History of Civilizations of Central Asia
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the dictatorship of the proletariat prevented them from gaining a proper appreciation of the true situation obtaining in the multi-ethnic Russian empire, which was in fact borne in mind by the Sovnarkom of the Russian Republic. The Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia (2 November 1917) solemnly proclaimed the ‘right of the peoples of Russia to free self-determination, and even to separation and the formation of an independent govern- ment’. In accordance with the declaration, in a special address ‘To all Muslim workers of Russia and the East’ (20 November 1917), the Sovnarkom of the Russian Republic urged them to:
seek to order your national life freely and without hindrance. This is your right. Please know that your rights, like the rights of all the peoples of Russia, are safeguarded by the full power of the revolution and its organs, the soviets of workers’, soldiers’ and peasants’ deputies. 22 By refusing the indigenous inhabitants of Turkistan and their national forces and orga- nizations the right to administer the region, the ruling parties, the Turkistan Bolsheviks and Left Socialist Revolutionaries, ruled out the possibility of a compromise solution to the question of who should hold power, and thereby made unavoidable the forthcoming clash of forces in the political life of the region. On 26 November 1917 in Kokand, the Fourth Extraordinary Regional Muslim Congress began its work. It was attended by more than 200 representatives from Ferghana, Syr Darya and Samarkand oblast’s, Transcaspia and Bukhara, and by delegates from the Sh¯ur¯a-yi
, the Sh¯ur¯a-yi ‘Ulam¯a’, the Soviet of Muslim Warriors, the Regional Jewish Orga- nization, etc. The focus of attention at the congress was the question of the form of gov- ernment in Turkistan. Most statements in that debate were sharply critical of the Turkistan Bolsheviks and their interference in the internal life of the indigenous population. All par- ticipants supported the idea of declaring autonomy. In a resolution adopted unanimously on 27 November, the congress: expressing the desire of the national groups inhabiting Turkistan for self-determination on the basis of the principles proclaimed by the great Russian revolution, declares Turkistan an autonomous territory within the Federal Russian Republic. The precise form of autonomy, however, was to be determined by the Turkistan Con- stituent Assembly. 23 On 28 November a name was given to the nascent government body: 22 Pobeda oktiabr’skoy revoliutsii v Uzbekistane , Vol. 1, 1963, p. 571. 23
, 8 Dec. 1917. 158 Contents
Copyrights ISBN 92-3-103985-7 ESTABLISHMENT OF SOVIET POWER the Turkist¯an Mukht¯ariyati (Turkistan Autonomous Assembly), 24 the first practical experi- ment in introducing a national democratic form of government in the territory of Turkistan. The structures of power determined by the congress – the Turkistan Provisional Soviet elected before the convening of the Turkistan Constituent Assembly, the Turkistan (Natio- nal) Assembly, the national government, and indeed the work of the congress – all had a clear democratic orientation. The new government structures were based on the pro- portional representation of all national groups, and drew on an integrated combination of general democratic and national values. When the government was formed at the congress, eight people were elected, and the remaining four seats were set aside to be filled by candi- dates of European origin. The government consisted of M. Tanyshbayev (prime minister), I. Shah-Ahmedov (deputy prime minister) and the following ministers: M. Choqayev, ‘Ubay- dallah Khojayev, Yurali Aghayev, Abijan Mahmudov, ‘Abd al-Rahman Urazayev and S. A. Gertsfel’d. 25 The decisions of the Fourth Extraordinary All-Turkistan Congress of Muslims stirred the broad masses of the indigenous population, who had hitherto been sluggish about the coup d’état and the appearance of soviets in the towns. There were thousands of politi- cal rallies, meetings and demonstrations in the towns and villages in support of the Turk-
: in Namangan, the qishl¯aqs (winter quarters) of Khanabad in Jalalabad volost’ (6 December), Tashkent (6 and 13 December), Kokand (7 December), Samarkand and other towns, and the First Extraordinary Congress of Muslim Workers’, Soldiers’ and Peasants’ Deputies (late December 1917), which sent a telegram to the Sovnarkom of the Russian Republic proposing that it should instruct the Tashkent Sovnarkom to hand over power in the Turkistan region to the Provisional Government of Turkistan in order to avert anarchy and diarchy (dual power), which might lead Turkistan to a great catastrophe. 26 The proclamation of the autonomy of Turkistan was supported by the Turkistan branches of a number of Russian parties, in particular the Turkistan Left Socialist Revolutionaries, the Tashkent branch of the Bund (the General Jewish Workers’ Union), the Tashkent Georgian Society, the First All-Ukraine Congress, the All-Russian Muslim Council, etc. Against the backdrop of the growing expression of popular will in favour of auton- omy for Turkistan, the fickle behaviour of the leaders of the Sh¯ur¯a-yi ‘Ulam¯a’ was rather curious. On 6 December 1917 at a political meeting in Tashkent, together with national democrats, Sh¯ur¯a-yi ‘Ulam¯a’ representatives supported the decision to proclaim autonomy and form the Turkist¯an Mukht¯ariyati, but soon afterwards, following the bloody events of 24
, 1 Dec. 1917. 25
, 18 Dec. 1917;
, 9 Dec. 1917. 26
, coll. 1318, inv. 1, file 88, fol. 22. 159 Contents
Copyrights ISBN 92-3-103985-7 ESTABLISHMENT OF SOVIET POWER 13 December 1917 (when on Bolshevik orders a peaceful demonstration of local inhabi- tants in Tashkent was gunned down, at a political meeting called by themselves in Tashkent), the same representatives criticized the Provisional Government of the Turkist¯an
, laying full blame on it for the events of 13 December, and calling for it not to be recognized. In this way, the conflicting views which had already come to light in the period lead- ing up to October between the Jadids and the ‘ulam¯a’-supporters concerning both strategic and tactical questions not only did not die down, but rather flared up with renewed intran- sigence, seriously jeopardizing national unity and the future of Turkistan autonomy. These
conflicting views
also shook
the Provisional Government of the Turkist¯an Mukht¯ariyati itself. After little more than two months of existence, it underwent a number of changes in its leadership. In early January, Prime Minister Tanyshbayev was replaced by M. Choqayev, who promised to take ‘more vigorous measures to defend Mus- lim interests’. 27 Under the leadership of Choqayev, the cabinet of ministers did indeed take active steps to consolidate the national forces around the Turkist¯an Mukht¯ariyati, to put it on a sound financial footing, and to create the Mukht¯ariyat’s own armed forces, which in addition to the regular national army (which by January had grown to a force of 2,000) also included the forces led by the head of the Kokand militia, Ergash. 28 However, the actions of Choqayev’s cabinet did not please those in favour of a more radical approach, who demanded an end to all contacts with the organs of Soviet power, and the launching of military action. On 5 February 1918 Choqayev’s cabinet was overthrown and power passed to Ergash, the leader of the more radically inclined forces. By this time, the Soviet posture had become more hardline. A majority of delegates at the Fourth Regional Congress of Soviets (19–26 January 1918) voted in favour of a resolu- tion proposed by the Bolsheviks: ‘The party of revolutionary social democrats must work to ensure the proletarian autonomy of the region.’ 29 They adopted the following resolu- tion: ‘The Kokand Autonomous Government and its members shall be outlawed, and its ringleaders arrested.’ 30 In late January/early February, Soviet military units began to converge on Kokand, not only troops from the garrisons in Ferghana oblast’, but also those who had managed to escape following the crushing of the Cossacks’ revolt at Samarkand, and troops from the 27
, 7 Jan. 1918. 28 Ibid., 31 Jan. 1918; Alekseyenkov, 1931 , p. 45.
