Leonid Zhmud The Origin of the History of Science in Classical Antiquity

Eudemus of Rhodes, 25ff.
142
See below, 232 n. 18.
143
The Magi and Egyptians (fr. 6 Rose = fr. 23 Gigon, with a parallel reference to Eude-
mus), Orpheus (fr.7a Rose = fr.26 Gigon), the Seven Sages (fr.3a–b Rose = fr.28–29
Gigon). Cf. above, 113 n. 154.

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6. Doxography: between systematics and history
153
6. Doxography: between systematics and history
A different lot fell to the principle of
pro¯tos heurete¯s in doxography. It was
predetermined, in many respects, by the purposes of Theophrastus’ work and
the character of his material. Doxography aimed to describe
all the (relevant)
doxai, and not only the true ones. In a word, its subject was the historically re-
corded opinions of physicists. This task dictated another method of arranging
the material, differing from that employed in the history of science. Apart from
the opinions true from the viewpoint of Peripatetic physics, which could be
qualified as discoveries and presented in chronological order, Theophrastus had
to register a great deal of
wrong opinions. In physics, as in medicine, studied by
Meno, firm proofs were often lacking and it was difficult to distinguish true
opinions from false ones. The ideas of an earlier thinker could seem sounder
than those suggested later, so that a ‘progressive’ scheme of things did not al-
ways work. Furthermore, Theophrastus had to deal with many
identical
opinions on the same problem, e.g. whether the cosmos is eternal or not.
144
In
the history of geometry, such a situation was hardly possible: after a theorem
has been proven, one can try for a more elegant or simpler proof, but no one
would simply state
 the same as it regularly happened in physics. Thus, Eude-
mus gives several successive solutions of the problem of doubling the cube,
which from the mathematical point of view are really different. In the history of
astronomy, for any important discovery (e.g. that the moon reflects the sun’s
light or that the angle of the obliquity of ecliptic is equal to 24°), Eudemus ap-
parently registered its immediate author alone, without mentioning all those
who shared this view. Finally, Peripatetic physics covered a much wider range
of problems than any mathematical science: it included matters that concern
physics, astronomy, and meteorology, as well as psychology, physiology, em-
bryology, and even geography (on the Nile’s floods, Aët. IV, 1)
As a result, the number of various
doxai – opposite, similar, or identical –
that were included in the doxography, as well as the number of their authors,
greatly exceeded the relatively limited material that Eudemus had worked on.
Together with the distinctive features of the physical opinions that had to be
fitted to the Procrustean bed of the Peripatetic categories, this factor largely
predetermined the complicated structure of the
Physiko¯n doxai, which com-
bined several principles of arranging material. Some of them were used in the
earliest doxographical accounts, others were developed by Aristotle. Herodo-
tus, as far as we can judge, used the chronological principle,
145
Hippias ar-
144
Aët. II, 4 (eı Áfqarto~ ô kósmo~): Anaximander, Anaximenes, Anaxagoras,
Archelaus, Diogenes, Leucippus: the cosmos is perishable; Xenophanes, Parme-
nides, Melissus: the cosmos is eternal.
145
His doxographical overview of the theories explaining the causes of the Nile’s floods
(II, 20–23) contains the opinions (without mentioning any names) of Thales, Euthy-
menes of Massalia (rendered by Hecataeus), and Anaxagoras. Cf.
FGrHist 1 F 302;
647 F 1, 5 and 2, 1–3 (= Aët. IV,1.1–3); Jacoby, F. Euthymenes von Massalia,
RE 6

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Chapter 4: The historiographical project of the Lyceum
154
ranged the ideas in accordance with their supposed relationship and similarity,
while Gorgias and Isocrates classified the material by the character and/or the
number of the principles admitted by the given philosopher.
146
In
Physics I, 2
Aristotle characterized the Presocratics’ principles according to the scheme
that goes back to Plato’s method of division (diaíresi~): there must be either
one principle or many; if one, it must be either motionless or in motion; if many,
then either limited (two, three, four, etc.) or unlimited plurality; if unlimited,
then either one in kind or different in kind. Since Aristotle cites but a few names
here (Parmenides, Melissus, Democritus), it is obvious that the systematic as-
pect of the doctrine of principles was more interesting to him than the historical
one. In the doxographical section of