Handbook of psychology volume 7 educational psychology
Download 9.82 Mb. Pdf ko'rish
|
- Bu sahifa navigatsiya:
- Metacognition and Learning
- Relevance to Cognitive Development, Expertise, and Intelligence 81 Summary 82
- Comprehension Monitoring 83 Development of Comprehension Monitoring 86
- Individual Interventions 90 Group-Based Interventions 91 General Recommendations
- Promise of Neuropsychology 94 Metacognition and Bilingualism 94 Integration of Metacognition Into
- METACOGNITION: IN SEARCH OF A DEFINITION
- Knowledge Versus Control Distinction
- Alternative Perspectives
- Metacognition: In Search of a Definition 81
- Relevance to Cognitive Development, Expertise, and Intelligence
|
References 77 Pintrich, P. R., & De Groot, E. V. (1990). Motivational and self- regulated learning components of classroom academic perfor- mance. Journal of Educational Psychology, 82, 33–40. Pressley, M., Woloshyn, V., Lysynchuk, L. M., Martin, V., Wood, E., & Willoughby, T. (1990). A primer of research on cognitive strategy instruction: The important issues and how to address them. Educational Psychology Review, 2, 1–58. Rachlin, H. (1991). Introduction to modern behaviorism (3rd ed.). New York: Freeman. Sagotsky, G., Patterson, C. J., & Lepper, M. R. (1978). Training children’s self-control: A field experiment in self-monitoring and goal-setting in the classroom. Journal of Experimental Child
Schunk, D. H. (1981). Modeling and attributional effects on chil- dren’s achievement: A self-efficacy analysis. Journal of Educa-
Schunk, D. H. (1982a). Effects of effort attributional feedback on children’s perceived self-efficacy and achievement. Journal of
Schunk, D. H. (1982b). Verbal self-regulation as a facilitator of children’s achievement and self-efficacy. Human Learning, 1, 265–277.
Schunk, D. H. (1983a). Ability versus effort attributional feedback: Differential effects on self-efficacy and achievement. Journal of Educational Psychology, 75, 848–856. Schunk, D. H. (1983b). Developing children’s self-efficacy and skills: The roles of social comparative information and goal setting. Contemporary Educational Psychology, 8, 76–86. Schunk, D. H. (1983c). Goal difficulty and attainment information: Effects on children’s achievement behaviors. Human Learning, 2, 107–117. Schunk, D. H. (1983d). Progress self-monitoring: Effects on chil- dren’s self-efficacy and achievement. Journal of Experimental
Schunk, D. H. (1983e). Reward contingencies and the development of children’s skills and self-efficacy. Journal of Educational
Schunk, D. H. (1984). Enhancing self-efficacy and achievement through rewards and goals: Motivational and informational effects. Journal of Educational Research, 78, 29–34. Schunk, D. H. (1985). Participation in goal setting: Effects on self- efficacy and skills of learning disabled children. Journal of Spe- cial Education, 19, 307–317. Schunk, D. H. (1987). Peer models and children’s behavioral change. Review of Educational Research, 57, 149–174. Schunk, D. H. (1995). Self-efficacy and education and instruction. In J. E. Maddux (Ed.), Self-efficacy, adaptation, and adjustment:
Plenum.
Schunk, D. H. (1996). Goal and self-evaluative influences dur- ing children’s cognitive skill learning. American Educational Research Journal, 33, 359–382. Schunk, D. H., & Cox, P. D. (1986). Strategy training and attribu- tional feedback with learning disabled students. Journal of
Schunk, D. H., & Ertmer, P. A. (1999). Self-regulatory processes during computer skill acquisition: Goal and self-evaluative influ- ences. Journal of Educational Psychology, 91, 251–260. Schunk, D. H., & Hanson, A. R. (1985). Peer models: Influence on children’s self-efficacy and achievement. Journal of Educational Psychology, 77, 313–322. Schunk, D. H., & Hanson, A. R. (1989). Self-modeling and chil- dren’s cognitive skill learning. Journal of Educational Psychol-
Schunk, D. H., Hanson, A. R., & Cox, P. D. (1987). Peer-model attributes and children’s achievement behaviors. Journal of
Schunk, D. H., & Rice, J. M. (1987). Enhancing comprehension skill and self-efficacy with strategy value information. Journal of
Schunk, D. H., & Swartz, C. W. (1993a). Goals and progress feed- back: Effects on self-efficacy and writing instruction. Contempo-
Schunk, D. H., & Swartz, C. W. (1993b). Writing strategy instruc- tion with gifted students: Effects of goals and feedback on self- efficacy and skills. Roeper Review, 15, 225–230. Schunk, D. H., & Zimmerman, B. J. (Eds.). (1994). Self-regulation