29 Nasha gazeta , 25 Jan. 1918. 30
, 1967 , p. 587. 160
Contents ISBN 92-3-103985-7 ESTABLISHMENT OF SOVIET POWER Orenburg Front. 31 On the orders of the military commissar of the Turkistan Republic, who arrived with them, from 6 to 9 February not only the residence and armed forces of the Turkist¯an Mukht¯ariyati were subjected to fierce shelling, but the peaceful population of Kokand and surrounding areas were also bombarded, and those localities were reduced to lifeless ruins. During the military operations, two members of the Turkist¯an Mukht¯ariyati, Yurali Aghayev and Miradil Mirza Ahmedov, were killed and Nasir Khan Tura, S. Gerts- fel’d and Abijan Mahmudov were arrested after they had fled Kokand. Ergash also fled Kokand with the remains of his troops. Many supporters of the Turkist¯an Mukht¯ariyati were arrested and shot without trial or investigation, and others emigrated. 32 Equally fierce measures were taken against national organizations. Following the dis- solution by the Sh¯ur¯a-yi Isl¯amiya of the municipal dumas in October and later months, such measures were now taken against the Sh¯ur¯a-yi ‘Ulam¯a’. By decision of the Turkistan Sovnarkom of 13 May 1918, the Tashkent branch of the ‘ulam¯a’ was prohibited as ‘not corresponding to the interests of the working class’ and its property was nationalized. Its journal, al-Iz¯ah [Clarification, Commentary], was banned. 33 No less sad was the fate of the national autonomous assembly formed at the Second All-Kazakh Congress held from 5 to 13 December 1917 in Orenburg. The autonomous Alash government elected at the congress was dubbed the Alash-Orda. At the same time, Alash supporters left the ratification of the autonomous constitution to the ‘goodwill’ of the All-Russian Constituent Assembly. Nevertheless, in their search for guarantors of their national autonomy, the Alash party activists were obliged to turn to anti-Soviet forces, in the persons of the ataman (chief ) Dutov and Admiral Kolchak. But those who were fighting Bolshevism were above all fervent supporters of a ‘united and indivisible Russia’, and refused to engage in military collaboration with the Alash-Orda. The leaders of the national liberal movement appealed repeatedly to the Bolshevik lead- ership. On the question of territorial and national autonomy, talks were held with Lenin and with the people’s commissar for nationality affairs, Stalin, in late March 1918 in Moscow by an Alash delegation from Ural’sk (the Dosmuhamedov brothers) and on a direct line in April 1918 by A. Bokeikhanov, Kh. Ghabbasov and A. Yermekov. 34 How- ever, the Alash-Orda programme received little understanding on the part of Russia’s Bolshevik leaders, or indeed local Bolsheviks. On 21 March 1918 the Ural Guberniya Congress of Soviets decided to dissolve the local Alash-Orda ‘government’, and made 31 According to several Soviet historians, 11 troop convoys arrived at Kokand station carrying cavalry, artillery and infantry units: see Zevelev, 1972
, p. 265. 32
, 12, 14, 19 March 1918; Choqay Oghli, 1992, p. 49 (footnote). 33
, Vol. 2, 1972, p. 265. 34
, 2001
, pp. 519–20. 161
Contents Copyrights ISBN 92-3-103985-7 ESTABLISHMENT OF SOVIET POWER arrangements for the arrest of the Dosmuhamedov brothers. The First Turgay Oblast’ Congress of Soviets (March–April 1918) decided to close down the Alash-Orda newspaper Qaz¯aq and confiscate its printing press. The Semirechye Oblast’ Commissariat for the Reg- ulation of Russian–Kazakh Relations decided to abolish the Kyrgyz Provincial Alash-Orda Committee. 35 However, Russia’s Bolshevik leadership, having engaged in a fierce struggle with the national democratic governments which had arisen in the peripheral regions of the Russian empire and which it saw as simply ‘bourgeois nationalist and counterrevolutionary’, was, with respect to political reconstruction, nevertheless obliged to make certain concessions to the national interests of the various peoples. In accordance with the programme being implemented in the first half of 1918 for the federation of the Russian state, and under the leadership of the extraordinary commissar of the Soviet Government, P. A. Kobozev, dispatched from Moscow in early April 1918, the plan for ‘ Soviet autonomy’ began to be carried out in Turkistan. In the resolution on the Turkistan Soviet Republic adopted on 30 April by the Fifth Regional Congress of Soviets, Turkistan was proclaimed a Soviet Republic of the Russian Soviet Federation, governing itself autonomously and coordinating its action with the Government of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR). 36 The proclaimed autonomy was legally ratified at the Sixth Regional Congress of Soviets (autumn 1918), through the adoption of the constitution of Turkistan. The constitution, having proclaimed the Turkistan Autonomous Republic to be part of the RSFSR, determined the allocation of powers between the federation and the autonomous republic, and confirmed the existing structure and functions of the organs of government: all power within the territory of Turkistan belonged to the soviets of workers’, soldiers’ and peasants’ deputies; the supreme legislative organ of the republic was proclaimed to be the Congress of Soviets, with the Turkistan Central Executive Committee (Turk TsIK – Turk- istan TsIK) as the standing legislative body acting between congresses, and the Soviet of People’s Commissars (SNK) as the executive organ with the right to take legislative initia- tives. The constitution, drawn up in accordance with the 1918 constitution of the RSFSR, withheld voting rights from individuals who used hired labour or lived on unearned income, and from the clergy and other such categories of the population. 37 ‘Soviet autonomy’ ignored the specific national aspects of the social, political and cul- tural life of the peoples of the region, and provided no legal protection therefore. ‘Soviet 35
, 1967, p. 608. 36
, Vol. 1, 1963, pp. 251–2. 37
, Vol. 1, 1959, pp. 279–80. 162
Contents Copyrights ISBN 92-3-103985-7 ESTABLISHMENT OF SOVIET POWER autonomy’, given its lack of the fundamental principle of national autonomy – the right of the indigenous people of a national-territorial unit to the independent exercise of govern- ment authority – was basically territorial, but not national-territorial. The aspirations of the indigenous peoples of Turkistan for the establishment and con- solidation of political sovereignty and national self-determination were not satisfied by the proclamation of ‘ Soviet autonomy’. Indeed, the constitution of the Turkistan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (TASSR) was not ratified by the Russian legislative organs. Instead, the preparation and holding of the Fifth and Sixth Regional Congresses of Soviets, the enthusiastic political agitation and propaganda, and the use of slogans concerning the need to involve the broad masses of the indigenous population in constructive work all led to shifts in the attitudes of the indigenous population, who had thus far been fairly indif- ferent to Soviet power. The re-elections to local soviets held immediately prior to those congresses were accompanied by an expansion in the area under Soviet power and the penetration of soviets into rural localities. There was also a growth in the proportion of representatives of the indigenous population in the government structures of the republic. While in the Turkistan Executive Committee elected by the Fifth Congress of Soviets there were 7 indigenous representatives out of 26, and in the Soviet of People’s Commissars 3 out of 16, in the Turkistan Executive Committee elected by the Sixth Congress of Soviets, there were 20 out of 75. These developments were decisively influenced by the First Congress of the Communist Party of Turkistan (KPT, June 1918), which completed the welding of the various Com- munist Party committees and organizations into a single party. Of particular importance for the future of Soviet statehood was the resolution adopted by the congress entitled ‘On party work among the Muslim proletariat’. The congress’s proclamation that the Muslim proletariat was recognized by the communists as ‘the mainstay of Soviet power in Turk- istan’ sounded somewhat demagogic. Nevertheless, a number of measures outlined by the congress with a view to putting the proclaimed autonomy into practice – recognition of the language of the majority of the population ( Turkic) as an official language alongside Russian; the publication of official documents in these languages; and the establishment at all levels of the Soviet system of commissariats for nationality affairs 38 – all played, as was the intention, a certain propagandizing role. At the same time as the formation of the Turkistan ASSR, the Soviet autonomy of the Kazakh people began to take shape. On 12 May 1918 a decision of the people’s commis- sar for nationality affairs of the RSFSR was published, providing for the establishment within the commissariat of a Kazakh Department. Within the People’s Commissariat for 38
