History of Civilizations of Central Asia
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cil was to be a representative Pan-Muslim governing body. It elected Mustafa Choqayev (Choqay-oghlu) as its chairman, and Ahmad Zeki Velidi as its secretary, and the members of the presidium were well-known progressive Jadids such as Munawwar Qari, Mahmud Khoja Behbudi, ‘Ubaydallah Khojayev, Tashpulat Norbutabekov, etc. At the same time, the First Turkistan Regional Congress of Councils of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies (7–15 April), at which only 5 of the 263 deputies were Muslims, came out in favour of the establishment in Russia of a republic with a strong centre, but did not voice any opinion on the question which was of major importance for the peoples of Turkistan: the autonomy of the region. 3 With regard to the future form of government, the Congress of Executive Commit- tees of Social Organizations of the Region (9–16 April 1917) 4 considered it necessary to ‘establish in Russia a democratic republic based on the principle of broad autonomy for the various regions of the state’. However, even the proposal to grant territorial rather than national autonomy was blocked by the chairman of the Turkistan Committee, who had been appointed by decision of the Provisional Government of Russia on 6 March 1917. 5 ‘As far as the administration of oblast’s [provinces] and krays [peripheral territories] is concerned, that is a matter for the Turkistan Committee.’ 6 At bottom, in replacing the governor-generalship of Turkistan with the Turkistan Committee, the Provisional Govern- ment had merely changed the external guise of the colonial administration of the region, while its essence remained as before. It led to confrontations between the Turkistan Com- mittee and local organizations. 3 Central State Archives (TsGA) of the Republic of Uzbekistan, coll. 17, inv. 1, file 399, fol. 187; Tashkent State Archive, coll. 10, inv. 1, file 28, fols. 2–3; Turkestanskie vedomosti, 12 April 1917. 4
, 1917
, pp. 8, 9, 28–9. 5
, Vol. 1, 1963, pp. 57–8. 6
, 1917
, pp. 15–16. 151
Contents ISBN 92-3-103985-7 ESTABLISHMENT OF SOVIET POWER Especially fierce was the political tug-of-war between the Turkistan Committee and the Tashkent Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies. Although the leaders of the national democrats did not believe that the Turkistan Committee was democratic, they nevertheless came out against the injunction of the Tashkent soviet that it should be wound up. The fiercely class-based approach of the Tashkent soviet to all social problems of the region, its growing demands for power, and its neglect of the general national interests of the indigenous inhabitants all tended to push the national democrats away from the soviets and exacerbate the opposition between them. This became particularly marked during the September (1917) events in Tashkent, when, taking advantage of the spontaneous indig- nation of the population in the face of the growing famine, the Bolsheviks attempted a coup-d’état , under the slogan of ‘transfer of power to the soviets’. The Second Regional Muslim Congress (7–11 September 1917), convened on the ini- tiative of the Sh¯ur¯a-yi Isl¯amiya, firmly proclaimed that: the congress is against the transfer of power to the soviets of workers’ and soldiers’ deputies. Power must be held by a coalition, based on all the forces of the country; in other words, it must be truly popular. 7 At this congress, the national democrats adopted the main planks of their platform: the indigenous population would take part in the regional government only if it was democratic and took their interests into account as the dominant constituent of the region; a top pri- ority for the population of Turkistan was the right to self-determination; and the Regional Muslim Council should be the legal pan-Muslim representative organ, acting in the name of the entire Muslim population, and defending its interests. 8 Within the movement to broaden the rights of the indigenous peoples to administer the region, fresh nuances became apparent. The liberal democratic tendencies, which had become stronger in the positions of the Jadid members of the Sh¯ur¯a-yi Isl¯amiya under the influence of the All-Russian Movement of Muslims, 9 gave rise to a backlash on the part of the clergy, who sought to stand apart in order to uphold the stability of traditional society and the inviolability of all Islamic rules and prescriptions. In June 1917 the Muslim clergy and their supporters left the Sh¯ur¯a-yi Isl¯amiya to form a new organization known as the
(Council of Religious Scholars). 7
, 13 Sept. 1917. 8 Ibid., 14 Sept. 1917. 9 Decisions of the First All-Russian Congress of Muslims (1–11 May 1917) on the granting of equal political rights to Muslim men and women, and the weakening of a number of shari‘a rules with a view to the emancipation of women. Programmnye dokumenty musul’manskikh politicheskikh partiy (1917–1920), 1985 , pp. 11–12. 152 Contents
