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2015 100.00 74.42 61.35 44.96 57.98 59.39 Average … 70.60 57.03 51.85 52.52 55.43 Source: Author’s calculation using ALRI data Table 4.4 shows fee collection rates for the regions for the past decade. Collection rates increased but then plummeted in 2008. Collection rates have steadily increased since then. The data are incomplete for GBAO. On the whole user fee collection rates are higher in DRS than in the other regions of the country. Figure 4.10: Fee collection rates (actual as % of planned fee income) Source: Author’s calculation using ALRI data 0,00 20,00 40,00 60,00 80,00 100,00 120,00 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 DRS Soghd Khatlon (Kulyab) Khatlon (Kurgan) Tajikistan CHAPTER - 4 86 In some areas user fees are paid in kind rather than cash with farmers contributing labor and rather than financial payment. This trend seems to be declining with a growing proportion of user fees paid in cash (Table 4.5). Table 4.6: Proportion (%) of user fees paid in cash GBAO DRS Sughd Khatlon (Kulyab) Khatlon (Kurgan) Tajikistan 2005 … 38.45 55.02 9.77 36.76 42.79 2006 … 56.57 49.52 25.01 42.98 44.67 2007 … 59.64 65.54 29.57 53.25 57.28 2008 … 61.79 67.92 29.57 54.90 58.53 2009 24.61 67.65 48.12 27.22 44.78 47.67 2010 75.88 70.18 53.56 56.82 52.07 55.26 2011 75.88 74.17 59.94 52.87 57.73 60.76 2012 63.48 57.74 61.37 62.38 72.14 65.32 2013 73.97 61.36 59.72 62.94 76.26 66.41 2014 93.51 67.39 60.41 47.93 73.65 65.93 2015 98.41 72.16 62.11 49.65 78.07 69.13 Average 72.25 62.46 58.47 41.25 58.42 57.62 Source: ALRI data Figure 4.12 shows that the proportion of user fees paid in cash has been increasing over the past decade although in DRS it dipped in 2012. Figure 4.11: Proportion of user fees paid in cash Source: Author’s calculation using ALRI data 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 DRS Soghd Khatlon (Kulyab) Khatlon (Kurgan) Tajikistan CHAPTER - 4 87 4.4.5. D EBTS Both debts owed by ALRI and owed to ALRI have been growing over the past decade but they dropped substantially in 2013 (figure 4.13). There have been two debt write offs with the cancellation of debts owed to ALRI by water users and debts owed by ALRI to Barqi Tojik. This amount was US $5.1 mln. in 2009 and US$ 48.2 mln. in 2014 (WB 2015b). However, debts are starting to accumulate again as the chart below shows. Debts in 2015 were over 130 mln. TJS (US$ 16 mln.). Figure 4.12: Total debts owed to and by ALRI (‘KUSD, 2015 prices) Source: Author’s calculation using ALRI data Figure 4.14 below shows the distribution of the debts that ALRI is owed and that it owes. Overall Khatlon (Kurgan) and Sughd account for the majority of ALRI debts. Over the past decade these account for over 70% of the debts both owed to and by ALRI. Figure 4.13: ALRI debts Debts owed to ALRI % Debts owed by ALRI % Source: Author’s calculation using ALRI data - 20 000,00 40 000,00 60 000,00 80 000,00 100 000,00 120 000,00 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Debts owed to ALRI Debts owed by ALRI 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% Khatlon (Kurgan) Khatlon (Kulyab) Soghd DRS GBAO 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% Khatlon (Kurgan) Khatlon (Kulyab) Soghd DRS GBAO CHAPTER - 4 88 The main creditors of ALRI are as follows: 91 1. OSJH Barki Tojik for supply of electricity 2. State Budget for taxes (VAT and others) 3. Social Protection Fund for 25% of salary taxes 4. Personnel for salary Money owed to ALRI is from farmers and water user associations . 4.4.6. T AX Table 4.6 shows ALRI tax obligations since 2007. ALRI has paid just over half of the tax that is due amounting to around 37.5 mln. somoni (US$ 8,3 mln.) over the nine-year period or around US$ 4.7 mln. (at current exchange rate). In addition, the Agency has paid fines and penalties of 7.4 mln. somoni (just under US$ 1 mln.). Table 4.7: ALRI Tax obligations (USD) Year Taxes Fines Penalties Accrued Paid Accrued Paid Accrued Paid 2007 892 372,06 423 941,76 - - 101 212,94 11 065,88 2008 2 077 937,65 816 682,94 - - 259 164,71 6 252,06 2009 1 738 102,93 1 230 568,05 - - 325 328,29 1 398,54 2010 1 267 592,50 916 350,00 45 893,64 - 463 973,18 445 192,05 2011 1 473 482,83 941 023,26 41 803,48 - 319 030,22 21 964,78 2012 1 452 930,21 1 165 732,34 54 885,74 11 295,32 376 264,68 10 583,19 2013 1 820 035,90 1 019 