, 1987
, pp. 11–12. 163
Contents Copyrights ISBN 92-3-103985-7 ESTABLISHMENT OF SOVIET POWER Nationality Affairs, an action group began work to convene an All-Kazakh Congress of Soviets. However, the preparatory work, under the leadership of the extraordinary com- missar for the Kazakh Steppe region, A. Zhangeldin, was halted by the civil war that began in mid-1918. It was only a year later, on 10 July 1919, that Lenin signed a ‘Decree on the Revolutionary Committee for the Administration of the Kyrgyz 39 Region’. On 26 August 1920 the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the Soviet of People’s Commis- sars of the RSFSR adopted a ‘Decree on the Creation of the Autonomous Kyrgyz (Kazakh) Socialist Soviet Republic’, according to which Kazakhstan was to acquire Soviet statehood, including the right to autonomy within the framework of the RSFSR. This decree was approved at the Constituent Congress of Soviets of Kazakhstan held from 4 to 12 Decem- ber 1920 in Orenburg. The congress, which was attended by 273 delegates, proclaimed the Kazakh Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (KASSR). 40 Soviet autonomy was thus established in Kazakhstan, as it had been in Turkistan, from above, on the initiative of the Bolshevik leadership of Russia. However, the increasingly complex political situation in the second half of 1918 had the effect of stalling the implementation of even these principles of autonomy. The policy of crushing democratic freedoms, the plundering of the property-owning classes, the destruc- tion of the economic infrastructure, the food crisis, the growing threat of famine and the narrow, class-based approach to state-building all conspired in mid-1918 to unleash a fierce civil war in Transcaspia, Semirechye and Kazakhstan. Being cut off from Soviet Russia by the Orenburg, Semirechye and Transcaspian fronts, Turkistan found itself effectively under a blockade. The White Guards controlled two-thirds of Kazakhstan. The anti-Soviet uprising in Tashkent, headed by the military commissar of the Turkistan Republic, the Bolshevik K. Osipov (January 1919), demonstrated the full extent of the crisis of Soviet power. The tight concentration of power in the aftermath of the uprising led to an even greater restriction of limited freedoms, and the unleashing of fresh terror and repressive measures: an extraordinary commission was set up to investigate the participants in the uprising and was empowered to ‘hand down and carry out sentences’. A purge of political parties and Soviet institutions was proclaimed, and the bourgeoisie was made liable to pay indemnities and perform forced labour. It was in this period that the fate of the Left Socialist Revolutionary Party was decided. Following the Osipov uprising and its crushing and, more particularly, the Left Social- ist Revolutionary uprising in Moscow and the consequent collapse of the Soviet coalition 39 In those years in official documents, the Kazakhs (Qaz¯aq) were called Kyrgyz (Qïrghïz), and the Kyrgyz were called Kara-Kyrgyz (Qara-Qïrghïz). 40
, 1967, p. 608; Istoriya Kazakhstana i Tsentral’noy
, 2001 , p. 523. 164
Contents Copyrights ISBN 92-3-103985-7 ESTABLISHMENT OF SOVIET POWER at the centre, the Seventh Regional Congress of Soviets legalized the liquidation and dis- solution of the Left Socialist Revolutionary Party in Turkistan. The two-party coalition, which had been in existence in the region since November 1917, fell apart. The Bolshe- viks became the only party in power. The monopoly on power of the ‘workers’ party’ further strengthened the ‘local separatism’ of the Bolshevik leadership of Turkistan, and their determination to be the sole deciders of the fate of the peoples of the region. However, these developments came into sharp conflict with the by then strongly cen- tralizing tendencies of the Russian Bolshevik Government. Their growing conviction of the need for a strong central power capable of restoring broken economic links and contacts with local authorities, standardizing the financial system, and ensuring order and disci- pline was reflected in a shift by central government in matters of practical detail towards extraordinary methods and forms of government, and the establishment of special organs – extraordinary commissions, extraordinary commissars, etc. – which were designed to compensate for the weakness of local authorities. Upon receiving the news of the crushing of the Tashkent uprising, the Russian Soviet of People’s Commissars established such a special commission on 12 February 1919. It was entrusted by the central government with the supervisory, judicial and executive functions of state power. On 5 March, of the various members of the special commission, P. Kobozev arrived alone in Tashkent at the head of a group of party workers. With the arrival of Kobozev, the situation in Turkistan became even more compli- cated: relations between him and several members of the Turkistan leadership deteriorated sharply. In his fight against their ‘local separatism’, Kobozev used the national question. He accused the Turkistan leadership of failing to resolve the national problem by creating autonomy only for themselves, and not for the broad masses of the indigenous population, by issuing calls for the immediate exercise of the right to self-determination. It was the position of Kobozev which in many ways determined the creation in March 1919 by the Regional Committee of the Communist Party of Turkistan of the Regional Muslim Bureau (Kraymusbyuro, Musbyuro) to work among the indigenous population (its members included T. Ryskulov as chairman, A. Muhitdinov, N. Khojayev, etc.) and dic- tated the introduction of the principle of proportional representation of national groups (nationalities) in the government organs of Turkistan (July 1919). In a comparatively short space of time, the Regional Muslim Bureau achieved concrete results by creating within the party committees local bureaux of Muslim communists and Muslim sections among the grass-roots party organizations, which very quickly became independent organizations existing alongside the party cells in production units. 41 41 Kommunisticheskaya partiya Turkestana v rezoliutsiyakh syezdov i konferentsiy , 1987 , p. 52. 165