Copyrights ISBN 92-3-103985-7 ESTABLISHMENT OF SOVIET POWER The separatist aims of the Sh¯ur¯a-yi ‘Ulam¯a’ became evident in the heated electoral campaign of the summer of 1917 for seats on the town councils (dumas). In this campaign, the Sh¯ur¯ayi ‘Ulam¯a’ produced its own platform and electoral list. The elections in Tashkent were won by the Sh¯ur¯a-yi ‘Ulam¯a’, which gained 62 seats out of 112, with 5 seats going to the Social Democrats, 24 to the Socialist Revolutionaries (SRs) and 11 to the Sh¯ur¯a-yi
. 10 The appearance in the public arena of the Sh¯ur¯a-yi ‘Ulam¯a’ substantially shifted the balance of political forces in the national movement, underscoring the steadily growing rift between the strategic and tactical aims of the two main currents that had come to the fore: the progressive democrats and the qadims (Persian qadim: ‘old’, traditionalist conservative), supporters of the ‘ulam¯a’. Each of these currents immediately sought to make its mark in terms of both organization and programme. The Congress of Muslim Organizations of Ferghana Oblast’, held in Skobelev from 12 to 14 June 1917 under the leadership of the intelligentsia and the progressive wing of the Muslim clergy, the Türk Adamï Markaziyat (Turkic Federalist Party, lit. ‘Turkish People’s Association’), 11 and the
Regional Congress of Muslims convened by the Sh¯ur¯a-yi‘Ulam¯a’ from 17 to 20 Septem- ber 1917, both recognized the need to form a political party to be known as the Ittif¯aq-i Muslimin (Muslim Alliance). 12 The meetings of both currents also hammered out their respective platforms. On a number of key issues, the progressive intellectuals and the qadims took identi- cal positions. They came out unambiguously in favour of granting Turkistan, Kazakhstan and other Turkic peoples national and territorial autonomy within the framework of a new Russia, and of the introduction there, for the first time in history, of a republican and par- liamentary form of government. However, the programme of the ‘ulam¯a’-supporters was aimed at the thorough Islamization of the future national political system. Social and political trends in the post-February period developed along very simi- lar lines in Kazakhstan. Here, the leaders of the national democratic intelligentsia, A. Bokeikhanov, A. Baitursynov, B. Dulatov, Zh. and Kh. Dosmuhamedov, Kh. Ghabbasov, M. Tanyshbayev, A. Yermekov, etc., functioned as a force for social consolidation under the watchword of national autonomy. Their weekly newspaper Qaz¯aq [Kazakh] gained indis- putable authority among the people. 13 With its hotly debated articles about the political situation of the Kazakh people and the political organization of the region, the newspaper played a major role in the political unification and activization of the democratic forces. 10
, 6 Aug. 1917. 11
, Vol. 1, 1963 , pp. 174, 193–4. 12 Ibid.
13 Choqay Oghli, 1992 , p. 13 (reminiscences from 1917). 153 Contents
Copyrights ISBN 92-3-103985-7 ESTABLISHMENT OF SOVIET POWER The All-Kazakh Congress convened by the national-liberal intelligentsia in Orenburg from 21 to 26 July 1917 was attended by delegates from all areas of Steppe region. The congress debated the vital problems of the Kazakh people: landownership, the workers’ question, public education, etc. In its resolutions adopted on those issues, the congress was in favour of halting the policy of resettling Russians in Steppe region, and returning the lands distributed to the settlers to the local population; of securing the immediate return of Kazakhs who had been mobilized during the First World War for work behind the front lines, and halting further such mobilization in the future; and of freeing those imprisoned for their opposition to the mobilization, and the halting of prosecutions on those grounds. With its proposals for the introduction of a special national administration, the creation of judicial organs for the local population, and the wide-scale development of public edu- cation, the congress laid the foundations for the future autonomous organization of the Kazakh steppes. 14 The platform elaborated by the congress defined the main lines and political programme of the national political party, Alash-Orda, which was founded at the congress. 15 The party came out firmly in favour of a democratic Russia, in which ‘each individual state within the federal republic would be autonomous and self-governing with equal rights and interests.’ On the whole, a characteristic of the movement for the autonomy of the peoples of Russian Central Asia was faith in the possibility of peaceful, constitutional means to achieve that goal. Muslim leaders of all tendencies were enthusiastic supporters of the All-Russian Constituent Assembly, and saw in its convening an opportunity to achieve autonomy and to decide the future of their peoples. The February 1917 events in Russia also produced an echo in the emirate of Bukhara and the khanate of Khiva, both under Russian protectorate, and helped to unite the progressive forces of the two khanates. In a comparatively short space of time, the Jadids organized themselves in the Young Bukharan and Young Khivan parties, drawing up their own ideology on the model of the Young Turks. A small number of young democratic elements, inspired by the ideas of the February revolution, proclaimed themselves ardent supporters of reforming and democratizing the social structure of their countries. They understood very clearly just how difficult and complex those tasks were, given the monarchistic foundations of society, whose stability was supported and encouraged by the indisputable authority of Islam and the Muslim clergy. The new political forces were obliged to seek help from outside. On 14 March 1917 the leader of the Young Bukharans, ‘Abdurrauf Fitrat, together with his 14 Choqay Oghli, 1992 , pp. 14–15. 15