989,71 35 698,45 2 787,49 308 423,58 85 008,29 2014 1 616 829,32 1 102 144,12 49 121,97 913,29 111 941,48 920 832,64 2015 1 290 581,27 659 043,97 13 315,08 37,62 85 653,33 46 861,27 Total 13 629 864,66 8 275 476,15 240 718,36 15 033,72 2 350 992,41 1 549 158,70 Source: ALRI data questionaries’ 4.4.7. C APITAL EXPENDITURE The amount spent on capital expenditure by ALRI was at its highest in 2007 and declined until 2010, increasing again but is now at the same level as it was in 2008 92 (see figure 4.14). Figure 4.14: Total income and capital expenditure (‘KUSD 2015 price) Source: Author’s calculation using ALRI data 91 Information provided by ALRI, April 2016 92 Information provided by ALRI, April 2016 0 10 000 20 000 30 000 40 000 50 000 60 000 70 000 2 0 0 7 2 0 0 8 2 0 0 9 2 0 1 0 2 0 1 1 2 0 1 2 2 0 1 3 2 0 1 4 2 0 1 5 Total income Capital Expenditure CHAPTER - 4 89 The vast majority of CAPEX is devoted to irrigation, accounting for 64% of CAPEX expenditure over the past decade. Land reclamation has accounted for 27% and floods and landslides for 9% since 2006 (figure 4.16). Figure 4.15: Share of Capital Expenditure Source: Author’s calculation using ALRI data CAPEX is predominantly in DRS, Sughd and Kulyab region of Khatlon, which account for over 80% of CAPEX since 2006 (figure 4.17). Figure 4.16: Regional allocation of CAPEX Source: Author’s calculation using ALRI data 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Floods Landslides Land Reclamation Irrigation 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Khatlon (Kurgan) Khatlon (Kulyab) Soghd DRS GBAO CHAPTER - 4 90 4.4.8. ALRI EXPENDITURE The allocation of expenditure across headings has been fairly uniform since 2009 with the vast majority of expenditure allocated to employment costs including wages, social taxes and insurances (figure 4.18). Figure 4.17: ALRI expenditure – share of total Source: Author’s calculation using ALRI data The value of the wage bill has increased by half in real terms since 2009 while the number of employees has fallen from over 10,000 to just under 7,000 suggesting a substantial increase in the real average wage. Table 4.8: Wages (TJS, budget item 2111) 2015 prices Employees Average wage 2009 16,550,644 10,393 1,592 2010 16,576,897 9,350 1,773 2011 17,217,267 8,636 1,994 2012 21,090,078 8,268 2,551 2013 20,169,059 7,825 2,578 2014 24,777,680 7,268 3,409 2015 24,074,335 6,808 3,536 Source: ALRI plan – fact data from ALRI Questionnaires 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Machineries and equipment Repairs, utility bills, fuel, communications, other Wages and social taxes and medical insurance CHAPTER - 4 91 4.5. S UB SECTOR FINDINGS AND FINANCIAL SUSTAINABILITY ANALYSIS The picture emerging from the PER for irrigation indicates that sector revenues have been increasing but they are still far short of those needed to rehabilitate the infrastructure and to ensure financial sustainability of the system. User fees have accounted for the majority of income for ALRI. But receipts have steadily declined since 2008. In 2015, the user fee collection rate was just under 60%. One option to improve the financial sustainability of the sector would be to increase the fee level and / or to increase the collection rate. However, the scope for such measures is limited. There is a high incidence of poverty in rural areas so incomes are limited. In addition, attempting to increase tariffs where service provision is so weak is likely to be met with hostility. Looking at expenditure of ALRI, around 70% is on wages and salaries. It could indicate that the agency is overstaffed. However, staff numbers have fallen substantially since 2009. In view of the weak state of irrigation infrastructure and the need for substantial rehabilitation, the high proportion of income devoted to wage costs may mean that there is insufficient funding to finance investments to maintain infrastructure. Such an interpretation would be consistent with other research cited above that existing financial resources are far from adequate to support continued agricultural investment to maintain rural livelihoods. However, greater attention is needed to rural incomes in determining tariffs for irrigation to consider affordability as high levels of poverty are found in rural areas. Government subsidies are expected to continue to be needed. The sector