Contents Copyrights ISBN 92-3-103985-7 ESTABLISHMENT OF SOVIET POWER Among the members of the national party organizations, there were numerous former Jadids. According to the leader of the Turkistan Jadids, Munawwar Qari, 42 as early as the first half of 1918, the Tashkent section of the secret Jadid society Ittih¯ad-i Taraqqi (Union for Progress), formed in August 1917, officially permitted its members to join Soviet gov- ernment parties. Cooperation with the Soviet authorities was begun by members of the national intelligentsia, many of whom started to work in Soviet institutions, particularly in the field of education. 43 The fact that the Jadids and members of the national intelligentsia joined the Communist Party had an impact both on the future development of the budding national communist movement and on the political positions of the leaders of the Regional Muslim Bureau. The Regional Committee of the Communist Party of Turkistan, and more particularly the Regional Muslim Bureau, took the initiative of implementing the decisions of the Cen- tral Committee of the Russian Communist Party ( Bolsheviks) regarding proportional rep- resentation of the national groups of the region. The authority of the Regional Muslim Bureau and its local branches grew significantly: they effectively controlled and ensured the movement of national cadres among the soviets. This group of party and Soviet workers, headed by the chairman of the Regional Muslim Bureau, T. Ryskulov, and intent on actively combating the remains of colonialism in the region, was initially supported by the Commission of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee (VTsIK) and the Council of People’s Commissars of the RSFSR on Turkistan Affairs (Turkkomissiya – the Turkistan Commission). It was formed following the breach- ing of the blockade and the definitive linking of Turkistan to the centre in October 1919. Its members included key party workers from the centre: Sh. Z. Eliava (chairman), M. V. Frunze, V. V. Kuibyshev, F. Goloshchokin, Ya. Rudzutak and G. I. Bokii. Granted sweep- ing powers not only by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the Council of People’s Commissars of the RSFSR, but also by the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks), the Turkistan Commission took decisive steps to neutral- ize the political forces that were firmly convinced that the Turkistan Bolsheviks had pri- ority rights to the leadership of Turkistan to counterbalance the centralizing aspirations of Russia. In this conflict, portrayed by the Turkistan Commission as a struggle with Great-Power chauvinism, the Regional Muslim Bureau and its chairman, T. Ryskulov, sided with the 42 His memoirs were written at the behest of the head of the Central Asian Department of the United State Political Administration (secret police; Russian acronym: OGPU) of the USSR, Bel’skiy, in 1928. Begun while Qari was still at liberty, they were completed behind the walls of OGPU, where he was imprisoned in 1929. 43
2001 , pp. 22–4. 166 Contents
Copyrights ISBN 92-3-103985-7 ESTABLISHMENT OF SOVIET POWER Turkistan Commission, with the result that Ryskulov was elected in January 1920 as chairman of the Turkistan Central Executive Committee. However, in this struggle it soon became apparent that the national communists were quick to defend their interests. As early as January 1920, the Third Conference of Muslim Organizations of the Communist Party of Turkistan elaborated, and the Fifth Conference of the Communist Party of Turkistan later proclaimed, a programme entitled ‘On the autonomy and constitution of Turkistan’. Designed to substantiate the premise, ‘Turkistan, from the point of view of ethnography and numerous other factors, is a Turkic national republic,’ this programme was aimed at upholding the sovereign rights of its indigenous population. 44 The ideas affirmed by the Fifth Conference of the Communist Party of Turkistan (Janu- ary 1920) through its decision to form the Turkic Communist Party and the Turkic Soviet Republic were boldly defended by Ryskulov’s group in a struggle lasting several months with the Turkistan Commission not only within the country, but also, on more than one occasion, involving appeals to the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party ( Bolsheviks). The visit to Moscow in May 1920 by a plenipotentiary delegation led by Ryskulov had considerable resonance in the social and political life of the region. Members of the Turkistan Commission also arrived in Moscow at the same time. In its observations on the ‘Project for the establishment of the Turkistan Autonomous Soviet Republic of the Russian Socialist Federation’ and its report on ‘The situation in Turkistan’ submitted to the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks), the Turkistan delega- tion, drawing on its experience of more than six months of the functioning of the Turkistan Commission and the Revolutionary Military Soviet of the Turkistan Front in Turkistan, gave a sharply critical assessment, in view of ‘the tendency of these two organs to consider Turkistan as a Soviet colony, whereas what is needed is a military administration of the region.’ 45 Finding that situation abnormal, the delegation demanded that full powers be granted to the workers of the indigenous national group, all superstructures such as the Turk- istan Commission be abolished, and the rights of the Revolutionary Military Soviet be restricted. 46 In the concrete measures proposed, particular attention was devoted to the affirmation of such symbols of state sovereignty as the creation of a national army, the attribution of full political powers solely to state organs of the republic (the Congress of Soviets, the Turkistan Central Executive Committee, the Turkistan Council of People’s 44 The Archives of the Apparatus of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan (AAP RUz), coll. 60, inv. 1, file 406, fol. 24ob. 45 Russian Centre for the Conservation and Study of Documents concerning Recent History (RTsKhIDNI), coll. 2, inv. 1, file 14099, fols. 2–5. 46 Ibid., fols. 5–5ob. 167 Contents
Copyrights ISBN 92-3-103985-7 ESTABLISHMENT OF SOVIET POWER Commissars), the affirmation of the autonomy of the Turkistan Republic, and arrangements for the representation of Turkistan in Moscow, etc. It was basically with such an outline of the nature and powers of the Turkistan Repub- lic that the national communists defended its future development within the framework of Russia, building mutual relations with the centre on the basis of a single, large-scale state union of peoples linked historically in an ethnic, territorial, economic, spiritual and material community. However, this did not suit the leadership of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party ( Bolsheviks). Among the wide range of solutions pro- posed during the decision-making process on Turkistan, the main idea was that of dividing Turkistan along ethnic lines put forward by the Turkistan Commission as early as Janu- ary 1920. Clearly, it was only the fear of boosting the national insurgent movement which accounts for a certain restraint on the part of the Central Committee of the Russian Com- munist Party (Bolsheviks) regarding the time-frames for the implementation of these ideas. In the four resolutions adopted on Turkistan matters on 29 June 1920 at the meet- ing of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bol- sheviks), subsequently known under the collective title of ‘On the principal tasks of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) in Turkistan’, a special task was entrusted to the Turkistan Central Executive Committee: ‘to proceed to reorganize the administrative dis- tricts of Turkistan in accordance with their ethnic composition.’ 47 Among the primary tasks of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) in Turkistan were the normalization of rela- tions between the settler population and the indigenous peoples rooted in former tsarist policies in Turkistan, and the elimination of the patriarchal-feudal heritage. At the same time, attention was drawn to the need to maintain in Turkistan a permanent representation of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, the Council of People’s Commissars of the RSFSR and the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks); fur- thermore, the competence was defined of the federal authorities and organs of state power in Turkistan, etc. The political processes governing the social life of the country and the never-ending squabbles between competing groups in the administrative apparatus took place against the background of the ongoing civil war, which rendered them especially acute. Thanks to the victory of the Soviet armed forces over Kolchak, and the ensuing creation from the various liberated military units of the Turkistan Front under the command of M. Frunze, which undertook military operations all over Turkistan, it became possible fairly rapidly to liquidate the Transcaspian Front (February 1920) and the Semirechye Front (April 1920). 47 Russian Centre for the Conservation and Study of Documents concerning Recent History (RTsKhIDNI), coll. 79, inv. 1, file 158, unnumbered sheet. 168
