Gw issn 0001 0545 b 20004 f fieedmfa Indivicka/sf
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32 example, K. Lapkin, E. Rahimow and E. L. Zolotorow, the diversion of the water from Siberia cannot stop the drying up of the Aral Sea. Most probably the sea will dry up completely because the water is in reality projected to irrigate the farmland.26 As a matter of fact, the project of the diversion of the Siberian water does not take the water needed to supply the Aral Sea into consideration. Water and irrigation specialists believe that water reserves of the River Sir Darya will be exhausted in 1990. Nevertheless the Soviet Russians want to proceed with the project regardless of the fate of the Aral Sea and its climatic conditions, only to utilize the southern regions of the Aral Sea. The Soviet Russian government wants to utilize the southern Aral Sea area and build 14 Sovkhozes for rice, 11 for cattle rearing, 16 for lucerne and vegetable farming and 2 for horticulture. In order to realise this project 400 million rubles are needed. The cost is amortizable within 6 to 7 years.27 If, at the end of the day, the Soviet Russian government will realise this vast project, then this will have an inten sive colonisation effect, triggered off by the Russians and especially by some Euro pean ethnic groups in the Aral Sea area. Soviet economic politics in Turkestan have been of a somewhat exploiting nature, as has been proved. There is no use struggling just to maintain a minimum survival sta tus, even if the communist doctrine preach es a “new building up phase of an eco nomic base for communism?” It is a fact and no exaggeration that the people in Turkestan have to pay, for instance in the Fergana area, the equivalent of 7 U.S. dollars for 1 kg of mutton, 2 dollars for 1 kg of grapes, 2,5 dollars for 1 kg of apples and 8-9 dollars for a chicken.28 People have to wait in queues here for ages, just in order to get the most necessary items for daily life or to wait for a luxury item they have yearned for, for a long time even if it is on the black market. This, in fact, is everyday life. The grain producing kolkhozniks in the Soviet Union received 2,13 rubles per hour, but the cotton pro ducing kolkhozniks only got 0,29 rubles per hour and the ones in Uzbekistan only got 0,26 rubles per hour.29 It is also a fact, most extraordinary though, that the so- called working productivity earns con siderably less in the agricultural field than in the industrial area. The kolkhoz members in Uzbekistan earned 24,7 rubles per month less in 1982 than the sovkhoz members. The kolkhozniks earn 47,8 rubles less than the industrial workers.30 The actual sense of this discrepancy should be obvious to anybody. If the industrial and agricultural products of this country do not primarily supply the inhabitants, one can easily figure out that the system is of a colonial nature. Ideological Activities as a Means to Secure Existence of Soviet Regime The communist leadership regards its ideological activity as part of its general policy in order to secure the regime. Educa tion of the people within “the spirit of communism” plays a major role in Turke stan, because the intention of the Soviet leadership is to activate the people in con tinuous measures, to mobilise them to poli tical and economic participation. These ideological activities are intended to make the people believe in the politics of the Soviet Union and in that way, that they feel absolutely dependent on the people who run the state, on the communist leadership and the regime of the Russians. The ideo logical activity has the additional task to suppress and fight ideas which are contrary to the ideas and politics of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Russian regime has also learned that communism has no chance without continuous propaganda and this is true especially in the Turkestan region. According to the words of the first secre tary of the communist party of Uzbekistan, Rashidow (who died on 31. 10. 