SW(Final8/31) Written by Allan B. Ho and Dmitry Feofanov
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657 ‘Settling Scores’, Lingua Franca (dismissed by Taruskin in The Danger of Music, p. 92, as a ‘shortlived academic gossip mag’), July/August 2001, on the Internet at 197 Here, even we must agree. When it comes to things like this, Professor Taruskin is, indeed, full of it. In On Russian Music, Taruskin recycles part of his ‘Cramb Lecture’ and adds several new accusations that are grossly exaggerated and inaccurate. While these are tangential to our main topic, we will address them in the interest of full disclosure of the facts and because these examples further showcase the good professor’s professional ethics and standards, or lack thereof: (1) On p. 17, Taruskin suggests that our AMS papers were accepted, over his objections, because ‘Prof. Hill had a personal relationship with Dmitry Feofanov, who had studied under him at the University of Illinois’. In fact, Mr. Feofanov, in the mid-1980s, signed up for one course with Professor Hill, ‘Problems and Methods’, but dropped it after having attended only a few class sessions. He was not a musicology student or an advisee of Professor Hill and his limited contact with him hardly constitutes a ‘personal relationship’. According to Prof. Hill (email of 4 February 2009), none of this influenced the Program Committee’s decision to accept our papers. (2) On p. 21, Taruskin states that ‘Dmitry Feofanov, it has recently been divulged, is Volkov’s lawyer’. This insinuation of a conflict of interest is not based on first-hand research or hard evidence, but cites as sources Fairclough’s book review ‘Fact, Fantasies, and Fictions’ (2005), pp. 454– 55, and Mitchinson’s ‘The Shostakovich Variations’ (2000), p. 54 (later reprinted in A Shostakovich Casebook, p. 317). Fairclough states that ‘Feofanov . . . is his [Volkov’s] lawyer’, ostensibly basing this on Mitchinson’s earlier statement: ‘Dmitri Feofanov, now acting as Volkov’s lawyer, has issued Kjellberg a cease-and-desist order and has threatened to sue her for defamation if she persists in objecting to the book [Conversations with Joseph Brodsky] as having been unauthorized by Brodsky’. Neither Fairclough nor Mitchinson footnote their source, yet Taruskin rushes to accept this as fact. Actually, Mr. Feofanov represented Mr. Volkov on just one occasion and without fee. This was in response to a letter by Ann Kjellberg in the Times Literary Supplement (2 October 1998, p. 19) that included spurious charges against Volkov. Mr. Feofanov’s involvement was limited and temporary. He agreed to act for Mr. Volkov in this brief instance because Mr. Volkov’s longtime attorney had just passed away, the TLS had refused to print Volkov’s rebuttal, and Mr. Feofanov found Kjellberg’s allegations deplorable. Clearly, Taruskin’s broader claim that ‘Dmitry Feofanov is Volkov’s lawyer’ is false. Incidentally, Mr. Feofanov’s specialty is ‘lemon law’ and involves suing car dealers for consumer fraud; Mr. Volkov neither owns nor drives an automobile. 198 (3) Also on p. 21, Taruskin accuses us of a ‘flat-out lie about the state of the Testimony typescript’. This is addressed in detail on pp. 56–96 above. At the time Shostakovich Reconsidered was written, we had not seen the altered typescript later discussed by Fay; to the best of our knowledge, the first signature was on page one. He also accuses us of a ‘feigned independence from Solomon Volkov’ and questions our ‘objectivity of judgment’, citing an errant email circulated on DSCH-list on 4 March 1999 in which Allan Ho wrote: ‘Dmitry: do you still want to run this by SV first, or is it a go?’ We stated at our Mannes Conference that we began our investigation of Testimony with an open mind, determined to report whatever we found, and that Allan Ho was at first skeptical about the memoirs (cf. note 80 above). Clearly, by March 1999, based on the evidence we had accumulated, we were convinced of Testimony’s authenticity. According to Taruskin, allowing Volkov to preview our response to David Fanning’s critique of Shostakovich Reconsidered is ‘collusion’; we consider it simply collegiality and a courtesy. As a final example of Taruskin’s inconsistent and hypocritical behavior, consider his oft-repeated claim that Testimony and its supporters view things in ‘one dimension’. This is a common tactic of unscrupulous scholars: to exaggerate another’s point to absurdity, then attack it. 658 For example, in criticizing MacDonald’s Testimony- influenced discussion of the Seventh Symphony, Taruskin writes: To uphold the view of the Seventh as exclusively anti-Stalinist one has to ignore the imagery of actual battle, as well as that of repulsion [. . .], and finally of victory[. . .]. These musical events can hardly be read out of the context of the war and its immediate, overriding urgencies, conditions that could not have been foreseen when Volkov’s Shostakovich claimed to have had his first thoughts of the Seventh. 659 Of course, neither Testimony nor MacDonald view that the Seventh is ‘exclusively anti- Stalinist’; to the contrary, Hitler and Stalin are described as co-evils: The Seventh Symphony had been planned before the war and consequently it simply cannot be seen as a reaction to Hitler’s attack. The 658 Matthew Westphal, reviewing Text and Act, makes the identical point: Readers will also see why Taruskin has deeply infuriated so many people. He regularly makes inflammatory (if not downright insulting) statements at the outset of an essay and then backpedals in the middle. He quotes a statement by another writer or musician, draws implications from that statement that are far more extensive than the speaker apparently intended, and then demolishes those implications and often mocks the unwitting speaker (on the Internet at Download Do'stlaringiz bilan baham: |
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