Contents Copyrights ISBN 92-3-103985-7 ESTABLISHMENT OF SOVIET POWER However, the Basmachi movement in the Ferghana valley remained for many years a key element of the armed opposition in the country. One of the leaders of the movement, Madaminbek, appealed to the commander of the Soviet troops in the Ferghana valley in 1919:
You have proclaimed a federation; you have proclaimed the self-determination of peoples; so why do you not grant it to us? Is it only because we are Muslims? Allow us to live as we wish, in accordance with your own slogans; allow us to choose the kind of government we wish, because there are more of us Muslims. . . . 48 Launched with the slogans ‘Turkistan for the Turkistanis’ and ‘Freedom for Turkistan’, as the movement developed, it drew to its ranks not only fervent advocates of independence for Turkistan, but also the broad masses of the population, who were unhappy with the unpopular ‘socialist’ policies: the closure of mosques and madrasas, the prohibition of
(Islamic judge) courts, the nationalization of all industrial enterprises down to craft workshops, the introduction of a bread monopoly and the requisitioning of farm produce, the activities of the food rationing detachments, the closure of the bazaars, the prohibition of free trade, etc. With strong support among the population, the movement included not only individuals from the more affluent sections of society – merchants, beys (dignitaries) and clerics –, but also rural dwellers and artisans. It was they, according to one of the leaders of the Turkistan Republic, who were the mainstay of the movement, which also included numerous representatives of the Jadid intelligentsia and members of secret Jadid organizations, such as the Ittih¯ad-i Taraqqi (1918–19), Milli Ittih¯ad (National Association, 1920–4) and the underground society Turkist¯an Milli Birligi (Turkistan National Union), created with the active participation of the celebrated social activist Ahmad Zeki Velidi. 49 All this explains why, following the failures of the Soviet armed forces on the Ferghana Front, Frunze was forced to admit that their opponents ‘were not mere brigands – had they been, . . . we would have finished with them long ago’. 50 From the very beginning, the insurgency was a mass movement, involving during certain periods in the years 1918–20 as many as 60,000 individuals. In these years, the insurgents had major successes in their military operations: at some times they had nearly the entire Ferghana valley under their control, with the exception of a few towns and railway stations. An important event was the establishment in October 1919, under the leadership of the commander of the Ferghana valley insurgency, Madaminbek, of the Fargh¯ana Muwaqqat Mukht¯ariyat Huk¯umati (Fer- ghana Provisional Autonomous Government), which represented the true objectives of the movement. 48 Russian State Military Archive (RGVA), coll. 28113, inv. 1, file 1, fol. 1. 49 Turkistan v nachale XX veka . . . ,
2000 , pp. 183–8. 50
, 1941 , p. 308. 169
Contents Copyrights ISBN 92-3-103985-7 ESTABLISHMENT OF SOVIET POWER From the death of Madaminbek in spring 1920 until the end of 1922, the leader of the insurgents was Qurb¯ashi (commander) Sher Muhammad Bek (known in Soviet sources as Kurshermat), elected at a qurultay (assembly). Under his leadership in May 1920, the Turk-
(Turkistan-Turkic Independent Islamic Republic) was established, which adopted a provisional constitution in April 1922. The government of Sher Muhammad Bek and the leaders of the Turkist¯an Milli Birligi at this time exerted particular efforts to unite the movement. However, in late 1922, having come under heavy pressure from the Soviet armed forces, the situation of the insurgency took a sharp turn for the worse, and Sher Muhammad Bek decided to dissolve the government and flee abroad. In 1923–4 the separatist tendencies within the movement became stronger. In the course of the fighting in 1924, the lack of contact and coordination between the various qurb¯ashis was soon felt in the fighting potential of the movement. Soviet armed forces in Ferghana, whose fighting strength continued to grow thanks to troop reinforcements from central Russia, doggedly squeezed the insurgents out of the positions they had conquered. The national military opposition suffered a defeat. 51 However, the defeat was only temporary; the insurgency movement continued on into the years 1925–35. The fighting in the Ferghana valley was bitter, with each of the warring sides experi- encing its share of terror and violence, and the civilian population caught between the two. The endless requisitioning of food, livestock and horses, the hunger, the sacrifices during the military operations, etc. all gave rise to countless losses in the human and productive resources of the region. Between 1918 and 1924 in the Ferghana valley, 1 million people died of starvation and no fewer than 500,000 died in the fighting. 52 The peoples of the Bukhara emirate and the Khiva khanate experienced no less dramatic and tragic events. In both places, following the October 1917 coup and the establishment of Soviet power in Russia and Turkistan, the internal and external political situation changed abruptly. The hostile attitude to the Bolsheviks, the refusal to recognize the Bolshevik government of Turkistan, and the overt endeavours of the ruling circles of the khanates to establish and maintain diplomatic relations with Afghanistan, Iran and Britain were all clear signals regarding their external political orientation. Relations between Russia, Soviet Turkistan and the Central Asian khanates began to take on a distinctly confrontational hue. The existence of an undeclared war with neighbouring states was a major irritant to the leaders of the Turkistan Commission and the Turkistan Front, who were increasingly inclined to the use of force in order to resolve the conflict. Prominent in their tactics was 51 Rajabov,
1995 , pp. 28–9. 52 Ibid., p. 19. 170 Contents
Copyrights ISBN 92-3-103985-7 ESTABLISHMENT OF SOVIET POWER the practice of inciting opposition forces in the khanates to use armed struggle against the ruling regimes. Within a comparatively short space of time, it proved possible to bring together all the opposition forces of the Khiva khanate: the Khiva Communists, the Young Khivans and the leaders of the principal Turkmen tribes in competition with Junaid 53 – Goch Mamed Khan and Ghulam ‘Ali Khan – and to create in November 1919 at Tortkul the Khivan Revolu- tionary Centre, which initiated the uprising in Khiva. On the orders of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Turkistan Republic, on the pretext of ‘providing assistance to the workers of Khiva in liberating themselves from the arbitrary rule of Junaid’, military units from the specially created Amu Darya Army Group immediately entered Khivan territory. Between late December 1919 and early January 1920, Soviet troops moving in from the north and south successfully occupied the strategic points of the khanate: on 20 January, Takhta, Junaid’s general headquarters, was taken (Junaid disappeared into the desert with a small detachment), and on 1 February the troops entered Khiva. On the following day, the khan of Khiva abdicated. Concealing the role of Soviet military expansionism in overthrowing the political regime of a neighbouring state, the leaders of the Turkistan Commission and the Turkistan Front hastened to depict the events in Khiva as a revolutionary uprising, a popular revolution. Convened on 26 April 1920, the First All-Khwarazm Qurultay of People’s Representa- tives declared the Khiva khanate dissolved and proclaimed the Khwarazm People’s Soviet Republic, reviving the ancient name of the region: Khwarazm. The provisional constitu- tion adopted at the qurultay noted the anti-monarchist, anti-feudal and popular-democratic character of the coup and the new regime installed thereby. While this constitution bor- rowed the form of government from the RSFSR, with its soviets and typical structure, these soviets were supposed to express not the dictatorship of the proletariat, but rather the dictatorship of the people. 54 The qurultay formed the government of the republic – the Soviet of People’s N¯azirs (inspectors, administrators). The leader of the Young Khivans, Pahlawan Niyaz Yusupov, was elected as chairman, the Young Khivan, Jum‘a Niyaz Sul- tan Muradov, and the chief of one of the Turkmen clans, Goch Mamed Khan Sapiyev, as vice-chairmen. On 13 September 1920 a treaty of alliance was concluded between the RSFSR and the Khwarazm People’s Soviet Republic, according to which Russia unconditionally recog- nized the ‘full independence of the Khwarazm People’s Soviet Republic, with all the 53 In January 1918 the khan of Khiva, Asfandiyar Khan, feeling that his grip on power was weak, invited Junaid Khan to Khiva and conferred full powers on him, appointing him commander-in-chief of the army. 54