83) the “power of the communist belief consists 33 of the propaganda of Marxism-Leninism”. Many well organised propaganda spe cialists from Russia are to be found in Turkestan. Apart from the usual means of spreading their ideology (radio, television, journals, newspapers, posters, films, litera ture and so on) these propaganda specialists work amongst the people as so-called “me diators for the ideas of the Communist Party to the work force”. There are 270.000 propaganda specialists in Uzbeki stan and 6,500 lecturers of the Communist Party Committees.31 There are around 234.000 agitators and about 102,000 in formants in Kazakhstan.32 In Turkmeni stan there were more than 16,300 teachers as agitators, apart from their teaching; more than 3,300 as political informers and 2,300 as propaganda specialists.33 In Kir ghizia there are about 27,000 propaganda specialists.34 This “Army of Propagandists” work according to their orders as a “brain washing machine” within the population. It is obligatory for the population to listen to the lectures of the propaganda specialists, after working hours, according to the de mand of the Soviet authorities (Party or ganisations, Soviet executive committees, Young-Communist-Organisations, collective farm committees and trade unions). The sectors for ideological activities are extensive. One of the tasks is to fight against the national traditions of Turke stan, if they are not in keeping with the communist way of thinking. According to the 1st secretary of the C.P. of Kirghizia, Usubaliyew, special steps were taken to get rid of the remainder of those danger ous traditional customs, especially religious.35 The Communists are trying intensively to get rid of the influence of the “bourgeois ideology”. In recent times the scientific and journalistic treatment of the Soviet Rus sian Turkestan-politics in the West and the infiltration of western critical thoughts about Turkestan has made Soviet ideolo gists panic. Up till now the Communists have tried to show that all foreign thoughts insomuch as they are against Moscow’s Turkestan-politics, are simply a “falsifica tion of the history of Middle Asia and Kazakhstan, and of the Leninist nationality policy”. The Communists defend themselves up to the present day by their numerous publications, and reports on the radio in the Soviet Union and also abroad against the “bourgeois, imperialist, anti-Soviet, na tionalist reactionary and hostile ideological diversions”, especially concerning Turke stan. It is a task of the future for the West to do research work on Soviet ideas about “Falsification”. However, it appears to be necessary to remind everybody that in the seventies of the 20th century an “All-Union-Council for the problems of foreign ideological tendencies” has been formed by the Aca demy of Science of the USSR. Afterwards the “scientific council for problems of foreign ideological tendencies” was formed by the Academy of the Soviet Republics in Turkestan. These so-called “Scientific Councils” have the task to register all forms of ideologies from abroad, including Anti-Communist-Movements and the dif ferent opinions about the “Soviet Central Asian and Kazakhstan regions”. Addi tionally, they have the task to defend themselves and to produce various ma terials for the authorities concerned with ideology for the “revealing of bourgeois falsifications of the history of Turkestan”. On April 26th 1972 the first conference of this “council” took place in Ashkhabad where the speakers tried to refute all opinions foreign countries have about Turkestan.30 On December 21st 1978 another conference took place in Ashkha bad, the topic was “some questions con cerning the present ideological fight” (Nekotorye woprosy sowremennoy ideolo- gitscheskoy bor’by). The object was to criticise, again, the questions of the so- called bourgeois falsification of the Leni nist nationalities politics of the communist party. The participants tried to interpret the Soviet Russian policy in Turkestan, subject to their own view. The result was 34 that the Soviet Union did not even want to hear about the foreign ideas about rus sification, the fate of the national culture and the colonisation of Turkestan. It was demanded to keep on fighting the “bour geois falsifiers of the history of Central Asia”.97 On December 27th 1979 the Academy of Science of Uzbekistan and the Ministry for High Schools and the Special Middle Schools of Uzbekistan in Tashkent organis ed a conference with the topic: “Questions of immediate interest concerning the ideo logical fight at the present stage and the task of the Science of Society in Uzbeki stan”. 