Schunk, D. H., & Zimmerman, B. J. (1997). Social origins of self- regulatory competence. Educational Psychologist, 32, 195–208. Schunk, D. H., & Zimmerman, B. J. (Eds.). (1998). Self-regulated learning: From teaching to self-reflective practice. New York: Guilford Press. Shapiro, E. S. (1987). Behavioral assessment in school psychology. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Skinner, B. F. (1953). Science and human behavior. New York: Macmillan. Snow, R. E. (1989). Toward assessment of cognitive and conative structures in learning. Educational Researcher, 18(9), 8–14. Snowman, J. (1986). Learning tactics and strategies. In G. D. Phye & T. Andre (Eds.), Cognitive classroom learning: Understand- ing, thinking, and problem solving (pp. 243–275). Orlando, FL: Academic Press. Vygotsky, L. S. (1962). Thought and language. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Weinstein, C. E., & Mayer, R. E. (1986). The teaching of learning strategies. In M. C. Wittrock (Ed.), Handbook of research on teaching (3rd ed., pp. 315–327). New York: Macmillan. Zimmerman, B. J. (1994). Dimensions of academic self-regulation: A conceptual framework for education. In D. H. Schunk & B. J. Zimmerman (Eds.), Self-regulation of learning and performance: Issues and educational applications (pp. 3–21). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
78 Self-Regulation and Learning Zimmerman, B. J. (1998). Developing self-fulfilling cycles of acad- emic regulation: An analysis of exemplary instructional models. In D. H. Schunk & B. J. Zimmerman (Eds.), Self-regulated learning: From teaching to self-reflective practice (pp. 1–19). New York: Guilford Press. Zimmerman, B. J. (2000). Attaining self-regulation: A social cogni- tive perspective. In M. Boekaerts, P. R. Pintrich, & M. Zeidner (Eds.), Handbook of self-regulation (pp. 13–39). San Diego, CA: Academic Press. Zimmerman, B. J., Bonner, S., & Kovach, R. (1996). Developing
Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. Zimmerman, B. J., & Kitsantas, A. (1996). Self-regulated learning of a motoric skill: The role of goal setting and self-monitoring. Journal of Applied Sport Psychology, 8, 60–75. Zimmerman, B. J., & Kitsantas, A. (1997). Developmental phases in self-regulation: Shifting from process goals to outcome goals.
Zimmerman, B. J., & Martinez-Pons, M. (1986). Development of a structured interview for assessing students’ use of self-regulated learning strategies. American Educational Research Journal, 23, 614–628. Zimmerman, B. J., & Martinez-Pons, M. (1990). Student differ- ences in self-regulated learning: Relating grade, sex, and gifted- ness to self-efficacy and strategy use. Journal of Educational Psychology, 82, 51–59. Zimmerman, B. J., & Ringle, J. (1981). Effects of model persistence and statements of confidence on children’s self-efficacy and prob- lem solving. Journal of Educational Psychology, 73, 485–493. Zimmerman, B. J., & Rosenthal, T. L. (1974). Observational learning of rule governed behavior by children. Psychological Bulletin, 81, 29–42. CHAPTER 5 Metacognition and Learning CHRISTINE B. M C CORMICK
79 METACOGNITION: IN SEARCH OF A DEFINITION 79
BASIC RESEARCH ON METACOGNITION 83 RESEARCH ON METACOGNITION AND READING SKILLS 83
83 Development of Comprehension Monitoring 86 RESEARCH ON METACOGNITION AND WRITING SKILLS 87 RESEARCH ON METACOGNITION AND PROBLEM-SOLVING SKILLS 89 RESEARCH ON METACOGNITION AND INSTRUCTION 90
90 Group-Based Interventions 91 General Recommendations for Instruction 92 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 93
93 Promise of Neuropsychology 94 Metacognition and Bilingualism 94 Integration of Metacognition Into Teacher Preparation 95 REFERENCES 97 A useful convention for beginning a chapter on any topic is to define that topic clearly. An unambiguous definition assures the establishment of clear communication pathways between the writer and the audience. That makes it obvious from the outset what the chapter will and will not be about. Unfortu- nately, this is not an easy task for a chapter about metacogni-
reconcile what researchers, teacher-educators, and practicing educators mean when they use this term. One deceptively simple definition, “thinking about thinking,” is really very complicated as evident from the blank stares I receive when I present that definition to a roomful of preservice teachers. Be- cause the title of this chapter is “Metacognition and Learning,” I decided to attempt to define metacognition as succinctly as I can and then move on to a discussion of research on the role of metacognition in classroom learning. I begin with a presenta- tion of more basic research on metacognition, followed by a summary of research on three classroom skills: reading, writ- ing, and problem solving. Finally, I review research on class- room interventions designed to facilitate the development of metacognition.