needs to see substantial performance improvements in agricultural performance and efficiency to boost productivity and incomes 4.6. C ONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS The sector needs substantial investment. Donors have provided extensive support and user fees provide a significant income in the sector. The constant issue of high debts suggests unwillingness or inability to pay a higher tariff. Where service is weak there is likely to be little appetite to pay an increased tariff. Services have to improve with the current fees. Government spending is presumably constrained. Public spending on irrigation is small compared to the level of need. Most funds come from user charges but these are constrained by low farm productivity. Rural water is caught in a downward spiral of poor performance leading to low productivity, which reduces both the ability and the willingness of farmers to pay for water, which in turn reduces the available finance for investment. There is lots of international experience to show that increasing fees without improving services does not succeed. The findings are consistent with those of the review conducted by the World Bank 93 that indicates that until water is available to WUAs in a flexible and reliable manner, WUAs are unlikely to succeed. They cite evidence from other locations such as USA, where water and electricity for irrigation have historically been greatly subsidized in national pumped irrigation schemes. As crop yields have increased water user organizations have become more sophisticated and farmers are able to pay for the complete costs of irrigation. WUAs must be large enough (covering more than 5000ha) and must not exist primarily to collect money. . 93 World Bank (2015) The Costs of Irrigation Inefficiency in Tajikistan CHAPTER - 4 92 Tajikistan provides a sharp illustration of the importance of the water – energy – food nexus. Water is essential for rural livelihoods and energy is vital for irrigation due to the nature of the terrain across the country. Water is a vital input into energy production via hydropower. But erratic energy supplies creating power outages present a major constraint to agricultural production creating unpredictable gaps in water supplies. Failings in service provision caused by electricity outages are likely to lead to lower rural incomes and lower willingness to pay for irrigation services. Improving irrigation is unlikely to come from user fees or government funding. Large-scale investment is needed to kick start irrigation infrastructure. This can only come from development partners. There is a need for massive investment in irrigation and drainage and donors are working on this but also there is a need for investment in the energy sector and power outages are also a reason for low productivity in the sector. Increasing financial resources for infrastructure alone is not going to generate financially sustainable irrigation networks. There needs to be attention to the wider water-energy-food nexus to ensure that the irrigation investments are integrated with the wider socio-economic landscape. In addition, greater attention is needed to the institutional structures of rural water. WUAs are reported to be struggling to become efficient and revenue collection for irrigation relies on these associations. More research is needed to understand the ownership of farm networks and the links between these and the ability to raise revenue from user fees for irrigation to enable the transition to a financially independent sector. CHAPTER - 4 93 CHAPTER - 5 94 5. R EVIEW OF P UBLIC E XPENDITURES IN THE D RINKING W ATER S UB - SECTOR 5.1. O VERVIEW OF SUB - SECTOR OBJECTIVES , POLICIES , PROGRAMS AND AGENCIES After over a decade of institutional reforms, the national policy setting in drinking water/sanitation sub-sector in Tajikistan has been greatly streamlined but remains to be fully implemented. With the adoption of the Government Decree on Water Sector reform program during 2016-2025 in December 2015, it is envisaged that that National Water Council under the Government of Tajikistan would serve as highest level of the vision/policy/strategy body. While details of the Water Council are being worked out within the National Policy Dialogues on Integrated Water Resources Management, Coordination Council on Water and Energy under the Government – minister level inter-ministerial coordinating body 94 - serves this purpose. National Development Strategy (NDS) serves as a key strategy setting document outlining core strategic directions for drinking water sector development. Associated Poverty Reduction Strategies (before 2015) or now Mid-term development program serve as a midterm business plans to implement goals set by the NDS. Important to highlight that the President of Tajikistan has taken personal interest in water and advocated internationally on this topic. In fact, a UN- supported decade “Water for Life” is widely believed to be initiated by Tajikistan. 