13 lectures were held which have already been published in Russian.38. From these publications one can see that the Soviet Russians wanted to justify all their statements and actions concerning their interventions in Turkestan, without re garding facts which had been criticised by western authors. “The problem of falsifica tion of socialist realities in Central Asia and Kazakhstan” was expressedly men tioned at the Communist Party Congress in Turkestan — January/February 1981 and suitable resolutions have been put for ward. The Soviet Russians regarded the handling of the Turkestan problem by foreign countries, as enemy propaganda. The secretary of the Communist Party of Turkmenistan, Gapurow, said amongst other things, in his statement of accounts, that the Central Committee of the Com munist Party of Turkmenistan had declared measures against enemy propaganda, in order to uncover these enemy actions. This was in January 1979. In the resolu tion of the congress it was mentioned that “our ideological enemies have to be actively uncovered”.39 During one item of the re solution of the XV Congress of the Com munist Party of Kazakhstan, it was men tioned: “The fight against the bourgeois and maoistic ideology must be enforced”.40 Rashidow said in his statement of accounts at the XX Congress of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan amongst other things: “It is necessary to uncover the lies and defamations of the bourgeois falsifiers, and to convey the truth about the Soviet Russian way of life to the people of this earth”.41 The Congress resolution of the Communist Party of Tadzhikistan demand ed: “All political ideological workers of the Communist Party have to fight a decisive battle, against the imperialist and ideologi cal diversions and against the anti-soviet- chiki”.42 The Soviet Russians have the in tention to fight on against the so-called “falsifiers”. This one can see from the re solution of the meeting of party activists of Uzbekistan (all party and government officials as well as all university teachers took part) on March 11th 1981: “The work to uncover all bourgeois falsifications has to be increased, with all means of propa ganda and agitation”.43 In the year 1983, this demand reached its climax after February 16th/17th 1983 when the “scientific” conference in Tash kent had taken place. The conference was about “The fraternal solidarity of the peo ples of the USSR in the period of develop ed Socialism”. There was a work section; “the development of national relations and the present ideological fight” where 12 lectures were held concerning the “falsifica tion of the Soviet Nationality-Politics, Islam-Politics in general, and of Turkestan particularly”.44 The main stress of the Soviet activities does not only lie in the fight against the ideology from abroad, but also the fight against nationalism in Turkestan. It is no secret to anybody, not even to the Soviet Russians, that there is a great national movement in Turkestan. The main aim of the national movement in Turkestan, is at present, the fight for the existence of the people as such, the resist ance against russification and the convey ance of pre-tsarist and pre-Soviet national intellectual culture to the young genera tion, preservation of national customs and religious beliefs as well as intensifying tradi 35 tional family life. The Soviets regard this as a “national separation” or as “limited”. Concerning this it said in the resolution of the X X II Congress of the Communist Party of Turkmenistan: “We must criticise any national limitation.45 By the way, ac cording to the Soviets “nationalism is the weapon of ideological diversion of the western powers”.46 (to be continued) 1 1 1 1 N a s e l e n i e S S S R (P o p u la tio n o f U S S R ), M o sco w 1980, p p . 10-11. 2 S ee: I t o g i V s e s o y u z n o y p e r e p i s i n a s e le n ia 1 9 7 0 g o d a . N a t s i o n a l n y s o s t a w n a se le n ia SS SR (R e su lts o f th e o v e ra ll U n io n census o f th e y e a r 1970. N a tio n a l d is trib u tio n o f th e p e o p le o f U S S R , M o sco w 1973, p p . 2 0 2 -2 1 0 , 2 2 3 - 31, 2 8 4 -8 9 , 2 9 5 -9 8 , 3 0 6 -3 1 0 . 3 F o r m o re see: “ W e s t n i k S t a t i s t i k i ” , J o u rn a l, M o sco w 1980, N o . 9-10. 4 “ W e s t n i k S t a t i s t i k i ” , 1980, N o . 9, p . 65. 5 “ W e s t n i k S t a t i s t i k i ” , 1980, N o . 2, p. 20. 6 “ W o p r o s y E k o n o m i k i ” , lo u rn a l, M o sco w 1978, N o . 8, p . 39. 7 “ S o w e t O z b e k i s t a n y ” , N e w s p a p e r, T a s h k e n t 4 / 2 / 1 8 1 , p . 5. 8 T u r k m e n i s t a n I l i m l e r A k a d e m i y e s i n i n g H a b a r l a r i , ] e m i g i y e t c h i l i k I l i m l e r i n i n g s e r i y e s i , J o u rn a l, A s h k h a b a d 1984, N o . 2, p . 91. C o n c ern in g th e p ro b le m o f th e d e m o g ra p h ic d e v e lo p m e n t o f T u rk e s ta n see also : B a y m irz a H a y i t, S o m e t h o u g h t s o n t h e p r o b l e m o f T u r k e s t a n , C o lo g n e 1983, p p . 