Metacognition emerged as an explicit focus of research in psychology (with an initial focus on metamemory) in the early 1970s, but psychologists and educators have long been aware of the knowledge and skills encompassed by this term (Baker & Brown, 1984). John Flavell (1976) offered an early commonly accepted definition of metacognition as “knowl- edge concerning one’s own cognitive processes and products or anything related to them” (p. 232). More than a decade later, Paris and Winograd (1990) asserted that most theorists emphasize two aspects of metacognition, knowledge about cognition and control over cognition. Knowledge Versus Control Distinction Metacognitive knowledge is typically characterized as being comparatively stable and usually statable (Baker & Brown, 1984; Garner, 1987). Jacobs and Paris (1987) further delin- eated the knowledge component of metacognition into de- clarative, procedural, and conditional aspects of knowledge. 80 Metacognition and Learning Declarative metacognitive knowledge refers to knowledge that a person may have about his or her abilities and about the salient learning characteristics that affect cognitive process- ing. Learners vary in the quality of their declarative knowl- edge depending on a variety of factors including age and ability. Flavell (1979) distinguished between types of declar- ative knowledge along the dimensions of knowledge of person, task, and strategy. Procedural metacognitive knowl- edge refers to knowledge of how to execute procedures such as learning strategies. The procedural knowledge of skilled learners is more automatic, accurate, and effective than that of unskilled learners. Conditional metacognitive knowledge refers to knowledge about when and why to use procedures or strategies. The conditional knowledge of successful learners makes them very facile and flexible in their strategy use. Metacognitive control, sometimes also referred to as execu- tive control, is described in various ways by different re- searchers, but the similarity among the definitions is fairly evident. Jacobs and Paris (1987) demarcated metacognitive control into the processes of planning, evaluation, and regula- tion. Planning includes the selection of a strategy to achieve a goal. Evaluation is monitoring of the progress made toward achieving the goal. Regulation refers to the revision or modifi- cation of the strategies to achieve the goal. Hacker (1998a) de- scribed executive control as consisting of both monitoring and regulating. Monitoring includes identifying the task, checking the progress of task completion, and predicting the eventual outcome. Regulation includes allocation of resources, specify- ing the number of steps to complete a task, and the intensity and speed with which it will be completed. Paris and Lindauer (1982) described metacognitive control during reading and writing as consisting of planning, monitoring, and evaluation. In this case, planning refers to the selection of strategies and the allocation of resources, monitoring to comprehension monitor- ing, and evaluation to the examination of progress toward goals that can lead back to more planning and more monitoring. What is common to all of these articulations of the control process is some initial analysis of what to do, making a plan to do some- thing, evaluating the usefulness of that plan, and then making appropriate revisions or modifications to the original plan. Garner (1987) described boundaries between research on metacognition and research on executive control. These areas of research have developed from different theoretical orienta- tions, make dissimilar assumptions, and rely on diverse methodological tools. Much of the work on metacognition emerged from Piagetian developmental research, whereas re- search on executive control originated in the information- processing model. Researchers from the two traditions differ in the emphasis placed on metacognitive knowledge rather than metacognitive control. Alternative Perspectives There are, however, alternative perspectives on metacogni- tion. For example, Schraw and Moshman (1995) focused on learners’ theories about their own cognition and on how well developed these knowledge structures are. These theories are “systematic frameworks used to explain and direct cognition, metacognitive knowledge, and regulatory skills” (p. 351). Schraw and Moshman distinguished between tacit, informal, and formal metacognitive theories. Tacit theories are im- plicit, “acquired or constructed without any explicit aware- ness” (p. 358). Because learners are not aware of them, these implicit frameworks are not accessible for verification and may persist even when incorrect or maladaptive. Informal
beliefs and assumptions but “have not yet constructed an ex- plicit theoretical structure that integrates and justifies these beliefs” (p. 359). Unlike tacit theorists, however, informal theorists do have some degree of explicit metacognition and thus can judge the value of their framework. Formal theories are “highly systematized accounts of phenomenon involving explicit theoretical structures” (p. 361). According to Schraw and Moshman, the Good Strategy User as outlined by Pressley, Borkowski, and Schneider (1987) would be an ex- ample of a formal metacognitive theory. Formal theorists are explicitly aware of their “purposeful efforts to construct and modify metacognitive theories” (Schraw & Moshman, 1995, p. 361), so they can use formal theory to assess and interpret observations. Schraw and Moshman suggested that learners develop metacognitive theories through cultural learning, in- dividual construction, and peer interaction. Cornoldi (1998) echoed the perspective of Schraw and Moshman in his defin- ition of metacognitive attitude as the “general tendency of a person to develop reflection about the nature of his or her own cognitive ability and to think about the possibility of ex- tending and using this reflection” (p. 144). Critical Distinctions Sometimes in order to get a more focused view of what something