, 1976
, pp. 41–6. 171
Contents Copyrights ISBN 92-3-103985-7 ESTABLISHMENT OF SOVIET POWER consequences deriving from such recognition’. However, with the military-political and economic agreements concluded alongside the treaty of alliance, the Khwarazm People’s Soviet Republic found itself once again fully dependent on Russia. 55 Events in the Bukhara emirate unfolded according to a similar scenario to that in Khiva. In a series of special directives issued on 10 August 1920, the Politburo of the Central Com- mittee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks), under pressure from the workers of the Turkistan Commission and the Turkistan Front, unambiguously foresaw the possibility of a similar course of events in Bukhara: 4. Launching an offensive on our own initiative instead of adopting preparatory measures for defence may only be carried out with the help of a more or less popular Bukhara revolutionary centre (albeit on our territory) urging us to launch such an offensive. . . . 56 The leadership of the Turkistan Commission and the Turkistan Front interpreted the directives of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) as a spur to action. As early as 3 August 1920, the Turkistan Commission held a meeting at which it managed to organize the Bukhara Communists and the Young Bukharan Revo- lutionary Organization into a bloc, on condition that the members of the latter agreed to ‘join the Communist Party officially, the very first day after the coup in Bukhara’. For the management of the ‘revolutionary’ events, a party centre was set up, consisting of one member of the Turkistan Commission, V. Kuibyshev, the chairman of the Central Bureau of the Young Bukharan Revolutionaries, Faizullah Khojayev, and the chairman of the Bukha- ran Communist Party, N. Husainov. On 28 August the party centre moved from Tashkent to New Bukhara. The following day, in Old Charju, the Bukharan Communist Volunteer Unit staged a parade – immediately proclaimed an uprising by the working masses, and the beginning of the revolution – and an appeal for assistance was sent to the Turkistan Commission. The Turkistan Front troops were by then already mobilized and ready for battle. Most of the offensive groups had been ordered to occupy their designated positions, and to begin active operations on the night of 28–29 August. The use of heavy armaments predetermined the outcome of the operation. On 2 September 1920 the Turkistan Front troops and the Bukharan Volunteer Units entered Bukhara. The emir left Bukhara with his troops. 57 On 14 September 1920 the All-Bukharan Revolutionary Committee was established, with ‘Abd al-Qadir Muhitdinov as its chairman. Also created was the new government – the 55
, 1976
, pp. 56–64. 56
, 1941
, p. 328. 57 Practically at the same time as the former emir, in 1920–1, more than 200,000 refugees, or about one- fourth of the population of eastern Bukhara, left the southern regions of what is now Tajikistan (Abdullayev, 1991
, p. 191). 172
Contents Copyrights ISBN 92-3-103985-7 ESTABLISHMENT OF SOVIET POWER Soviet of People’s N¯azirs, to which Faizullah Khojayev was appointed chairman. Both the All-Bukharan Revolutionary Committee and the government were composed essentially of communists. By that time the Young Bukharan Revolutionary Party had dissolved itself. The All-Bukharan Qurultay of People’s Representatives held on 6–8 October 1920 proclaimed the Bukharan People’s Soviet Republic. Under the treaty of alliance signed on 4 March 1921 between the RSFSR and the Bukharan People’s Soviet Republic, Rus- sia unconditionally recognized the independence of the Bukharan Republic. However, the adopted principles of economic cooperation, as in the case of the Khivan Republic, further increased the dependence of Bukhara on Russia. 58 The coups in Bukhara and Khwarazm constituted a practical implementation of the Bolshevik idea of ‘world revolution’. In pursuit of this aim, the Bolsheviks did not refrain from armed aggression against the sovereign states of Khiva and Bukhara, on the pretext of providing assistance to the ‘people in uprising’, a situation that they had themselves organized. In response to the coups in Bukhara and Khiva and their occupation by Soviet armed forces, armed liberation movements arose immediately. Their popular and ubiquitous nature bore witness to the hostility of the peoples of these countries to the new regimes. This strug- gle continued on into the 1930s, but was at its most widespread and intransigent during the initial period of 1920–4. One of the constant demands put forward by the insurgents was the immediate withdrawal of Soviet armed forces from the territories of those countries. At times, the insurgents managed to control almost the whole territory of western Bukhara (late 1921) and eastern Bukhara (late winter–early spring 1922); the capitals of the two states were subjected to prolonged sieges, which were accompanied by hard and bloody fighting in Bukhara (March 1922) and Khiva (January 1924). Only by increasing the strength of its forces was the leadership of the Turkistan Front able to dampen the ardour of the insurgency. According to Western sovietologists, in spring–autumn 1923, the Soviet command fielded against the insurgents in the Bukharan Republic a large contingent numbering, according to some estimates, as many as 100,000 troops. Even so, it proved impossible to crush the liberation struggle completely for many years. The glorious pages of that movement’s history were written by its leaders, who were devoted to the ideas of freedom and independence, and endeavoured to consolidate the insurgent forces and lead their military operations: Ibrahim Bek Laqay, Mulla ‘Abd al-Qahhar and the celebrated Turkish activist Enver Pasha in Bukhara, and Junaid Khan in Khwarazm. 58
. . . , Vol. 2, 1921 , pp. 5, 12–14. 173 Contents
Copyrights ISBN 92-3-103985-7 ESTABLISHMENT OF SOVIET POWER The undiminished popular opposition in Turkistan, Bukhara and Khwarazm grew into a broad liberation movement in defence of the sovereignty of those peoples’ states, way of life and faith, which the Bolsheviks, in view of the changes they had wrought in those countries, clearly intended to obliterate. Following the well-known decisions on Turkistan taken by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bol- sheviks) in June 1920, the state apparatus of Turkistan had come completely under the control of the central authorities. As early as July 1920, the Turkistan Commission found it necessary to reform the Regional Committee of the Communist Party of Turkistan, and to establish, pending the convening of the Fifth Congress, a Provisional Central Committee of the Communist Party of Turkistan. At the same time, a decision was taken to renew the membership of the Presidium of the Turkistan Central Executive Committee. The renewed central organs refused to admit as members Ryskulov and his supporters, who backed the idea of a Turkistan Republic. Under the slogan, ‘Only a successful struggle against Pan- Islamism and Pan-Turkism’, campaigns were undertaken in Turkistan to purge the party- state apparatus at all levels, update the lists of party members, and re-elect local soviets. The entire party-state apparatus was thus renewed. Under the slogan, ‘There is no single Turkic language, just as there is no single Turkic culture,’ a campaign was unleashed against Islam and Islamic institutions as the principal bearers of the cultural heritage of the East. In 1920 party resolutions were adopted for the closure of the legal courts of q¯az¯ıs and beys, and the expropriation of waqf (religious endowment) lands. In 1922, owing to the strengthening of the insurgency, the Bolsheviks were obliged to make a number of what they called ‘political concessions’, among which it was felt necessary to re-establish the Islamic courts and return the waqf lands to the Muslim communities; as early as March 1923, the Seventh Congress of the Communist Party of Turkistan insisted that in no case should such concessions be extended further. 