, 21 Nov. 1917. 154 Contents
Copyrights ISBN 92-3-103985-7 ESTABLISHMENT OF SOVIET POWER comrade-in-arms, Yuldashev, sent a congratulatory telegram to the Provisional Govern- ment of Russia in which they included a request for help in carrying out political reforms in the emirate of Bukhara. 16 Under pressure from the democratic forces of Russia, the rulers of the khanates agreed to make a number of concessions to the reformers. On 5 April 1917 a manifesto was adopted in the khanate of Khiva whereby the power of the khan was limited by a majlis (parliament), to be elected from among the representatives of the clergy and the bour- geoisie, and a Council of N¯azirs (ministers). The government and the majlis were headed by Young Khivans, who saw the establishment of a constitutional monarchy as a stepping- stone on the way to realizing their reformist aspirations. On 7 April 1917 the last Bukhara emir, Sayyid ‘Alim Khan, signed a manifesto for reforms drawn up by the Russian resident in Bukhara, Miller. In it, the emir promised to regulate the tax system, institute a government treasury, introduce a fair system of jus- tice and a proper budget, institute controls over government officials, establish a system of municipal government, and encourage and foster the development of industry, trade, sci- ence and education. Announcing the reforms, the manifesto stressed that ‘the sole basis for all improvements and useful changes can only be the Holy shar¯ı‘a’. The Bukharan Jadids received the manifesto enthusiastically and decided to show their support in a demonstration, which was broken up by conservative forces. The Jadids, fear- ing persecution, fled to Tashkent and Samarkand. Under pressure from the clergy, the emir had the manifesto abrogated. In the riw¯ayat (religious ruling) proclaimed by the clergy, all proponents of reform were declared outlaws. A little later, in June 1917, the Khivan Jadids were also defeated. On the orders of Esfandiyar Khan, 17 Young Khivans were arrested and their places in the majlis were taken by representatives of the feudal aristocracy. In early November 1917, the khan dissolved the entire majlis. The Young Khivans who remained at liberty also sought shelter in Turkistan. These events had a decisive impact on the subsequent political course of the khanates. On the one hand, the forces that supported absolute monarchy were able to consolidate their position, and the monarchy itself became more brutal. On the other hand, the oppo- sition movement underwent changes. With the loss of their illusions concerning the possi- bility of a peaceful reform of society, a section of the Jadids, in particular the liberal wing, shied away from active political work, and another section – the Young Bukharans and Young Khivans – adopted a sharp change in tactics: relying on external political forces, they embarked upon the path of armed struggle against the regime. 16
, Vol. 1, 1963, pp. 38–9. 155 Contents
Copyrights ISBN 92-3-103985-7 ESTABLISHMENT OF SOVIET POWER By the autumn of 1917 in Turkistan, the widespread bitterness of the European workers and soldiers in the towns of the region had clearly boiled over into revolutionary sen- timents. Spearheading the masses, who were steadily becoming revolutionized, was the Tashkent Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies, led by the Bolsheviks. Thus, as soon as the news was received in Tashkent on 27 October 1917 that the Provisional Government in Petrograd had been overthrown, a plenary meeting of the Tashkent soviet held on the night of 27–28 October adopted a decision to launch a military uprising. The three days of fighting in Tashkent culminated in an armed coup d’état, and on 1 November, the Tashkent soviet seized power. The same day, it sent a telegram to all soviets of the region: ‘All power has been taken by the soviets. Take power into your own hands.’ Unlike in Petrograd, where the question of power in the country had been immediately resolved at the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets, in Turkistan there was a fierce battle for power between the parties and organizations that had participated in the October coup in Tashkent (Bolsheviks, Left Socialist Revolutionaries, Internationalist Mensheviks, members of the Tashkent soviet and the Turkistan Regional Muslim Council, etc.) and those who were opposed to the transfer of power to the soviets. Defending their previous positions, which had been repeatedly proclaimed by the Turkistan Regional Muslim Coun- cil, the national democrats publicly expressed their strong protest against the seizure of power by the Bolsheviks. 