Towards a General Theory of Translational Action : Skopos Theory Explained
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Towards a General Theory of Translational Action Skopos Theory Explained by Katharina Reiss, Hans J Vermeer (z-lib.org) (2)
4.2 The priority of functionality
For example: Central Europe, 21st century. B (male) and C (female) meet at work in the morning. B says to C Good morning!, tipping his hat, smiling. Beautiful day, isn’t it? C returns the greeting. Assumption 1: in the above situation, B must act; he is obliged to ‘behave reasonably in line with the norms’. What is ‘reasonable’ under the given cir- cumstances is determined by the prevailing culture-specific norms (even if they are violated!). The norm prevailing in the example is (we assume) that, on their first meeting of the day, colleagues exchange signs of goodwill, a man taking the initiative with regard to a woman. Assumption 2: B can act by choosing from a limited number of options (B can act verbally or non-verbally in a variety of ways). The number of op- tions depends on his assessment of the situation, on the one hand, and on the purpose of the action, on the other. A parliamentary speech cannot be sung, a marriage announcement would not be in the same format as an obituary. The relation between purpose and form of behaviour is culture-specific. Assumption 3: C must react; by her reaction, she establishes an interaction with B (even ignoring B would be a reaction!). Assumption 4: C can react by choosing from a limited number of options (cf. assumption 2). Norms are accepted because of conventions, i.e. after (explicit or tacit) agreement. Norms can be changed at all levels of society, and they are actually Katharina Reiß and Hans J. Vermeer 87 changed over the course of time (sometimes a reason for ‘intergenerational conflict’). With regard to the acceptance of norms, societies are not one uniform group, i.e. they consist of discrete subgroups. To explain the acceptance (or not) of norms, we shall use the analogy of games and their rules. As a member of a society, each person must play and they can choose a game from among a number of possible games. The rules of the chosen game must be observed as long as the game lasts. The players determine the duration of the game. A chosen game can be abandoned in favour of another one. Acting can be described as re-acting (in the broadest sense) to a given situation. Actions are regarded as recurrent when common features can be observed in situational factors. Norms are rules for recurrent behaviour (act- ing) in specific types of situations. Norms are culture-specific. Therefore, the type of (assumed) situation is a culture-specific constant in acting. In a particular situation, acting is determined by an assessment of the factors of the situation at hand. Acting is regarded as reasonable if a claim can be made that it is appropriate, in line with the norms of the given culture (!) and the situation, by the person who is in a position to make this claim. We shall assume that every person wants to act reasonably (i.e. based on reasonable motivating factors) in a given situation, so that they can claim that their behaviour is appropriate for the situation (these claims need not be expressed, or expressible, in well-formed sentences). Acting is ‘intentional’ or ‘purposeful’ in two ways: it is intended to be appropriate to the situation and it is intended to achieve an aim in a given situation, e.g. to adjust oneself to a situation or to change a situation to mould it to one’s own purpose. Acting may therefore be described as a function of two factors: the assess- ment of a given situation and the intention (or function/purpose of the action) deriving from it: A = f (sit, int) Norms are established at the level of type and not of token. In individual situations, there is usually a choice between a limited number of options (in exceptional cases, the number of options may be 1). There is no strict or pre- dictable sequence of individual utterances for a particular situation, but there is a framework for the sequence of utterance types. Kallmeyer and Schütze (1976: 2) confuse type and token when they claim that there is a fixed sequence of utterances in individual situations. They give the following example: If one person begins a telephone call with the question What are you Download 1.78 Mb. Do'stlaringiz bilan baham: |
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