59 The independence of the Khwarazm and Bukharan republics in the early mid-1920s was highly illusory; in practice they had already lost their independence. Almost immediately, the external economic and political functions – the chief attributes of state sovereignty – were removed from them. With the economic union of the three republics of Turkistan, Bukhara and Khwarazm, the creation of the Central Asian Economic Council (1923), the inclusion of the communist parties of Khwarazm and Bukhara within the Russian Com- munist Party ( Bolsheviks) (1922), the creation of the Central Asian Bureau of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) for the unification and coordi- nation of the activities of the communist parties of Turkistan, Bukhara and Khwarazm, monetary unification, the basis of which was the Russian chervonets (10-rouble banknote), 59
, 1987
, p. 213. 174
Contents Copyrights ISBN 92-3-103985-7 ESTABLISHMENT OF SOVIET POWER and various other measures, the political, economic and financial levers of power in these states fell into the hands of the party-state leadership of Russia. With a view to ‘synchronization’ with the more developed regions of Russia, backward Bukhara and Khwarazm were brought into the general process of modernization. This led to an extremely harsh, forcible break-up of traditional structures, causing great suffer- ing among the population. The formal beginning of the socialist stage in the development of Bukhara and Khwarazm came with the resolutions of the legislative organs of these republics. The Ninth All-Khwarazm Congress of Soviets (October 1923) and the Fifth All-Bukharan Congress of Soviets (19 September 1923) proclaimed the trans formation of their republics into socialist republics, which became known as the Khwarazm People’s Socialist Republic and the Bukharan People’s Socialist Republic respectively. In this new situation, the leadership of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) again examined the idea of national-territorial demarcation. On 31 January 1924 the Organiza- tional Bureau of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) entrusted Ya. E. Rudzutak, the secretary of the Central Committee of the Russian Commu- nist Party (Bolsheviks), with the task of carefully examining the question of demarcation of the national-territorial boundaries of the region, and ascertaining the views of the leaders of the three Central Asian republics (Turkistan, Bukhara and Khwarazm) thereon. 60 Thus, the 1920 idea of demarcating the boundaries of the Turkistan Republic, which was part of the RSFSR, turned into a more large-scale proposition – that of drawing the borders not only of the Turkistan Republic, but also the Bukharan Republic and the Khwarazm Republic, which were legally still independent sovereign states. The party leadership of Russia had not the slightest doubt about the correctness of the proposal to draw the borders of the three state entities, which reflected the general ori- entations that had by then clearly emerged among the party leadership at the centre. The representatives of almost all Union Republics came out against these orientations, sharply criticizing them as early as at the first party congress after the formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), the Twelfth Congress of the Russian Communist Party (April 1923). Noting that ‘the construction of the Union had gone down the wrong avenue’, the participants in the debates examined the chief reasons for this, in the light of the grow- ing tendencies for bureaucratic administration, voluntarism and centralism that had become established under the leadership of Stalin and the dictatorship of the Bolsheviks. 61 Given these developments, the position of the Central Committee of the Russian Com- munist Party with regard to the Central Asian region is understandable. It was on its direct 60
, 1967
, p. 726. 61
. . . , 1968
, pp. 295–519, 567–619. 175
Contents Copyrights ISBN 92-3-103985-7 ESTABLISHMENT OF SOVIET POWER orders that the leading party organs of Turkistan, Bukhara and Khwarazm found them- selves involved in implementing the idea that they themselves had put forward for national- territorial demarcation. Much of 1924 was taken up with the drawing of borders, which was carried out from beginning to end by party functionaries of the region, under the leadership of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party and its duly empowered representatives – the members of the Central Asian Bureau of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party, with a complete absence of mechanisms for the expression of the will of the peoples, and without taking into account the views of ethnographers, economists, historians, etc. Only in its final stage was the question of national-territorial demarcation transmitted to the state organs of the republics for ratification. The resolutions of the extraordinary session of the Turkistan Central Executive Com- mittee (15 September 1924), the Fifth All-Bukharan Qurultay of Soviets (20 September 1924) and the Fifth All-Khwarazm Qurultay of Soviets (29 September–5 October 1924), as the supreme governing organs of the republics, all approved the results of the demarca- tion and the creation of the new state entities: the Uzbek and Turkmen Union Republics, which joined the USSR; the Kyrgyz Autonomous Republic within the RSFSR; the Tajik Autonomous Oblast’ within the Uzbek Republic; the Karakalpak Autonomous Oblast’ within the Kazakh ASSR; and finally the transfer of territories inhabited by Kazakhs to the Kazakh ASSR. 62 A little later, the status of the national self-determination of the Tajiks was modified. At a meeting on 4 October 1924, the Uzbek Bureau on National-Territorial Demarcation decided to agree to the decision of the Tajik Commission to establish the Tajik Autonomous Republic, to be part of the Uzbek Union Republic. At the beginning of the second session of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the RSFSR (14 October 1924), and subsequently the second session of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the USSR (27 October 1924), a favourable response was given to the petitions of the extraordinary sessions of the Central Executive Committee of the Turkistan ASSR, the Fifth All-Bukharan and the Fifth All- Khwarazm Qurultays of Soviets for national-territorial demarcation and the formation of new Union Republics, autonomous republics and oblast’s. 63 The Third Congress of Soviets of the USSR (May 1925) responded favourably to the ‘free expression of the will of the peoples’ of the Turkmen and Uzbek Republics to join 62 Central State Archives (TsGA) of the Republic of Uzbekistan, inv. 1, file 139, fols. 25–7; coll. 47, inv. 1, file 563, fols. 7–8; file 32, fol. 32. 63
, 1924
, No. 4, p. 208. 176