95 As the decade came to completion in 2015, Tajikistan’s new NDS clearly stated water as one of key priorities for the government through 2030. While no direct reference to drinking water is made in the new NDS, focus is placed on integrated water resource management and developing land and water management systems as priority areas within 2 out of 4 strategic goals: energy security and food security. At the same time, drinking water and sanitation is highlighted in the human capital development block with clear reference to lack of safe and reliable drinking water infrastructure, inequality and access as core problems and activity areas and one of the anticipated results (monitor able) within the NDS. National consultations on Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) highlighted access to clean drinking water and sanitation as one of 10 key priorities 96 . 94 Ministers: Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Economic Development and Trade; Justice; Finance; Energy and Water resources; Industry and New technologies (as needed); Agriculture; State committee on investment and state property management; Chairman: Environmental Protection committee; emergency committee; Barqi Tajik; President of the Academy of Sciences; Director of the Center for Strategic Research; head of legal department, head of industry and energy department, head of international relations, head of agriculture and land use department – all under Executive office of the President; head of water resources department the Ministry of Energy and Water resources). 95 http://waterforlifeconf2015.org/eng/statement-by-the-president-of-the-republic-of-tajikistan-h-e-mr-emomali- rahmon-at-the-high-level-international-conference-on-the-implementation-of-the-international-decade-for-action- water-for-life/ 96 Other priorities include education; health care; good governance; jobs; protection from crime and violence; reliable energy; freedom from discrimination and persecution; improving transport systems and road infrastructure; food security. CHAPTER - 5 95 Box 2. Water: From MDGs to SDG - is Tajikistan fit to meet the challenges? MDGs and progress made in Tajikistan: The global MDG target on drinking water of 90% of population with access to an improved drinking water source was reached by 2010 – 5 years before the target date. The target on sanitation was one of the most lagging among all of the MDG targets globally as only 40 % of the population still used unimproved sanitation facilities in 2015. Discrimination and inequality in access to water and sanitation also remained by the end of the MDG period: in between and within countries, between rich and poor, and between rural and urban areas 97 . Tajikistan is no exception. Though Tajikistan met the MDG drinking water access improvement target, there is a clear urban/rural divide in terms of access, and quality of water and sanitation. Currently, in Tajikistan around 60 % of the population is reported to have access to drinking water (around 95% urban and less than 50% in rural areas). Sanitation covers 23% of the population including only 44% of the urban population and 5% of the rural population have access to safe sanitation. About 30% of the water distribution systems do not function for various reasons, and 40% of the population use water directly from rivers, channels, small irrigation network, other water sources which are considered to be unsafe. Water losses in the drinking water supply systems exceed 20% according to official data while unofficially water losses are estimated to be closer to 40-50%. 98 Irrigation systems are in equally dire conditions. Download 0.75 Mb. Do'stlaringiz bilan baham: |
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