17 The members of the Turkistan Regional Muslim Council who, following the October events, had left Tashkent for Kokand were antagonistic towards the Bolsheviks, and considered it absolutely unacceptable to come to an agreement with them on the question of power. The fierce struggle over the principles governing the form that the new government should take affected the working atmosphere at the Third Regional Congress of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies, which opened on 15 November 1917 in Tashkent. 18 The 114 dele- gates to the congress were composed mainly of European workers and soldiers. The draft resolutions on how regional power should be organized submitted for discussion by the party fractions of the Left Socialist Revolutionaries, the United Social Democrats (Right Socialist Revolutionaries and Mensheviks), the Regional Congress of Peasants’ Deputies and the resolution of the Conference of Muslims (12–15 November 1917) proclaimed by the leader of the ‘ulam¯a’, Sher ‘Ali Lapin, all included arrangements for the repre- sentation of the indigenous population in the regional government bodies. However, the Maximalist 19 -Bolshevik majority blocked these proposals. 17 Svobodniy Samarkand , 25 Nov. 1917. 18 The congress, which merged on the following day with the Regional Congress of Peasants’ Deputies, became known as the Regional Congress of Workers’, Soldiers’ and Peasants’ Deputies. 19 Maximalists: Menshevik-Maximalists. 156 Contents
Copyrights ISBN 92-3-103985-7 ESTABLISHMENT OF SOVIET POWER The Bolsheviks resolutely insisted on creating regional power structures on central- ist principles and on a strictly proletarian class basis. In his address, the Bolshevik F. I. Kolesov said: It is the soldiers, workers and peasants who were victorious, and they must take power into their own hands. . . . We demand that all power should go to the soviets of workers’, soldiers’ and peasants’ deputies. 20 At the congress, a majority of votes went to the draft resolution by the united fraction of Bolsheviks and Maximalists, which became known as the Declaration. It stated that the highest organ of authority in the region would be the Regional Soviet of Workers’, Soldiers’ and Peasants’ Deputies, henceforth to be known as the Soviet of People’s Commissars of the Turkistan Region, and that its membership would be limited to representatives of the Left Socialist parties which had taken part in the October coup. Concerning participation by the indigenous population in the regional organs of government, the congress was quite unambiguous: The inclusion of Muslims at present in the organs of the highest regional revolutionary author- ity is unacceptable in view of the uncertain attitude of the native population to the authority of the soldiers’, workers’ and peasants’ deputies, and in view of the fact that there are no proletarian class organizations among the native population. 21 The government elected at the congress (Soviet of People’s Commissars) did not include a single representative of the indigenous population of the region. In accordance with the resolution adopted at the Third Congress of Soviets concern- ing the organization of power at local level, power began to be transferred there to the soviets. Between November 1917 and January 1918, Soviet power was established in all new quarters of the towns of the Turkistan region. As in Tashkent, a decisive role in the establishment of Soviet power was played by workers and soldiers of European origin, led by the Bolsheviks and supported by the Left Socialist Revolutionaries. In the soviets them- selves, the proportion of Muslim representatives was insignificant, with none at all among the leaders of local soviets at that time. With the establishment of Soviet power began the process of creating Soviet adminis- trative structures and, above all, punitive organs. On 28 November 1917 the Sovnarkom (Soviet of People’s Commissars: the first Soviet government) of Turkistan took a deci- sion to create detachments of the Red Guards in Turkistan. From early 1918, Red Army units began to be formed in the Turkistan region, and Chekas (from the Russian initials for Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counterrevolution and Sabotage – the first 20
, 18 Nov. 1917. 21
, 1947
, p. 93. 157
Contents Copyrights ISBN 92-3-103985-7 ESTABLISHMENT OF SOVIET POWER Soviet security organs) and revolutionary tribunals began to be set up everywhere. The soviets and their punitive organs waged a relentless battle against all parties, organizations and forces which did not recognize Bolshevik power. The Turkistan Bolsheviks’ orthodoxy and their literal interpretation of the principle of Download 8.99 Mb. Do'stlaringiz bilan baham: 
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