is, theorists and researchers try to elucidate what it is not—a nonexample using the terminology of the concept- learning literature. One key discrimination for understanding the concept of metacognition is to articulate the distinction between cognition and metacognition (Nelson, 1999; Nelson & Narens, 1994). Nelson (1999) defined metacognition as “the scientific study of an individual’s cognitions about his or her own cognitions” (p. 625). Thus, metacognition is a subset of cognition, a particular kind of cognition. Garner and Alexander (1989) identified cognitive strategies as activities Metacognition: In Search of a Definition 81 for cognitive enhancement and metacognitive strategies as activities for monitoring cognitive processes. In other words, cognitive skills facilitate task achievement, and metacognitive skills help to regulate task achievement. Some research has supported the distinction between cognition and metacognition. For example, there is evidence that metamemory deficits can exist without memory impairment, so memory and metamemory are distinct (Nelson, 1999). Swanson (1990) provided evidence for the independence of metacognition from general aptitude by finding that fifth- and sixth-grade students with high levels of metacognitive skill outperformed students with low levels of metacognitive skills on problem-solving tasks regardless of overall aptitude. Although Hacker (1998a) referred to the “debatable issue” of whether thoughts that were initially metacognitive but are now nonconscious and automatic can still be considered metacognition (see also Nelson, 1996), he suggested that most researchers consider metacognitive thought to be con- scious and purposeful thinking (about thinking). Paris and Winograd (1990) limited their conception of metacognition to “knowledge about cognitive states and abilities that can be shared among people” (p. 21). Another important distinction is that between metacog- nition and self-regulation. Paris and Winograd (1990) noted that some researchers also include an affective component in their definitions of metacognition such as metacognitive beliefs or attributions. Borkowski (1996), for example, de- scribed three interrelated aspects of metacognition: knowl- edge, judgments and monitoring, and self-regulation. Borkowski’s view of metacognitive knowledge corresponds to Flavell’s (1979) categories of person, task, and strategy. Judgments and monitoring refer to processes occurring while performing a task, such as a feeling of knowing or comprehen- sion monitoring. Self-regulation refers to adapting skills and strategies to meet changing demands. Zimmerman (1995), however, argued that self-regulation “involves more than metacognitive knowledge and skill, it involves an underlying sense of self-efficacy and personal agency and the motivational and behavioral processes to put these self beliefs into effect” (p. 217). A learner could have well-developed metacognitive knowledge but be unable to self-regulate in a specific context. Self-regulated learning refers to the “capability to mobilize, direct, and sustain one’s instructional efforts” (p. 217). Thus, self-regulated learning is “more than metacognitive knowl- edge and skill, it involves a sense of personal agency to regulate other sources of personal influence (e.g., emotional processes and behavioral and social-environmental sources of influence)” (p. 218; for a further discussion of self-regulated learning, see chapter by Schunk and Zimmerman in this volume).
nition, “thinking about thinking,” has been traditionally asso- ciated with Piaget’s stage of formal operations, the concept has relevance for other theoretical perspectives in cognitive development (Yussen, 1985). The centrality of metacognition to cognitive development was highlighted by Flavell in 1979 when he argued that the “nature and development of meta- cognition and of cognitive monitoring/regulation is currently emerging as an interesting and promising new area of investi- gation” (p. 906). He described young children as being limited in their knowledge about cognitive phenomena (metacognition) and as failing to monitor memory and com- prehension. He developed a model of cognitive monitoring that he hoped would serve as a target for development. According to this model, development occurs through inter- actions among metacognitive knowledge, metacognitive experiences, goals (or tasks), and actions (or strategies). Metacognitive knowledge is stored knowledge about person, task, and strategy variables. Metacognitive experiences are the “items of metacognitive knowledge that have entered consciousness” (p. 908). Through metacognitive experiences, the stored metacognitive knowledge can be altered by adding, deleting, or revising information. Paris and Winograd (1990) elaborated on the integral role of metacognition in cognitive development by arguing that metacognition is “both a prod- uct and producer of cognitive development” (p. 19). Kuhn (1999, 2000) extended the discussion of the role of metacognition in cognitive development by focusing on the link between metacognition and the development of higher order thinking skills. She characterized the skills that most con- sider to be critical thinking skills as being metacognitive rather than cognitive. Higher order thinking or critical thinking by definition involves reflecting on what is known and how that knowledge can be verified—clearly metacognitive processes. Kuhn talked about metaknowing in three broad categories: metacognitive, metastrategic, and epistemological. Metacog- nitive knowing is declarative knowledge, knowledge about cognition. Metastrategic knowing refers to the selection and monitoring of strategies (procedural knowledge). Epistemo- logical knowledge refers to the general philosophical questions underlying a thoughtful examination of knowledge itself.
some of which are metacognitive. They are more skilled than novices at time allocation, strategy selection, prediction of task difficulty, and monitoring (Sternberg, 2001). Ertmer and |