Contents Copyrights ISBN 92-3-103985-7 ESTABLISHMENT OF SOVIET POWER the USSR. The national-territorial demarcation and formation of the new state entities was thus completed. However, the process of state-building in the part of Central Asia that was under Russian influence continued. On 1 February 1926 the Presidium of the Central Executive Commit- tee of the RSFSR transformed the Kyrgyz Autonomous Oblast’ into an autonomous repub- lic. On 15 October 1929 a decision was taken to form the Tajik Union Republic. In 1930 the Karakalpak Autonomous Oblast’ was hived off from the Kazakh ASSR and transferred to the Uzbek SSR as an autonomous republic. The 1936 constitution of the USSR enshrined the change in the legal status of the Kazakh and Kyrgyz Autonomous Republics – they became Union Republics of the USSR. 64 The implementation of the idea of demarcation was a fairly ‘successful’ manoeuvre by the Bolsheviks. Above all, a substantial blow had been dealt to the ideology and practice of the national liberation movement. The centre had succeeded in shifting the attention of the peoples of the region from external to internal problems, and this was soon reflected in a decline in the insurgency movement. Most important, by this action the Bolsheviks achieved patent successes in their strategic aims. Above all, by including in the demarca- tion exercise concerning the Turkistan ASSR both the Bukharan and Khwarazm Republics, which were legally speaking independent states, these two ancient states of the region dis- appeared from the political map of the world. Once again, the Bolsheviks demonstrated their loyalty to the imperial policies of tsarism, and its geopolitical claims to the Central Asian region. At the same time, the demarcation exercise and the formation of the new political entities afforded the Bolshevik leadership a welcome propaganda image of social- ist democracy regarding the resolution of the national question in Soviet Central Asia, a matter to which they accorded considerable significance in their utopian hopes for the worldwide triumph of the revolution. For the peoples of Central Asia, the demarcation of borders and the formation of new ‘national states’ imparted fresh nuances to their ongoing development. The thousand- year-long tradition of Central Asian statehood was thus interrupted. Despite the frequent changes of ruling dynasties and the shifting spatio-territorial parameters, the chief com- ponent of this statehood had remained constant: the long-standing multi-ethnic nature of the population, with intermixed patterns of settlement, and the inhabitants’ common eco- nomic, social, religious and cultural attributes. Each ethnic group, occupying its own spe- cific niche, remained a truly equipollent constituent of the community. Now, the formation of Union Republics, autonomous republics and oblast’s introduced a size-based hierarchy of ethnic groups, not only in relation to the status of the political 64
, 2001 , p. 530. 177
Contents Copyrights ISBN 92-3-103985-7 ESTABLISHMENT OF SOVIET POWER entity, but also within that entity: the titular ethnic group, which gave its name to the politi- cal entity, and ‘national minorities’. In this way, portions of the population, who continued to live and work on their ancestral lands, were, according to official definitions, turned into ‘national minorities’. This was bound to affect their self-awareness and give rise to a feeling that their rights had somehow been circumscribed, and this was in turn reflected in the ethno-national processes within the various political entities. The conflictual nature of the situation was exacerbated by the problem of ‘divided ethnic groups’: the new political entities, which brought together the greater part of the ‘titular’ nationality, nevertheless also remained multi-ethnic societies, with an identical set of ethnic groups present in each of them. In essence, the ethno-national processes and relations among the peoples of the region were thus sown with time-bombs, which in emergency situations were likely to explode into all manner of conflicts. Naturally, the process of national statehood-building had diverse consequences, includ- ing both long-term negative phenomena and positive shifts. National-territorial demarca- tion, although carried out ‘from above’, often using voluntarist methods, spurred the con- solidation of the region’s major ethnic groups – the Uzbeks, Kyrgyz, Kazakhs, Turkmens, Tajiks and Karakalpaks – and to a certain extent this fostered the formation and develop- ment of their national self-awareness and their spiritual and linguistic unity. However, the positive potential of the boundary demarcation exercise was seriously limited by the impact of Soviet unitarism, which had by then begun to be felt and had actually been enshrined in the constitution. In accordance with the first constitution of the USSR, adopted in January 1924, many strategically important questions were entrusted to the supreme organs of the USSR: foreign policy and foreign trade, establishment of the foundations and overall development of the economy, a unified monetary and credit system, ship building and production, basic labour laws, general principles in the field of education, use of mineral, forest and water resources in the national territory, management of transport and posts and telegraphs, adoption of the government’s budget, etc. 65 In this connection, it is hardly correct to claim that the new political entities of the region constituted the creation of ‘national statehood’. Given their almost complete absence of sovereignty, these entities were effectively reduced to the level of administrative-economic provinces of the USSR. The constitutionally instituted structures of Soviet power and their plenary powers con- stituted a political extension of the Marxist-Leninist concept of the class-based nature of socialist statehood, with its cornerstone idea of the dictatorship of the working class. Elec- tions to the governing bodies of the country were instituted by the constitution on the basis of indirect and unequal voting rights: five times as many delegates were elected by urban 65
. . . ,
1948 , pp. 367–8. 178 Contents
Copyrights ISBN 92-3-103985-7 ESTABLISHMENT OF SOVIET POWER inhabitants as by rural inhabitants; 66 this was supposed to ensure the ‘leading role of the working class’ in government bodies. Also deprived of voting rights were people who used hired labour or who lived on unearned income, members of the clergy, former policemen, etc. Given that the Central Asian region of the USSR had a predominantly rural population, and that typical local occupations (cotton-growing, livestock-raising) required the use of hired labour, the electoral system introduced by the constitution reduced the representation of the Central Asian peoples in the central power structures of the country. The constitutionally sanctioned non-separation of the legislative, executive and juridi- cal arms of government, the absence of generally recognized checks and balances in the centralized political life, and the fact that the constitution completely ignored the rights and freedoms of the individual all inevitably led to the consolidation of totalitarianism, and consequently of violence, terror and repression, all of which were particularly promi- nent in the 1930s. Thus, within a fairly short space of time, the formal legal status of the national-territorial entities of the region underwent substantial changes. However, with regard to sovereignty, they retained their original status quo, since they continued to remain a part of the political entity known as the USSR, without rights and rigorously subordinate to the central authorities. The usurpation of power by the Bolsheviks and the forcible communist expansion in Central Asia led to the destruction of the political pluralism engendered by the February revolution, and the ideas of democracy and people’s power embodied in the ideology and practice of the liberal democratic Jadid intelligentsia of Turkistan, Kazakhstan, Bukhara and Khwarazm. In their alternative models for the social and political organization of their peoples, those peoples’ specific national traits and their moral and ethical principles and standards were closely linked to the achievements of democracy and global progress. The fact that the Bolsheviks accorded priority to class interests over national interests, ignored the national factor, pursued a policy of forcible Sovietization and imposed a socialist form of statehood on peoples constituted a domination of the majority by a minority, and a denial of the right of peoples to determine their own historical destiny and way of life. 66
. . . , 1948
, p. 369. 179
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