9 -1 9 ; W . I. K o z lo w , N a t s i o n a l n o s t i SSSR . E tn o d e m o g ra fic h e sk iy o b - z o r ( N a tio n a litie s o f U S S R . E th n o d e m o g ra fic a l su rv e y ), M o sco w 1982, 303 p p . 9 “ S o w e t O z b e k i s t a n y ” , 2 4 / 2 / 1 9 8 1 , p . 6. 10 “ O z b e k i s t a n K o m m u n i s t i ” , J o u rn a l, T a s h k e n t 1981, N o . 2, p. 72. 11 “ O s t e u r o p a ” , Jo u rn a l, A ach en , 1979, N o . 9, p . 71 5 -6 . 12 “ K a z a k h s t a n s k a y a P r a w d a ” , N e w s p a p e r, A lm a - A ta 4 / 2 / 1 9 8 1 ; “ T u r k m e n s k a y a I s k r a ” , N e w s p a p e r, A s h k h a b a d 1 7 / 1 / 1 9 8 1 ; “ S o w e t O z b e k i s t a n ” 4 / 2 / 1 9 8 1 ; “ S o w e t s k a y a K i r g i - z i y a ” 2 3 / 1 / 1 9 8 1 (N e w s p a p e r, F r u n z e ); “ K o m - m u n i s t T a d z h i k i s t a n a ” , N e w s p a p e r, D u s h a n b e , 26. 1. 1981. 13 “ K a z a k E d e b i y a t i ” , N e w s p a p e r, A lm a - A ta , 6 / 2 / 1 9 8 1 . 14 “ K a z a k h s t a n K o m m u n i s t i ” , J o u rn a l, A lm a - A t a 1984, N o . 4, p . 40. 15 “ K h l o p k o w o d s t w o ” , J o u rn a l, M o sco w 1981, N o . 1, p . 4. 10 “ S o w e t O z b e k i s t a n y ” , 2 9 / 1 / 1 9 8 1 , p . 2. 17 “ O z b e k i s t a n K o m m u n i s t i ” , 1981, N o . 2, p . 21. 18 “ K h l o p k o w o d s t w o " , 1984, N o . 4, p . 2. 19 F o r m o re see: B a y m irz a H a y i t, D i e W i r t s c h a f t s p r o b l e m e T u r k e s t a n s (T he E c o n o m i c al p ro b le m s o f T u rk e s ta n ), A n k a r a 1968, p p . 1 0 9-110. 20 “ O z b e k i s t a n K o m m u n i s t i ” , 1979, N o . 2, p 16. 21 “ O z b e k i s t a n d a i j t m a i f a n l a r ” , J o u rn a l, T a s h k e n t 1978, N o . 10, p . 1. 22 “ O z b e k i s t a n K o m m u n i s t i ” , 1979, N o . 2, p . 15. 23 “ O z b e k i s t a n a d a b i y a t i v a s a n ’a t i ” , N e w s p a p e r, T a s h k e n t, 1 / 4 / 1 9 8 3 . See also : P h ilip P . M ic k lin , S o v i e t W a t e r D i v e r s i o n P l a n s f o r K a z a k h s t a n a n d C e n t r a l A s i a , in “ C e n tr a l A s ia n S u r v e y ”, O x f o r d , 1983, N o . 4, p p . 9-43. 24 “ O z b e k i s t a n K o m m u n i s t i ” , 1979, N o . 2, p . 14. 25 “ K h l o p k o w o d s t w o ” 1981, N o . 3, p . 14. 26 “ O z b e k i s t a n d a i j t m a i f a n l a r ” , 1981, N o . 1, p . 63. 27 “ O z b e k i s t a n d a i j t m a i f a n l a r ” , 1981, N o . 2, p. 64. 28 “ D i e W e l t ” , N e w s p a p e r, B o n n , 2. 12. 1980, p . 1. 29 “ K h l o p k o w o d s t w o ” , 1981, N o . 3, p . 15. 39 “ O z b e k i s t a n K o m m u n i s t i ” , 1984, N o . 6, p . 45. 31 “ O z b e k i s t a n K o m m u n i s t i ” , 1981, N o . 2, pp. 38-3 9 . 32 “ K a z a k h s t a n s k a y a P r a w d a ” , 5 / 2 / 1 9 8 1 . 33 “ T u r k m e n i s t a n K o m m u n i s t i ” , J o u rn a l, A s h k h a b a d , 19S0, N o . 11, p . 82. 34 “ S o w e t s k a y a K i r g i z i y a ” , 2 1 / 1 / 1 9 8 1 , p. 7. 33 “ S o w e t s k a y a K i r g i z i y a ” , 2 1 / 1 / 1 9 8 1 , p . 6. 86 “ I z w e s t i y a A k a d e m i i N a u k T u r k m e n s k o y S S R . S e r i y a o b s k e h e s t w e n n y k h N a u k ” , J o u rn a l, A s h k h a b a d , 1972, N o . 3, p p . 9 4 -9 5 . 37 F o r m o re a b o u t th is c o n fe re n c e see: I z w e s t i y a A k a d e m i i N a u k T u r k e s t a n s k o y S S R . S e r i y a o b s k e h e s t w e n n y k h N a u k ” , 1979, N o . 2, p p . 93-9 4 . 38 “ O z b e k i s t a n d a ijtmai f a n l a r ” , 1980, N o . 3, p p . 9 -9 2 . 39 “ T u r k m e n s k a y a I s k r a ” , 3 0 / 1 / 1 9 8 1 , p . 2. 40 “ K a z a k h s t a n s k a y a P r a w d a ” , 8 / 2 / 1 9 8 2 , P- 2. 41 “ O z b e k i s t a n K o m m u n i s t i ” , 1981, N o . 2, p . 43. 42 “ K o m m u n i s t T a d z h i k i s t a n a ” , 3 0 / 1 / 1 9 8 1 , p. 2. 43 “ O z b e k i s t a n M a d a n i y a t i ” , N e w s p a p e r, T a s h k e n t, 1 3 / 3 / 1 9 8 1 , p . 3. 44 See also : “ S o w e t O z b e k i s t a n y ” , 1 7 / 2 / 1983, p . 1 -3 ; 1 8 / 2 / 1 9 8 3 , p . 1-2. 45 “ T u r k m e n s k a y a I s k r a ” , 3 0 / 1 / 1 9 8 1 , p . 2. 46 S ee: O . R e d z h e p o w a , N a t i o n a l i s m - o r u d i e - i d e o l o g i c h e s k i k h d i w e r s i i (N a tio n a lis m as a n id e o lo g ic a l d iv e rsio n ), in “ T u r k m e n s k a y a I s k r a ” , 2 7 / 1 / 1 9 8 1 , p . 2. Download Do'stlaringiz bilan baham: 
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