in Ibarretxe-Antuñano (1999d: 210), (26) could be accepted if used negatively 
and in a very specific context. For instance, if we say Don’t touch that joke when you make your speech 
before the committee. However, if this example is analysed internally, i.e. without any context, then it is no 
longer possible. 
148
It is important to bear in mind that the physical property  is no longer understood 
as ‘physical’ in abstract meanings because in these cases there is no physical contact required. For instance, 
it is possible to say sentences like Her attitude touched me even though you have only read about it, and 

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B. Iraide Ibarretxe Antuñano
Chapter 2: The Semantic Field of Sense Perception 
197
any kind of physical or metaphorical contact between the P, John, and the OP, the joke. 
The joke is too vague
149
as an entity to be able to be touched, and therefore, it clashes 
with the property yes
>.
Therefore, it is argued that these sentences are infelicitous because the properties 
that characterise each of these senses clash with the possible properties that these 
concepts have. In other words, they do not abide by the ‘verb-property requirement’, 
because the properties of the different elements that are put together in a sentence violate 
the properties that constitute the bodily basis of these sense perception verbs. 
The second part of the ‘verb-property requirement’ deals with the way in which 
some properties that characterised these perceptual processes are highlighted by the 
semantic content of these elements. 
Sentence (28) is an example of the argument-driven semantic extension ‘to